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Introduction 
The importance of information in the formation process of security prices has a long 
history. The dissemination of information can take on different forms depending on the legal 
constraints. However, in all developed financial markets, financial analysts play a prominent 
role in collecting, analysing and diffusing information. Financial analysts typically supply 
future earnings estimates and stock picking advices in the form of recommendations. Earnings 
estimates are the essential part of security valuation by analysts and investors. They have 
even become an integral part of financial reporting in the financial press. Early research has 
accumulated evidence that these estimates are optimistically biased. More recently, empirical 
studies have found that analysts’ optimistic bias is lessening, that its extent differs across 
analysts, firm characteristics and countries.  
Broadly speaking, this dissertation investigates the determinants of financial analyst 
forecasts bias. In the first essay, I examine the relative accuracy of European financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and its determinants. I show that the results obtained for US 
analysts can not be generalised to European analysts who face a seemingly different job 
market as well as several different institutional and economic environments.  
In the second essay, I investigate the influence of financial analysts’ location on their 
performance. More precisely, I examine the relative performance of local versus foreign 
analysts on Latin American stock markets. I find foreign analysts to be more timely and more 
accurate than their local counterparts. In addition, I document stronger price reactions after 
foreign analysts’ forecast revisions than after those of local analysts. 
The third essay is related to the declining pattern of financial analyst forecast bias. In 
particular, I investigate whether US CEOs compensation arrangements give CEOs incentives 
to manipulate analysts’ expectations downward in order to release earnings that meet or beat 
market estimates. The results confirm this hypothesis. I document a strong link between 
expectations management and the relevant option component of CEO compensation, bonus 
plans, and the percentage of the company’s shares owned by the CEO who manages it. 
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The remainder of this document is structured as follows. In Chapter 1, I describe the 
activity of financial analysts and I review the general properties of analyst forecasts 
highlighted by past empirical studies. In Chapter 2, I review the literature that investigates the 
determinants of financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present the three 
essays of my dissertation. A final conclusion is provided at the end of this document. 
 3
 
Chapter 1: What do financial analysts do? 
In this chapter, I first provide a description of financial analysts’ main activity: 
fundamental or security analysis. A precise description of the security valuation process sheds 
light on the potential factors that may explain the properties of financial analyst forecasts and 
can help the reader to understand the underlying process behind analyst forecasts. 
Furthermore, it underlines the key role played by analysts’ earnings forecasts in the valuation 
process. Second, I describe the general properties of financial analyst earnings forecasts. 
More precisely, I review the literature devoted to financial analysts’ accuracy, with respect to 
time-series models, and rationality. 
1.1 Fundamental analysis 
Analysts produce information that is important for the market. As of today, a large 
fraction of the money invested by institutional and individual investors is still actively 
managed with fundamental analysis acting as the guiding principle of most of the investors. 
The importance of financial analysts’ activity for financial markets has also been 
acknowledged by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in a November 1998 
statement1: “Analysts fulfill an important function by keeping investors informed. They digest 
information from Exchange Act reports and other sources, actively pursuing new company 
information, put it all in the context, and act as a conduits in the flow of information.” In this 
section, I first provide a detailed description of fundamental analysis as well as its uses and 
proceeds. Second, I explain the reasons that motivate research on earnings forecasts and 
describe the two principal bodies of research that investigate their properties. 
                                                          
1 The report of the SEC “Analyzing Analyst Recommendations” is downloadable from: 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm 
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Figure 1.1: Fundamental analysis 
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Figure 1.1 depicts the various steps of fundamental analysis as well as its uses and proceeds. 
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1.1.1 Description 
Fundamental analysis is the principal activity of financial analysts. Figure 1.1 depicts the 
various steps of fundamental analysis as well as its uses and proceeds. Analysts evaluate a 
company’s operations. They use publicly available information, such as past and current 
financial statements, regulatory fillings, information gathered from their own research, their 
own knowledge and expertise as well as from company management, in order to obtain 
earnings and growth prospects at different horizons. A valuation model is used in conjunction 
with these estimates, or numbers directly derived from them, in order to convert the set of 
forecasts into a firm’s intrinsic value. Using the difference between its market and intrinsic 
value, analysts typically assign recommendations (e.g. “buy”, “hold”, “sell”), price targets or 
return forecasts to the firm2.  
The information produced by sell-side analysts, who are employed by broker-dealers, can 
be addressed to internal (e.g. in-house fund managers) or external investors, both institutional 
and individual; and, in some cases, to the bank’s corporate finance department3. Buy-side 
analysts, who typically work for institutional investors, principally produce information for 
internal use. For investor customers, financial analysts’ information serves as a basis for 
investment decisions. Typically, banks do not directly charge external investors for research. 
However, external customers are supposed to direct part of their trades to the bank that 
provides them with investment research. The practice of exchanging research services for 
commissions is referred to as “soft dollar payments”. Analysts’ most important contribution 
for the corporate finance department comes in assisting, in carrying out due diligence 
responsibilities with regard to initial public offerings, private placements, mergers and 
acquisitions, and secondary offerings; see Securities Industry Association (2001). Corporate 
finance clients pay direct fees to the bank for its services. A proportion of these fees is 
                                                          
2 Some empirical evidence are inconsistent with this practice. In particular Cornell (2001) investigates analysts’ 
reactions following the publication of a press release by Intel that leads to a 30% price drop in September 2000. 
He shows that none of the 28 recommendations changes issued by financial analysts was consistent with a 
discounted cash flow valuation. 
3 As underlined in the Securities Industry Association research report published in August 2001: “Analysts’ role 
with regard to corporate financing departments varies widely across firms. Many securities analysts do not due 
diligence in order to further corporate financing objectives. Sometimes those departments have their own 
analysts.” 
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attributed to analysts as compensation for the specific services provided to the corporate 
finance department4.  
1.1.2 Research on fundamental analysis 
There is a huge amount of empirical and theoretical literature on fundamental analysis. 
Almost each stage of the process depicted in Figure 1.1 has given rise to academic research. 
However, a large body of literature focuses on the properties of financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Three reasons can explain the emphasis put on earnings forecasts. First, every 
valuation model5 either directly or indirectly uses earnings forecasts. Second, asset pricing 
and cost-of-capital models generally involve earnings expectation variables for which proxies 
must be provided if these models are to be tested empirically or implemented in practice; see 
Hamon and Jacquillat (1999) and Brav and Lehavy (2003) among others. Third, if analyst 
forecasts measure market expectations, then evidence of excess volatility or irrationality in 
analysts’ expectations may help to explain the excessively volatile asset returns (see Shiller, 
1981) and anomalous market behaviour (see De Bondt et Thaler, 1985, 1990) documented by 
past research.  
As underlined by Kothari (2001), analyst forecast research can be broadly divided in two 
categories. The first examines the properties of analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. 
Consensus forecast can be defined as the mean or median of all outstanding analyst forecasts 
for a particular horizon (quarterly, annual or long term). More precisely, this literature focuses 
on the accuracy and the rationality of financial analyst forecasts. In the following section, I 
review the literature classified in this category.  
The second category focuses on the properties of individual analyst forecasts either cross-
sectionally or temporally. More precisely, this body of literature puts emphasis on the 
determinants of financial forecasts bias as well as on the differences in forecast accuracy 
across analysts, firms, and countries. It will be reviewed in Chapter 2 of this document. As 
noted by Kothari (2001), there is an overlap between these two areas of research. Therefore, 
the conclusions drawn in one area can sometimes by applicable to both. 
                                                          
4 In the U.S., the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibits firms from basing research analysts’ 
compensation upon specific investment banking services transaction since May 2002; see Hensley and Strouse 
(2002). 
5 See Fama and Miller (1972) and Ohlson (1995) among others. 
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This thesis focuses on the factors that influence the properties of financial analyst 
forecasts. Therefore, I restrict my literature review to the two areas of research mentioned 
above. Doing this, I leave aside two important bodies of research related to financial analyst 
forecasts. First, I do not review the literature that examines the investment value of financial 
analyst forecasts (see Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Chan et al., 1996 among others) 
and the investment performance of various valuation models that use financial analyst 
forecasts; see Frankel and Lee (1998), Lee et al. (1999), and Liu and Thomas (2000) among 
others.  
Second, I do not consider the body of research that examines the relationship between 
some properties of analyst forecasts (e.g. dispersion, number of analysts following the firm) 
and a firm’s cost of capital (see Ghyssel and Juergens, 2001; Diether et al., 2002), stock 
return variability (see Ajinkya and Gift, 1985) trading volume (see Ajinkya et al., 1991; 
Bildersse et al., 1996), or stock price informativeness; see Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1995) and Hong et al. (2000).  
1.2 The properties of financial analyst forecasts 
The first objective pursued by early research on financial analyst forecasts is to compare 
the accuracy of the earnings forecasted by analysts with those drawn from various 
econometric models. In other words, these investigations seek to answer the following 
question: “Are financial analysts’ earnings forecasts useful?”. The second objective is to 
examine whether financial analysts are rational. More precisely, these studies examine the 
cross-sectional forecast errors and how available information is integrated in their earnings 
forecasts. Typically, these studies were performed with consensus data on the US market. In 
this section, I first give a brief overview of the main analysts’ data sources available to 
academic researchers. Actually, the characteristics of the data and the evolution of their 
availability through time help to understand how research has developed. Then I review the 
literature devoted to analysts’ accuracy and rationality. Finally, I address the potential 
research design and statistical problems which may question some of the results obtained by 
past research. 
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1.2.1 Data sources 
There are three major providers of financial analyst forecasts. Their main activity is to 
provide investors and academics with earnings per share forecasts (annual and quarterly), 
long term growth forecasts, and recommendations generally collected from brokerage 
institutions that employ sell-side analysts. They typically provide individual as well as 
consensus data. Some years ago, they also began to provide portfolio management tools, 
market or industry-aggregated forecasts, and some other facilities6. The main differences 
between these providers lies in their international coverage, the date of data initiation, and the 
characteristics of the analysts reporting to the institution. 
For the US market, Thomson Financial Corporation’s International Brokerage Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) has been providing monthly consensus data since 1976 and daily individual 
data since 1983. These data initially included earnings per share and long-term growth 
forecasts. Since the takeover of First Call by Thomson Financial, recommendations are also 
available. I/B/E/S initiated international coverage in 1987 for both consensus and individual 
data. As of January 2002, I/B/E/S was providing estimates for more than 13’000 companies in 
59 different countries. 
Zacks Investment Research collects earnings per share forecasts, long-term growth 
forecasts, and recommendations from approximately 250 brokers. The database covers more 
than 6’000 US stocks (including ADR’s) for which consensus and individual data are 
available. Zacks does not provide international data.  
Since the early 1970’s, Value Line provides earnings per share forecasts in the Value 
Line Investment Survey published every Friday. There are more than 2’900 different US 
firms covered by Value Line that accounts for approximately 91 percent of the total market 
value of all securities on CRSP (see Brav and Lehavy, 2003). Stocks are analysed once every 
13 weeks, and their earnings predictions are updated four times a year. Contrary to other 
providers, the analysts that issue the Value Line forecasts are independent analysts. Typically, 
one or two professional analysts follow a given firm. Consequently, Value Line does not issue 
individual analyst data. Besides earnings forecasts, Value Line provides various other 
                                                          
6 For instance, Zacks provides its clients with lists of earnings and sales surprises as well as trading facilities for 
its clients. 
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measures such as price targets and earnings predictability ratings. International companies are 
not covered by Value Line. 
Associés en Finance is the only European company that provides analysts’ data. Associés 
en Finance has provided consensus and individual earnings per share forecasts for the French 
market since 1977. During the 1990s, coverage was extended to include the 1’200 largest 
European quoted companies in terms of market capitalization. Forecasts are collected from 
more than 160 different research departments. Besides earnings per share forecasts, Associés 
en Finance provides an estimate of the Security Market Line for each covered company. 
With the availability of individual data, a large body of research devoted to the properties 
of individual analyst forecasts has emerged. Access to larger international data sets has 
enabled comparisons of analysts’ forecast properties and their determinants across countries.  
1.2.2 Financial analyst forecasts compared to time-series forecasts 
Early research examines whether financial analyst forecasts are a better surrogate for 
market expectations than time-series forecasts. Brown and Rozeff (1978) are the first to 
document superior accuracy on the part of financial analyst forecasts over time-series 
forecasts for quarterly earnings. Fried and Givoly (1982) find that analyst forecasts are more 
accurate than time-series model forecasts and that analyst forecast errors are relatively more 
associated with abnormal stock price movements. The authors attribute the superiority of 
financial analyst forecasts to the broader information set available to analysts and to a timing 
advantage because they issue their forecasts after time-series model forecasts are generated. 
Brown et al. (1987) show that analyst forecasts’ superiority is robust to many factors such as 
forecast horizon and forecast error definition. O’Brien (1988), however, favours the time-
series model in the prediction of quarterly earnings for a 60 days’ trading horizon. Overall, 
despite some conflicting evidence, past studies indicate that analysts outperform econometric 
models in forecasting earnings. 
1.2.3 The rationality of financial analyst forecasts 
A forecast is rational in Muth’s (1961) sense if it contains no systematic errors 
(unbiasedness) and can not be improved by using information available when the forecast was 
made (efficiency). Numerous past academic studies have concluded that analyst forecasts 
 10
contain an optimistic bias. Optimism is inferred form a systematic positive difference between 
the forecast and actual earnings per share. An optimistic bias is documented for US firms by 
Crichfield et al. (1979), Abarbanell (1991), and Lim (2001) among others. The same evidence 
is reported for French companies (see Jacquillat and Grandin, 1994), European companies 
(see Capstaff et al., 2001), as well as emerging market firms; see Chang et al. (2000). Some 
recent research on financial analysts’ forecast bias documents a decrease in analysts’ 
optimism in recent years for US companies; see Brown (1997, 2001a) and Richardson et al. 
(1999). Brown (2001a) attributes the recent decrease in financial analyst forecast error to 
management behaviour. He shows that profit-reporting firms generally meet or slightly beat 
analysts’ estimates, so the forecast error is rarely negative and extreme. Managers of these 
firms succeed in doing so either by issuing pessimistic earnings pre-announcements or by 
managing earnings; see Degeorge et al. (1999). In contrast, when a firm reports a loss, 
managers generally do not attempt to meet or beat analysts’ consensus estimates. They often 
do not tell analysts that they are about to report a loss, sometimes accompanied by a big bath. 
As a result, the expected earnings tend to be greater and extremely high. Richardson et al. 
(1999) find evidence of a switch from upward biased to downward biased annual forecasts as 
the earnings announcement date approaches. They also show that pessimistic analyst forecasts 
are more prevalent for firms with the highest incentives to avoid earnings disappointments. 
Their finding also suggests that the reduction in analyst forecast bias can be partly attributed 
to managerial behaviour. Kothari (2001) argues that the improvement in the quality of the 
data can also give rise to a decrease in financial analyst forecast bias. 
In addition to the clear evidence favouring a systematic bias in analyst forecasts, past 
research results suggest that financial analyst forecasts fail to accurately incorporate new 
information on a timely basis. Several studies document analysts’ tendency to misinterpret 
new information for US firms. These studies typically model the information set available to 
analysts with past earnings and past forecast errors. Lys and Sohn (1990), Ali et al. (1992), 
and Teoh and Wong (1997), suggest that analysts underreact to new information. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1990) find that analysts systematically overreact to new information, whilst 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find that analysts underreact to negative information and 
overreact to positive information. Capstaff et al. (2001) report results that are consistent with 
an overreaction by financial analysts in European countries. Note that the efficiency of 
financial analyst forecasts has been investigated in order to test the rational expectation 
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hypothesis but also to examine whether the post-earnings announcement drift is attributable to 
financial analysts’ underreaction to past information; see Abarbanell and Bernard (1992).  
Overall, results from past research show that financial analysts are irrational. This 
irrationality suggests that analysts fail to appropriately integrate available information (e.g. 
macro-economic prospects) in their forecasts. An other explanation is that their forecasts are 
influenced by non informational factors, such as incentives arising from the market on which 
financial analysts evolve. 
1.2.4 Research design and statistical problems 
Kothari (2001) identifies five potential research design problems that may influence the 
results obtained so far on analyst forecast rationality. First, financial analyst forecast errors 
are highly skewed. Gu and Wu (2003) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find that a small 
number of forecast-error observations disproportionately contributes to the observed bias. 
This high skewness also increases the sensitivity of the results to the treatment of outliers; see 
Kothari et al. (2001). Second, there are differences in the actual earnings that are used to 
compute financial analyst forecast errors; see Phillbrik and Riks (1991). Analysts generally 
provide earnings forecasts that are free of special items and other one-time gains and losses. 
Therefore, earnings forecasts and actual earnings can be different, especially when Compustat 
actual earnings are used. Data providers adjust the actual reported earnings for special items 
and write-offs. However, Kothari (2001) argues that these adjustments are somehow 
subjective and may contribute to the observed bias and noise in financial analyst forecasts. 
Third, the decline observed in the size of the bias during recent years may not be due to 
managerial behaviour but to the improvement of the coverage of firms in the databases. 
Fourth, Kothari (2001) suspects the existence of survival biases in the data. He argues that 
this bias may arise because some firms go bankrupt but mostly because of mergers and 
acquisitions. Finally, the practice of mixing stale and recent forecasts in order to compute 
consensus estimates may contribute to the optimistic bias documented in past research. If 
analysts’ proclivity to revise forecasts decreases for firms that perform poorly (e.g. firms that 
report poor quarterly earnings), using stale forecasts may generate an optimistic bias.  
Keane and Runkle (1998) demonstrate the importance of statistical inference and data 
selection in testing the rationality of financial analyst forecasts. They use a Generalized 
Method of Moments regression methodology where they model the correlation of analyst 
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forecast errors across firms and industries in a given period. In addition, they eliminate 
observations with important asset write-downs. Their results fail to reject the hypothesis of 
analysts’ rationality.  
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Chapter 2: The determinants of financial analysts’ forecast bias 
In addition to the forecast bias documented in the literature reviewed in the previous 
chapter, there are two additional findings that are important to mention in order to understand 
the development of research conducted on financial analysts. First, some analysts present 
superior forecasting ability than others; see Stickel (1992) and Sinha et al. (1997) among 
others. This finding has important practical implications for investors who generally receive 
information from multiple different investment research providers. Second, the characteristics 
of financial analyst forecasts differ across countries; see Chang et al. (2000) and Capstaff et 
al. (2001). Starting from there, subsequent literature puts emphasis on three different issues:  
1. What are the determinants of financial analysts’ cross-sectional forecast accuracy? 
2. What are the explanatory factors of financial analysts’ relative forecasting 
performance? 
3. What are the country-variables that contribute to explain international differences 
in analyst forecasts properties? 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature that seeks to answer these 
questions. The literature reviewed in Section 1 investigates the relationship between analyst 
forecasts and the macroeconomic situation. Section 2 is devoted to the research that examines 
the impact of institutional factors on financial analysts’ activity. Differences in these factors 
at the firm-level contribute to explain differences in analyst forecast accuracy across firms 
(see Brown, 1997) whereas differences at the country-level provide a potential explanation for 
the international differences in financial analyst forecast properties. In Section 3, I review the 
literature relating the conflicts of interests arising from the multiple use of research and from 
the reliance of analysts on corporate management information. These agency problems entail 
optimism in analyst forecasts as well as differences in the relative performance of financial 
analysts. Finally, in Section 4, I review the recent body that examines the relationship 
between analysts’ activity and their career concerns. Results drawn from this literature are 
important in order to understand the incentives faced by analysts and their tendency to herd. I 
do not review empirical studies that investigate the impact of analyst portfolio complexity and 
available resources on forecast-error properties. These investigations will be reviewed in 
details in Chapter 3 of this document. 
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2.1 Macroeconomic situation 
As depicted in Figure 1.1, a firm’s prospects are closely tied to those of the broader 
economy. Therefore, a “top-down” analysis of a firm’s prospects must start with the global 
economy. Typically, brokers employ macroeconomists, sometimes called “strategists”, to 
perform this task for a particular country or money zone. Once the prospects of the broad 
economy have been defined, financial analysts consider the implication of the outside 
environment on the industry in which the firm operates. Finally, the analyst has to consider 
the firm’s position within the industry. 
Despite the crucial importance of macroeconomic prospective for industries and firms, 
very little research have attempted either to examine the impact of macroeconomic 
fluctuations on financial analysts’ activity, or to understand how financial analysts are able to 
incorporate macroeconomic fluctuations in their forecasts. Using I/B/E/S aggregated one-year 
earnings per share forecasts for the S&P 500 index, Chopra (1998) shows that analyst forecast 
errors are the most important when the business cycle is reversing. The same is true for 
financial analyst forecast dispersion. He concludes that the worst economic environment for 
analyst forecasts is that of an accelerating or decelerating economy. Richardson et al. (1999) 
investigate the behaviour of US individual analyst one-year earnings forecasts during booms 
and recession periods. They show that analysts are more pessimistic during boom years and 
overestimate earnings during recession years. Analysts have a tendency to underestimate 
earnings in boom years and to overestimate earnings in recession years. Consistent with the 
view that some industries are more sensitive to the business cycle than others, Brown (1997) 
shows that financial analyst forecast error differs by industry. He reports a very low forecast 
error for firms operating in the food and kindred products industry, which is a defensive 
industry. On the other hand, he reports a very high forecast error for firms operating in the oil 
and gas industry.  
Guay et al. (2003) investigate how financial analysts incorporate macroeconomic shocks 
affecting individual companies into their earnings forecasts. They use three different 
macroeconomic risk variables: the absolute change in the level of interest rate, the absolute 
change in the level of foreign exchange rate, and the absolute level of the change in 
commodity prices. They show that analysts encounter difficulties incorporating 
macroeconomic shocks into their expectations. However, analysts are able to resolve part of 
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the uncertainty created by the shocks. They attribute their finding either to analysts having 
incomplete information about corporate macroeconomic exposure or to analysts’ failure to 
utilize available information about corporate risk exposure. A third reason could be that 
analysts face incentives that prevent them from incorporating appropriate economic 
information into their forecasts. Krische and Lee (2000) investigate the relation between 
analyst stock recommendations and several variables that have predictive power for stock 
returns. They find that analysts generally pay little attention to the predictive attributes of 
these variables.  
2.2 Institutional factors 
Institutional factors characterize the informational environment in which the firm evolves. 
Broadly speaking, these factors will influence the quality and quantity of information 
available to the analysts (supply side of information) as well as the demand of information on 
the part of investors. There are two reasons why institutional factors play an important role in 
the investigation of financial analyst forecast properties. First, as the major determinant of a 
firm’s information environment, they will influence financial analyst forecast accuracy. Their 
influence will be either direct, through the quality and quantity of information available to the 
analysts, or indirect through their impact on the properties of reported earnings. Second, 
differences in institutional factors across countries may explain part of the documented 
differences in financial analyst forecasts’ properties reported by international studies; see 
Higgins (1998), Chang et al. (2000), and Capstaff et al. (2001).  
In this section, I give a description of the main institutional factors that affect a firm’s 
informational environment and I describe their impact on this environment. Then, I review the 
literature that investigates the impact of these factors on earnings’ properties. Finally, I 
review the studies that examine the direct influence of institutional factors on financial 
analyst accuracy. I do not review the body of research that investigates the influence of 
institutional factors on the market demand for information (see Lang et Lundholm, 1993; 
Lang et al., 2002 among others) nor do I review the branch of research that studies their 
impact on firms’ cost of capital and value; see Miller (1999) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
among others.  
2.2.1 Institutional factors and the corporate informational environment 
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Three categories of institutional factors can be distinguished. First the factors related to 
the firm’s reporting requirements. In particular, the characteristics and the flexibility of the 
accounting standards adopted by the company. The flexibility of the accounting standards 
determines the extent of reporting choices available to managers. According to Nobes and 
Parker (1998), management’s degree of discretion entails differences in the format of 
financial statements, accounting principles, and disclosure level.  
Second, the investor protection rules and the extent of their enforcement affect corporate 
policy choices; see La Porta et al. (2000). In our framework, they influence managers’ 
reporting decisions. The threat of shareholder litigation affects the adequacy and timeliness of 
management’s disclosures (see Skinner, 1994; Miller and Piotroski, 2000 among others). The 
strength of enforcement of the investor protection rules particularly influences the extent to 
which firms conform to the accounting regulations; see O’Brien (1998).  
Third, the type of ownership structure influences the firm’s informational environment. 
Perotti and Von Thadden (2003) develop a theoretical model that highlights the impact of the 
ownership structure on the information diffusion. They show that lender-dominated firms 
discourage informative prices. In contrast, firms dominated by shareholders encourage greater 
price informativeness. In other words, firms with concentrated ownership have a poorer 
information environment: They disclose less to the market in order to protect their vested 
interests and they attract less private information acquisition.  
2.2.2 Institutional factors and the properties of accounting earnings 
Institutional factors alter corporate reported economic performance as well as the 
relationship between economic income (stock price changes) and accounting earnings. 
Research investigating the link between institutional factors and accounting choices has either 
followed a firm-level approach or a country-level approach. 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) argue that a firm’s accounting environment influences the 
extent to which companies engage in systematic forms of earnings management. Earnings 
management activities contribute to systematic errors in analyst forecasts. They show that the 
cross-sectional optimistic bias documented by past research is attributable to a relatively 
small number of observations. These observations result from extreme decreasing income 
strategies (big baths) on the part of firms that are not able to meet some specified earnings 
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targets. The accounting reserves created by these decreasing income strategies will enable 
firms to reach relevant earnings targets in subsequent periods. Abarbanell and Lehavy’s 
(2003) results are consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) 
who show that firms pursue specific earnings threshold strategies. Leuz et al. (2003) provide 
comparative evidence on corporate earnings management across thirty one countries. They 
report systematic differences on the level of earnings management across countries. Their 
analysis suggests that insider economies, with concentrated ownership, weak investor-
protection countries and small stock markets exhibit higher levels of earnings management 
than outsider countries with relatively dispersed ownership, strong investor protection and 
large stock markets. They conclude that there is an important link between investor protection 
and the quality of accounting earnings reported to market participants. Zimmermann and 
Gontcharov (2003) investigate the influence of accounting standards on earnings management 
for German firms. More precisely, they examine whether the level of earnings management 
differs between German firms presenting consolidated accounts under German-GAAP, IAS or 
US-GAAP. They find significant lower level of earnings management for firms reporting 
under US-GAAP. The manipulations under German-GAAP and IAS are shown to be the 
same.  
Capstaff et al. (2001) argue that the level of association between stock returns and 
accounting earnings may influence the incentives that financial analysts have in order to 
produce accurate earnings forecasts. Indeed, the potential usefulness of accurate earnings 
forecasts as inputs for valuation models depends heavily on the return-earnings relation or the 
earnings response coefficients. Alford et al. (1993) compare the informational content and 
timeliness of accounting earnings in several countries using the U.S. as a benchmark. Their 
results reveal significant differences in the timeliness and informational content of accounting 
earnings across countries. Accounting earnings from Australia, France, Netherlands and U.K. 
are more timely than US accounting earnings. On the other hand, annual accounting earnings 
from Denmark, Germany, Singapore, and Sweden reflect less timely or less value-relevant 
information than US accounting earnings. Similarly, Ball et al. (2000) show that accounting 
incomes in common-law countries are significantly more timely than in code-law countries. 
2.2.3 Institutional factors and financial analyst accuracy 
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Several research investigate the (direct) impact of institutional factors on the properties of 
financial analyst forecasts. A few of them are conducted on a country-level. For instance, 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find a positive (negative) relationship between the quality of US 
firms’ disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy (dispersion). Most of the research in this area 
tries to relate the differences in analyst forecast accuracy across countries with international 
differences in institutional factors. Examples of such investigations are Chang et al. (2000), 
and Hope (2003). Chang et al. (2000) report strong positive (negative) correlations between 
financial analysts’ accuracy (dispersion) and the quality of accounting disclosures as well. In 
addition, they find that forecast error is much lower in the countries with English legal code. 
Hope (2003) focuses on the influence of accounting-related institutional factors on financial 
analyst forecasts. Investigating the properties of analyst accuracy in nineteen different 
countries, he finds the annual report disclosure and the extent of accounting standards 
enforcement to be positively (negatively) correlated with forecast accuracy (dispersion). On 
the other hand, the degree of flexibility of accounting standards is found to be negatively 
(positively) associated with forecast accuracy (dispersion). Lang et al. (2003) investigate the 
impact of increased disclosure requirements on analysts’ accuracy for non-US firms that are 
listed on US exchanges as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). They report that non-US 
firms that are listed as ADRs display increased forecast accuracy than other non-US firms.  
Overall, past research reports a positive (negative) relationship between the richness of a 
firm’s informational environment and analyst accuracy (dispersion). This body of research 
also suggests that international differences in analyst forecast accuracy can be partly 
attributed to differences in institutional factors across countries. 
2.3 Conflicts of interest faced by financial analysts 
In their 2001 Investor Alert “Analyst Recommendations”, the SEC’s office of Investor 
Education and Assistance warns investors about the potential conflicts of interest faced by 
financial analysts: “While analysts provide an important source of information in today’s 
market, investors should understand the potential conflicts of interest analysts may face. For 
example, some analysts work for firms that underwrite or own stocks in the companies they 
cover – either directly or indirectly, such as through employee stock-purchase pools in which 
they and their colleagues participate”. The same report identifies six factors that may 
influence analysts’ independence and objectivity. These factors can be broadly categorized in 
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four different issues: (1) corporate financing business conflicts, (2) pressure from the 
management of the companies the analyst covers, (3) internal pressure to increase brokerage 
commissions, and (4) conflicts created by analyst’s ownership interest in the companies. 
In this section, I give a brief explanation of each of these issues and review the relevant 
existing academic literature associated with them. The academic literature related to conflict 
of interests focuses on the US market. As of today, there is no existing research that formally 
documents the existence of conflict of interests on other stock markets7. I do not review the 
regulatory measures that have been taken by the legislator to address these problems, nor their 
impact on financial analysts’ activity. I let the reader refer either to Hensley and Strouse 
(2002) for a summary of the proposed rules aimed at solving conflicts of interest in the 
investment research business, or to Boni and Womack (2002) for a discussion on their 
implications and appropriateness.  
2.3.1 Corporate financing business conflicts 
As depicted in Figure 1.1, analysts may take part in investment banking deals such as 
IPOs and SEOs. As the SEC notes in its report on analysts: “They generally assist the 
investment banking team with due diligence research into the company, participating in 
investor road shows, and helping to shape the deal”. For analysts participating in investment 
banking deals, brokerage houses’ compensation arrangements link (either directly or 
indirectly) analysts’ compensation and bonus to the number of investment banking deals in 
which they take part or to the profitability of the firm’s corporate finance division. This gives 
analysts strong incentives to issue optimistic forecasts since these forecasts help the corporate 
finance division generate business. In particular, optimistic recommendations, before and 
after IPOs, increase the likelihood that the analyst’s bank will be selected as underwriter for 
the IPO or the next security offering. Furthermore, as underlined by Michaely and Womack 
(1999), the underwriter generally initiates coverage for the newly issued securities in the 
aftermarket. It is therefore hardly believable that the underwriter’s analyst will initiate 
coverage with a negative opinion on the newly listed firm’s prospects.  
Empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts working for companies 
whose employer is affiliated with a company through an underwriting relationship issue more 
                                                          
7 This is merely due to the fact that, in other countries, detailed information on IPOs and SEOs has not been 
collected in a public database such as the SDC New Issues Database so far.  
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optimistic forecasts than unaffiliated analysts. Lin and McNichols (1998) show that, around 
SEOs, lead and co-underwriter analyst growth forecasts and recommendations are 
significantly more favourable than those made by unaffiliated analysts. However, they do not 
document a significant difference in earnings forecast accuracy between both groups of 
analysts. In addition, they confirm that analysts, both affiliated and unaffiliated, issue 
optimistic forecasts in the period preceding the equity offering in order to maintain or attract 
investment-banking business. Michaely and Womack (1999) examine recommendations 
disseminated by brokerage houses in the period following IPOs. They report that analysts 
employed by lead underwriter companies issue 50% more “buy” recommendations than do 
analysts from other brokerage firms. Dugar and Nathan (1999) and Dechow et al. (2000) also 
offer empirical evidence consistent with the conflicts of interest hypothesis.  
2.3.2 Pressure from companies’ management 
The success of fundamental analysis highly depends on the accuracy and the timeliness of 
the information available to the analysts. In this environment, corporate management is a key 
source of information for the analysts. As a result, analysts cooperate with firms to gain and 
maintain access to the management. Analysts who do not cooperate, by issuing unfavourable 
forecasts, bear the risk of losing one of their most important information sources. 
Furthermore, investment professionals value the ability of brokerage analysts to arrange 
meetings for them with companies; see Boni and Womack (2001) and Dini (1999).  
Lim (2001) shows that financial analysts rationally issue optimistic forecasts in order to 
improve management access. The extent of the bias is larger for companies presenting greater 
potential information asymmetries (small-size companies and companies with low analyst 
coverage) and for analysts who are more reliant on management access as source of company 
information (e.g. junior analysts). This finding appears inconsistent with recent evidence of 
increasingly pessimistic cross-sectional forecast errors attributed to managerial behaviour; see 
Richardson et al. (1999) among others. However, if managers are able to influence analysts so 
that they issue optimistic forecasts, there are strong reasons to believe that they may also be 
able to put pressure on analysts so that they reduce their earnings forecast estimates as the end 
of fiscal year approaches. 
2.3.3 Internal pressure to increase brokerage commissions 
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Analysts derive part of their compensation from the brokerage business they help to 
generate with their research reports. The willingness to generate trading commissions 
provides analysts with incentives to issue optimistic forecasts as “buy” recommendations will 
generate more trading commissions than “sell” recommendations. Indeed, unless the client 
already owns the stock, he will not trade following a “sell” recommendation and only few 
investors are ready or able to sell short. Michaely and Womack (1999) argue that it is difficult 
to define analysts’ precise contribution to trading volume. However, Irvine (2001) provides 
empirical evidence on the relationship between trading volume and analyst coverage on the 
Canadian stock exchange. 
2.3.4 Analysts’ ownership in the companies 
Regarding this issue, the SEC notes “An analyst, other employees, and the firm itself may 
own significant positions in the companies analyst covers. Analysts may also participate in 
employee stock-purchase pools that invest in companies they cover. And in a growing trend 
called venture investing, an analyst’s firm or colleagues may acquire a stake in a start-up by 
obtaining discounted, pre-IPO shares. These practices allow an analyst, the firm he or she 
works for, or both to profit, directly or indirectly, from owning securities in companies the 
analyst covers”. These types of conflicts of interest is probably the one that is the easiest to 
understand. However, this issue remains anecdotal since no formal empirical test has, as yet, 
investigated the consequences of stock ownership on financial analyst forecasts. 
In summary, we see that the multiple uses of research and the importance of information 
obtained from corporate management creates agency problems on the part of financial 
analysts. Crockett et al. (2003) argue that the only solution to these problems is to align 
analysts’ incentives with their compensation. A solution would consist in indexing analysts’ 
compensation arrangements on their forecast accuracy. However, as noted by Crockett et al. 
(2003) this issue is not obvious: “There are divergences between their [analysts’] success at 
picking stocks and correctly forecasting earnings and other fundamentals. During the recent 
boom, some stock prices appeared to move away from fundamentals, burnishing the 
reputation of those who were good stock pickers at the expense of who were more focused on 
fundamentals”. Furthermore, investment banking deals are an important source of financing 
for the research departments whose direct profits are less important and more difficult to 
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measure. In this context, the issue is whether investors would be willing to pay more 
brokerage fees in order to receive independent research. 
2.4 Analysts’ career concerns 
There are two major reasons why analysts’ career concerns have a determinant impact on 
analyst accuracy. First, financial analysts’ accuracy will be influenced by their incentives to 
forecast accurately. These incentives are highly dependent on the relation between analysts’ 
forecasting performance and career concerns such as reputation, compensation, and career 
termination. Different incentives to produce accurate forecasts across international labor 
markets for financial analysts may also cause differences in financial analyst forecast 
accuracy across countries. Second, career concerns such as reputation, have been shown by 
academic theory (see Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994) to influence imitation or 
herding among financial agents. This means, herding among analysts may contribute to the 
optimistic bias documented by past research and to some differences in forecast accuracy 
among analysts. In this section, I review the literature that examines the relationship between 
accuracy and career concerns as well as the literature that investigates the link between 
analysts’ career concerns (reputation) and herd behavior.  
2.4.1 Analysts’ career concerns and forecast accuracy 
An important number of past research investigates whether relative analysts’ accuracy 
improves as analysts age. Examples of such research include Mikhail et al. (1997), Jacob et 
al. (1999), and Clement (1999) for the US market as well as Clement et al. (2000) for a few 
non-US markets. The evidence appears mixed and sensitive to the variable used to measure 
financial analyst experience. However, a majority of the investigations conducted on the US 
market show that relative analysts’ accuracy improves with age; that is, analysts have 
incentives to improve their accuracy during their careers. For non-US markets, a weak or 
insignificant relationship between analysts’ experience and accuracy has been documented. 
Unfortunately, these studies do not consider the nature of the implicit incentives (career 
concerns) faced by security analysts. In other words, they do not investigate why analysts 
may (or may not) have interests to improve their forecast accuracy during their careers.  
 23
Stickel (1992) is the first to document a positive relationship between analysts’ 
performance and career concerns. He finds that Institutional Investor All-American analysts,  
who are typically better compensated than other analysts (see Michaely and Womack, 1999 
among others), provide more accurate earnings forecasts and tend to revise their 
recommendations more frequently than other analysts. Mikhail et al. (1999) document that 
poor relative performance among analysts leads to job turnover. Both studies suggest a 
positive relationship between forecast accuracy and positive career concerns. More recently, 
Hong and Kubik (2003) find that relatively accurate analysts have a greater probability of 
being hired by a prestigious brokerage house (i.e. to get higher compensation) than other 
analysts. Conversely, relatively inaccurate analysts are more likely to move down the 
brokerage house hierarchy. Furthermore, controlling for forecast accuracy, they find that 
analysts who issue relatively optimistic forecasts (forecasts greater than the consensus) are 
more likely to move up the brokerage house hierarchy. They conclude that brokerage houses 
do not only reward accurate forecasts but also relatively optimistic forecasts. This suggests 
that accurate analysts experience favourable job separations outcomes and that, among the 
group of accurate analysts, the more optimistic analysts experience even more favourable 
career-development outcomes.  
2.4.2 Analysts’ career concerns and herding 
Analysts may be influenced by the recommendations of other analysts. The degree to 
which they are influenced may be related to their career concerns. Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) suggest that analysts herd to protect their reputation. Specifically, analysts may herd 
because, at some stages of their careers, it is less costly for their reputation to be wrong when 
other analysts make the same mistake than to be wrong alone. Welch (2000) tests for herding 
in analysts’ recommendations. He detects behaviour consistent with mutual imitation among 
analysts. More precisely, he reports a significant influence of the prevailing consensus on 
subsequent analyst forecasts. This influence is not significantly stronger when the consensus 
turns out to be correct in its prediction of future stock price movements suggesting that 
analysts herd based on little or no information. Even if he does not identify the reasons why 
analysts herd, his results are consistent with reputation-based theories. Hong et al. (2001) are 
the first to investigate whether analysts herd in order to manage their reputation. They find 
younger analysts to herd more (they forecast closer to the consensus) than their older 
counterparts. Older analysts issue more timely forecasts and revise less than younger analysts. 
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They conclude that the young analysts’ need for preserving their reputation leads them to herd 
more than older analysts whose reputation is generally established. Phillips and Zuckermann 
(2001) also provide evidence consistent with theories relating herd behaviour and reputation. 
They find that Institutional Investor All-American analysts issue significantly more “sell” 
recommendations than other analysts. Cooper et al. (2001) report significant differences in the 
accuracy of lead analysts (timely analysts) and follower analysts (who are suspected to herd). 
They find that lead analysts provide less accurate forecasts than follower analysts. They 
conclude that lead analysts trade timeliness against accuracy. However, the stock price 
reaction following analyst forecast revisions is significantly higher for lead analysts than for 
followers ones. Their results suggest that herding influences the relative accuracy of financial 
analysts as well as the relative informativeness of their revisions. 
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Chapter 3: The characteristics of individual analyst forecasts in Europe 
3.1 Introduction 
Financial analysts, the bull market heroes, are now the principal targets for criticism. The 
implosion of the “technological bubble” and scandals such as Enron have led to increased 
attention on analysts practices by the press, regulators and even analysts’ employers. 
Analysts’ tendency to issue over-optimistic forecasts in order to attract investment banking 
business (see Michaely and Womack, 1999) or to maintain good relationship with firms’ 
management (see Lim, 2001) are two stylised facts that have already been documented by 
academic research. Beside this, the closer examination of analysts’ practices raised even more 
crucial questions for investors and banks: Are financial analysts really competent?8 And, if 
they are, what factors drive the performance of financial analysts?  
Results from the existing literature on financial analysts show that some of them are 
better than the others; (see Stickel, 1992, and Sinha et al., 1997 among others). Moreover, 
differences in analysts’ performance have been shown to be partly explained by factors such 
as analysts' experience, portfolio complexity and resources. 
Although extensive research has been made in the United States, work on 
analysts' forecasts in Europe is in a more nascent stage. There are at least three reasons why 
the characteristics of earnings' forecasts for European companies are worth to be more deeply 
analysed. First, not much is known about the way the European labour market for financial 
analysis works. More precisely, one does not know how financial analysts’ compensation is 
related to the quality of their output (e.g. earnings forecasts or recommendations). In the U.S., 
analysts’ compensation is generally related to the investment banking deals (mainly IPOs) to 
which they take part and to their external reputation. External reputation is influenced by 
annual polls such as the Institutional Investor’s All-American Research Team poll (see 
Stickel, 1992). Since two of the most important criteria to obtain a high ranking in these polls 
are the perceived quality of earnings forecasts and stock-picking ability, US analysts have 
strong incentives to produce accurate earnings forecasts. In Europe, the IPO activity is lower 
                                                          
8 For example, in an article entitled “Analysts, even worse than weatherfrogs”, the German magazine “Der 
Spiegel” compares financial analysts’ accuracy to the accuracy of weather forecasts made by frogs (see Spiegel 
Online, 2000). 
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than in the U.S. Therefore, the information generated by analysts is delivered mainly to the 
bank’s investing customers. As research reports and recommendations are usually provided 
free to investor clients, analysts’ activity generate little direct profit. Consequently, analysts’ 
compensation is lower9. External reputation is also less important for analysts in Europe than 
in the U.S. Analyst rankings are in a nascent stage and far less popular than in the U.S10. 
Furthermore, existing rankings tend to focus on sell-side analysts who work for the largest 
Anglo-Saxon investment banks11. Therefore, it is hard to know whether European analysts 
really derive benefits from producing accurate earnings forecasts. 
Second, there are still major differences in accounting practices across European 
countries12 which have two important consequences on European financial analysts’ activity. 
First, as reported by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (1998), this constitutes a major obstacle in 
cross-border equity valuation. European research department being now organised by 
industry, most of the European analysts have to follow companies located in distinct countries 
which report under different accounting rules. Second, as documented by Alford et al. (1993), 
differences in accounting practices lead to differences in the value-relevance and the 
timeliness of earnings across countries. Earnings forecasts are usually used as input for 
valuation models by analysts and investors. Capstaff et al. (2001) argue that if earnings are 
weakly relevant for future returns, analysts may devote only few efforts and resources to 
earnings forecasting. In the same vein, if investors can not use earnings forecasts as a reliable 
input in their valuation models, they may attribute little importance to their accuracy in 
valuing the quality of their research analysts. Overall, the differences in the accounting 
practices under which European companies report may complicate the task of European 
financial analysts and influence the incentives for European financial analysts to produce 
accurate earnings forecasts.  
                                                          
9 Rielle (2001) documents strong differences between remunerations of financial analysts and of portfolio 
managers in favor of portfolio managers. She also reports strong differences in salaries between Swiss and US 
financial analysts. 
10 The first Thomson – Extel ranking was published in 1997 whilst the first Institutional Investor European 
ranking was published in 1998. 
11 This is corroborated by an article in Le Point by Golliau (2000). About existing analysts’ rankings, she writes: 
“Anglo-Saxon rankings have a tendency to select only… Anglo-Saxons”. 
12 European listed companies of the European Union (EU) will have to adopt IAS for their group account by 
2005 due to EU regulation. But, as of today, European companies are still free to report under domestic 
accounting rules.  
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Third, even if there is a trend toward the integration of European markets, stock prices 
still respond predominantly to domestic factors; see Isakov and Sonney (2003) and Baca et al. 
(2000). For U.S. stocks, Guay et al. (2003) show that analysts encounter difficulty 
incorporating the effects of interest rates, foreign exchange and commodity price shocks in 
their estimates. One can suspect that industry-specialised analysts covering stocks across 
different European countries face an even more complicated task. Not only are the economic 
shocks difficult to integrate in their estimates but, to a certain extent, these shocks differ 
across countries.  
This paper seeks to identify the determinants of financial analysts’ forecasts accuracy for 
14 European financial markets. I test whether European financial analysts’ forecast accuracy 
is linked with their experience. I investigate how portfolio complexity affects the forecast 
error of financial analysts in a context of increasing industry specialisation. Finally, I examine 
whether analysts working for prestigious brokerage houses produce more accurate forecasts 
than their peers.  
Important differences are documented with respect to concurrent studies performed on the 
US market. Controlling for firm specific experience, no evidence is found about a learning 
effects in the financial analyst profession in Europe. I observe a negative link between 
forecast accuracy and the degree of international diversification of analysts’ portfolios. This 
suggests that the synergy gains from the industry-structured research departments in Europe 
may be altered by the decrease in forecast accuracy due to increasing country diversification. 
I provide evidence that analysts employed by large brokerage houses covering Europe do not 
produce more accurate forecasts than their peers.  
In a second set of analysis, I test whether there is a relationship between analysts’ 
accuracy and their career prospects. I find that there is a high number of analysts who leave 
the profession each year and that analysts positive career development is not linked with their 
relative forecast accuracy. However, analysts with bad track-records are more likely to leave 
the profession. Thus, one can reasonably conclude that the labour market does not reward 
analysts who produce accurate earnings forecasts.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports the main results from previous 
researches. Section 3 describes the work hypothesis and empirical methodology. Section 4 
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gives a description of the data set. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 
concludes.  
3.2 Prior research 
3.2.1 Differential forecast accuracy among security analysts 
Stickel (1992) shows that Institutional Investor All-American Research Team analysts 
forecast EPS more accurately than non-All-American analysts. Their forecast bias is smaller, 
they produce forecasts more frequently and their forecast revisions have a greater impact on 
security prices. Sinha et al. (1997) document superior performance in subsequent periods for 
analysts who are identified as superior in a previous period. Desai et al. (2000) observe that 
companies recommended by Wall Street Journal All-Star analysts outperform the market. 
They also document a superior forecasting ability for analyst who focus on a single industry. 
Conversely, Jacquillat and Grandin (1994) find no evidence of differential ability among 
research department in France.  
3.2.2 The determinants of financial analysts’ forecast accuracy 
Several factors have been identified as determinants of financial analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Examining quarterly earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, Mikhail et al. 
(1997) show that more experienced analysts issue more accurate forecasts and that stock 
prices react more strongly to their forecast revisions. Clement (1999) documents a positive 
relationship between analysts’ relative forecast accuracy and analysts’ firm-specific and 
general experience. Brokerage houses’ research operation structure and resources are found to 
be related to forecast accuracy. Indeed, the author observes a positive relationship between 
brokerage houses’ size (number of analysts employed) and forecast accuracy. He shows that 
forecast error increases with the number of industries and firms followed by individual 
analysts. Finally, he notes a negative relationship between forecast age and forecast accuracy. 
Brown (2001) reaches the same conclusions. In addition, he confirms the persistence in 
financial analysts’ forecast accuracy; see also Sinha et al. (1997) for previous evidence. Jacob 
et al. (2000) examine the impacts of analysts’ aptitude, learning-by-doing and the internal 
environment of the brokerage house on forecast accuracy. They find that brokerage house’s 
characteristics and analysts’ aptitude are positively correlated with forecast accuracy. 
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However, experience (“learning-by-doing”) is no longer positively correlated with forecast 
accuracy once specific company-analyst alignment has been controlled for. They argue that 
the small but statistically significant learning effect documented by Clement (1999) may 
result from the survival of more clever analysts within the profession or from analysts for 
which the optimal company-alignment has been found. In line with Clement (1999) and 
Brown (2001), they find that the higher the forecast horizon, the less accurate the forecasts 
are. Hong et al. (2000) notice a deterioration of forecast accuracy as financial analysts age. 
Lim (2001) examines the relationship between analysts’ characteristics and the forecast bias. 
He argues that more experienced analysts and analysts employed by large brokerage houses 
need less to cultivate management access. Consistent with this hypothesis, he finds that more 
experienced analysts working for important brokerage houses issue less biased forecasts. On 
the other hand, less experienced analysts issue rationally biased forecasts to gain management 
access and consideration. 
Clement et al. (2000) are the first to investigate the characteristics of financial analysts’ 
relative performance outside the US market. They document important differences between 
Canadian, British, Japanese, German stocks and US ones. Indeed, they show that for Japanese 
and German stocks, after controlling for firm-specific experience, analysts do not produce 
more accurate forecasts as they age. They explain their finding by the fact that the Japanese 
and German societies consider the employer-employee relationship like a family link in 
which employees do not need demonstrate a superior ability to keep their job. However, they 
also fail to find a link between relative accuracy and general experience on the British and 
Canadian markets where the employer-employee relationship is supposed to be closer to the 
US one. Moreover, their approach does not make a clear-cut split between local versus 
foreign analysts. A positive link between the size of the brokerage house and forecast 
accuracy is reported for Canadian and British markets but not for German and Japanese 
markets where analysts employed by large institutions have no advantage relative to their 
peers. They justify this finding by differences in corporate governance procedures between 
common-law countries (Canada and UK) and civil-law countries (Japan and Germany). In 
common-law countries, where equity is more extensively used as a source of capital, financial 
analysts of important brokerage houses have an advantage relative to their peers due to an 
extensive access to private communication with management. On the other hand, in civil-law 
countries, where the reliance to public external capital is more restricted, analysts who work 
for important brokers have less influence on stock prices and, therefore, a limited access to 
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private communication with the management. This explanation neglects the fact that most of 
the big European (and Japanese) banks are universal banks. They may provide corporations 
with less investment banking services but they provide commercial credit facilities and other 
services. As such, they also have a private access to management.  
As shown above, the relationship between financial analysts’ experience and forecast 
accuracy is subject to controversial results and is highly sensitive to the methodology used to 
measure experience. As mentioned in the introduction, previous research shows that the 
findings of similar studies conducted on US stocks cannot be generalized to other countries. 
Although the differences between these markets have been highlighted, no credible 
explanation has been given yet to explain them. The present research is designed to fill, at 
least partly, this gap. 
3.3 Hypotheses and empirical design 
3.3.1 Hypotheses 
• Effects of experience on forecast accuracy 
In agreement with previous research, two measures of experience are retained: company-
specific (task-specific) and general experience. Analysts’ company-specific experience is 
measured by the accumulation of firm-specific skills over time. General experience represents 
the general forecasting skills and knowledge accumulated by analysts through time. 
At least three reasons favour the positive relation between experience and forecast 
accuracy. First, “learning-by-doing” suggests a positive relationship between experience and 
task performance. Financial analysts’ forecasting skills should improve with repetition and 
feedback. As mentioned by Jacob et al. (1999), the more experienced the analysts become, the 
more capable they should be to identify the relevant sources of information and the factors 
that drive a company’s earnings. They must also be able to use their past forecast errors to 
improve their future forecasts.  
Second, Lim (2001) suggests that less experienced analysts are likely to be more reliant 
on management relations than seasoned analysts. As a consequence, they issue more 
optimistic forecasts in order to cultivate management relations.  
 31
Third, if the labour market is efficient, the best performing analysts should be rewarded 
for their efforts and the poorest performer should be forced out of the profession. 
Consequently, one could expect more experienced analysts to be more accurate. Hong and 
Kubik (2003) show that US analysts work in an environment where their forecasting 
performance affects their career prospects.  
Nevertheless, previous research and the context of this study also suggest some reasons to 
believe that analysts’ forecast accuracy may not increase with forecasting experience. A 
primary and necessary condition for analysts to improve their forecasting skills as they age 
(learning effect) is that they devote sufficient effort to forecasting earnings. For this condition 
to be met, at least two requirements have to be satisfied. First, analysts must derive personal 
benefits from producing more accurate forecasts than their peers (see Holmström, 1999). 
Personal benefits can be either monetary or social (e.g. reputation or personal recognition). As 
mentioned in the introduction, little is known about the level of analysts compensation 
packages in the different European countries and about the relationship between their salaries 
and forecast accuracy. The second necessary requirement to motivate analysts to spend time 
and efforts on forecasting earnings is the value relevance of earnings. If earnings are only 
weakly related to future returns their accuracy will not be important in the eyes of investors. 
Consequently, the resources devoted by analysts to forecasting earnings may be less 
important than in the U.S.. Alford et al. (1993) and Ball et al. (2000) underline differences in 
the size of the relationship between security returns and annual earnings across European 
countries13. Therefore, the effort devoted by analysts to forecasting earnings may differ from 
those devoted by U.S. analysts and they may differ across European countries as well.  
• Effects of portfolio complexity on forecast accuracy 
Previous research show a negative association between portfolio complexity and forecast 
accuracy. In single-country studies, the number of companies and industries followed are 
used as proxies for portfolio complexity. Consistent with previous studies, a negative 
relationship between forecast accuracy and these two variables is expected. In this multi-
country framework, the number of different countries for which financial analysts provide 
forecasts is added as a third proxy for portfolio complexity. A negative relationship between 
                                                          
13 In both studies, the correlation between returns and earnings changes appears to be high in France and the 
U.K. and low in Germany. Alford et al. (1993) also document strong correlation in Netherlands whilst for other 
European countries correlations are relatively low. 
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forecast accuracy and the number of countries followed is assumed for two reasons. First, 
despite the increasing importance of industry effects, country effects are still the main 
determinant of stock returns in Europe (see Isakov and Sonney, 2003 and Baca et al., 2000 
among others). This still imperfect market integration in Europe means that, nowadays, 
analysing a Dutch bank still differs from analysing a German one. We conjecture that it may 
prove difficult for an analyst following companies in many European countries to take these 
different country effects into account. As a consequence, its relative performance should 
decrease with the number of countries in which he follows stocks. The recent transition in 
Europe from country to industry organised research departments may exacerbate the influence 
of multiple-country-following on forecast accuracy.  
Second, as outlined by Hope (2003), institutional factors such as disclosure levels, degree 
of accounting standards’ flexibility and degree of accrual accounting vary across European 
countries. Again, these differences, that have been shown to impact forecast accuracy, may 
alter the performance of analysts following companies in multiple countries since it may 
prove difficult for them to get familiar with each different reporting environment.  
• Effects of brokerage house’s size on forecast accuracy 
There are several reasons to believe that analysts employed by prestigious brokerage 
houses should issue more accurate forecasts than their peers. First, large brokerage houses 
have the opportunity to provide their analysts with superior resources, such as information 
tools and administrative support, than medium and small-sized brokerage houses. Second, we 
expect top-tier brokerage houses to have the prestige and financial resources to attract the best 
analysts. Important brokerage houses are ready to pay more to hire influential financial 
analysts. Third, as Hong and Kubik (2003) show, poor performing analysts working for top-
tier brokerage houses are more likely to be penalized by the labour market. Consequently, 
only the best analysts should stay in place in big brokerage houses. Fourth, Phillips and 
Zuckermann (2001) show that analysts who work for prestigious brokerage houses (high-
status analysts) enjoy a greater degree of immunity to pressure than middle status analysts 
(analysts working for less prestigious brokerage houses) who have to cultivate ties with 
corporate executives. Indeed, they show that high-status analysts are more likely to issue 
SELL recommendations than financial analysts who work for less prestigious brokerage 
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houses. Lim (2001) draws the same conclusions for earnings forecasts as he shows that 
analysts who work for big brokerage houses tend to issue less biased earning forecasts.  
3.3.2 Measurement of dependent and independent variables 
The definition of variables are similar to those used in previous research. Therefore, I 
only provide the reader with a short description of each variable and place in brackets the 
study that first suggested it.  
PMAFE  [Clement (1999)]: The ratio of the current year individual analyst’s forecast 
error for a particular firm divided by the mean current-year forecast error of all analysts for 
the firm, minus one. It measures relative forecast accuracy. 
GEXP  [Lim (2001)]: The logarithm of one plus the number of consecutive years (up to 
the current year) during which the analyst has been supplying at least one forecast. It 
measures analysts’ general forecasting skills. 
CEXP  [Lim (2001)]: The logarithm of one plus the number of consecutive years (up to 
the current year) during which the analyst has been supplying at least one forecast for a 
specific firm. It measures company-specific (task-specific) experience14.  
NCOMP  [Clement (1999)]: The number of firms for which the analyst supplied at least 
one forecast during the current year. It measures portfolio complexity.  
NSIC  [Clement (1999)]: The number of two-digit SICs for which the analyst supplied at 
least one forecast during the current year. This variable measures industry specialisation.  
NCOU  [Clement et al. (2000)] : The number of two-digit I/B/E/S country codes for 
which the analyst supplied at least one forecast during the current year. It measures analysts 
portfolio’s geographical diversification.  
10TOP  [Clement (1999)]: A dummy variable set to one if the analyst is employed by a 
firm ranked in the top 10% during the current year and set to zero otherwise. Brokerage 
houses are ranked yearly with respect to the number of analysts employed. In the multiple-
                                                          
14 Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999) measure job and company experience as the number of years (not the 
logarithm of one plus the number of years) for which the analyst has been supplying forecasts to I/B/E/S. Our 
empirical results are not sensitive to the choice operated for this measure.  
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country regressions, TO  is computed by ranking brokerage houses on an European basis 
whereas for the country regression they are ranked on a country basis. It proxies for the 
resources available to the financial analyst.  
10P
1 DCEXP
DNCO
DFAGE
= ⋅
+ ⋅
+ ⋅
FAGE  [Lim (2001)]: The logarithm15 of one plus the fraction of year separating the 
current-year earnings forecast made by the analyst on a specific firm from the end of fiscal 
year. The variable controls for forecasts’ staleness. 
3.3.3 Estimation methodology 
The methodology described in Baltagi (2002, pp. 12-15) is applied to control for firm and 
year effects. Differences across firms and years can be captured by regressing each 
observation on the dependent variables and a dummy variable for each firm-year observation. 
Doing this, we control for any difference in the difficulty of forecasting earnings among firms 
and for changes that may affect analysts’ forecasting task over time (e.g. changes in forecast 
technology over time). This methodology is equivalent to estimating the model with all 
variables adjusted by their related firm-year means. Due to the size of the sample, I use the 
latter approach. The estimated model is the following: 
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4 , , 5 , , 6
7 , , , ,
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i j t i j t i j t i j t
i j t i t t i j t
i j t i j t
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β β β
β β β
β ε
+ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅
+
   (1) 
with all variables firm-year mean adjusted (D stands for cross-sectionally centered). I do 
not include a constant term since the respective means have been subtracted from each 
variable. A positive (negative) value for the centered variable means that the forecast error or 
characteristic of analyst i for stock j is above (below) average on year t.  
                                                          
15 Using a linear relationship between forecast age and relative forecast error in the regressions yields to the 
same result.  
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3.4 Sample selection 
The individual analysts’ forecasts are provided by Institutional Broker Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). The Detail History File for European markets covers the period from 1987 to 1999. 
Since forecasts for 1987 are scarce, the sample is restricted to the 1988-1999 period. Ranked 
by the number of individual analyst’s forecasts, I include the 14 major European markets: 
France, United-Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Ireland and Austria. The Detail History tape also contains a 
Broker - Analyst file in which each individual analyst and broker is identified by a personal 
code valid all through the period. Thus, the analyst can still be tracked as she moves to 
another brokerage company. I also use the realised yearly EPS provided with the database16. 
The initial sample contains all individual analyst forecasts17 issued between 1988 and 1999 
for the above mentioned countries. Consistent with previous research, I apply the following 
filters to this initial sample:  
1. Each forecast must be issued between the end of previous fiscal year and the current 
fiscal year end.18 
2. The last forecast issued by each analyst for a given firm a given year is taken into 
account. 
3. Analysts who appear in the database in the two initial years (1988 and 1989) are 
dropped from the database as well as all forecasts issued in 1988 and 1989.  
4. The company for which the forecast is issued must be followed by at least three 
analysts. 
5. Realised Earning Per Share has to be listed in the I/B/E/S Actual File. 
The first requirement attempts to limit the impact of expectation management by 
companies’ executives on our empirical results. Recent research show that managers have an 
                                                          
16 Actual File lists historical reported earnings. These are entered into the database on the same basis as analyst’s 
forecasts. 
17 It is impossible to determine the identity or experience of team members’ analysts. However, our empirical 
results are the same if we include teams of analysts in the sample. They are available upon request by the author. 
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increasing tendency to manipulate analysts’ expectations downward as the earning 
announcement date narrows (see, e.g., Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). We use the most recent 
forecasts before the end of current fiscal year to evaluate the analysts because we need a 
common time frame to compare their performance19 (see Crichfield et al., 1978) among 
others. The third filter is attributable to the fact that the I/B/E/S data set is left censored. 
Indeed, it is impossible to compute how much experience analysts who appear in the database 
in 1988 have. The deletion of all forecasts issued during 1988 and 1989 enables the CEXP 
and GEXP to present some variability during the initial year of the final sample (1990). With 
fewer than three forecasts for a company, comparisons may not be meaningful, hence the 
fourth restriction. The final requirement is made to avoid heterogeneous data20.  
As shown in Panel B of Table 3.1, the final sample contains a total of 99'063 forecasts 
provided by 5’605 analysts for 2'812 different companies. The major part of the forecasts 
(89%) is concentrated in the last five years of the period (1995-1999). Panel C of Table 3.1 
shows that more than 40% of the forecasts are produced for French and English companies. 
The smallest countries have few observations during the initial years. The exclusion of 
analysts’ teams produces a strong reduction in the number of observations for the English 
market which is the most important in terms of forecasts number (individual analysts and 
teams undistinguished) in the I/B/E/S European Detail File. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 In Clement (1999), earnings forecasts are required to be issued between the end of previous fiscal year and 30 
days before current fiscal year end. An additional proportion of 17.35% of the observations should be excluded 
by applying this more restrictive criteria. Note that our empirical results are insensitive to this restriction. 
19 Note that the obtained results are not sensitive to the chosen cut-off date. 
20 Earnings per share provided in the I/B/E/S Actual File differ slightly from the reported earnings per share, in 
the sense that some one-time items such as write-offs are excluded from the I/B/E/S numbers. Liu and Thomas 
(2000) show that the deletion of some one-time items in actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S increases the 
value-relevance of earnings relative to reported earnings taken from Compustat. 
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Table 3.1: Sample statistics 
     
 No. Forecasts No. Analysts No. Brokers No. Firms 
     
     
Panel A: Number of observations lost due to data filtering 
     
     
Initial sample of annual earnings 
forecasts 343'553 6'167 374 5'310
Lost observations due to:   
- Imposing 365 days and 
minimum forecast horizon  80'216 316 10 306
- Taking the last forecast issued 
by each analyst 142'847 0 0 0
-  Controlling for left censoring 5'357 123 8 227
- Requiring a minimum coverage 
of three analysts per year 12'356 100 4 1'896
- Missing fiscal year-end earnings 3'714 23 1 69
     
Final sample 99'063 5'605 351 2'812
     
Panel B: Sample by year  
     
     
1990 703 110 30 193
1991 771 138 31 206
1992 1'525 194 38 334
1993 2'223 357 69 415
1994 5'411 700 114 669
1995 10'791 1'456 168 1'111
1996 15'701 2'113 215 1'556
1997 19'608 2'705 242 1'828
1998 20'840 3'004 253 1'974
1999 21'490 3'481 237 1'936
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
     
 No. Forecasts No. Analysts No. Brokers No. Firms 
Panel C: Sample by country  
     
France 23’872 1’418 102 442
U.K. 19’604 1’465 100 870
Netherlands 10’616 868 92 185
Germany 10’263 1’073 85 231
Sweden 6’037 815 76 181
Spain 5’768 567 75 120
Switzerland 5’476 555 74 156
Italy 4’401 617 84 135
Norway 3’119 511 57 111
Finland 2’945 450 70 104
Denmark 2’838 361 54 106
Belgium 2’790 370 60 82
Ireland 887 141 38 53
Austria 447 126 38 36
     
 
This table summarizes the number of forecasts, analysts, brokers and firms included in the sample during the 
period under review. Panel A presents the number of observations lost due to: maximum and minimum forecast 
horizon requirement; considering only the last forecast issued by each analyst; the deletion of the forecast 
issued by analysts who appear in the database in the two initial years (1988-1989) and the deletion of forecasts 
issued during the 1988-1989 period (left censoring); the elimination of the forecasts issued for companies 
which are followed by less than three analysts during a year; and the deletion of companies for which no fiscal 
year-end earnings data was available in the database. Last row of Panel A reports the total number of forecasts, 
total number of different analysts, brokerage houses and companies appearing in the sample. Panel B details 
the sample by year. No. Forecasts represents the number of annual earnings forecasts made each year. No 
Analyst represents the number of analyst who produced a forecast during the fiscal year t. No Brokers 
represents the number of banks (or brokerage companies) for which analysts work each year. No. Firms is the 
number of firms in the sample. 
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3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
• Raw variables 
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for the raw (non centered) variables21. Similar to the 
US feature, European financial analysts present an optimistic bias. On average, financial 
analysts stay in the sample for about two years (2.34). This is about half of what Hong et al. 
(2000) observe for US financial analysts. Therefore, the turnover in the profession is higher in 
Europe than in the US. On average, European financial analysts follow a stock during 1.75 
years. This is one year less than what Hong et al. (2000) observe for US analysts. The 
turnover in European financial analysts’ stock portfolios is yet also higher than for US 
analysts. This result may be related to the higher turnover in the profession but also to the 
restructuring of European research departments. European financial analysts cover an average 
of 1.5 different countries with some of them (99% percentile of the distribution) providing 
forecasts on seven different countries. On average, brokerage houses employ slightly more 
than ten analysts per year while some of the biggest employ 85 of them. There seems to be 
important discrepancies between the size of the brokerage houses in Europe. On one side, 
there are large brokerage houses that tend to employ many analysts because they do business 
in all types of industries and in all countries. On the other side, there are smaller brokerage 
houses that tend to be more numerous and more regionally focused although they also provide 
a diversified industry and international coverage to their clients. The number and average size 
of brokerage houses are in line with what Hong and Kubik (2003) document for the US, 
suggesting that the size of the financial analysis labour market is almost similar in these two 
regions.  
                                                          
21 The objective is to compare the mean values with those obtained in similar studies conducted on the US 
market. The differenced variables used in the regressions are difficult to interpret since they represent 
differences from their respective means. Descriptive statistics for the differenced variables used in the 
regressions are available upon request by the author. 
 40
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for the raw variables 
        
   Percentile 
        
Variable N Mean 1 25 50 75 99 
        
        
Forecast error (%) 99'063 -2.48 -28.61 -2.79 -0.28 0.28 7.91
Company experience (years) 99'063 1.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00
General experience (years) 14'258 2.34 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 8.00
Number of companies 14'258 6.95 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 31.00
Number of countries 14'258 1.48 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.00
Number of 2 digit codes 14'258 2.36 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 8.00
Forecast age (days) 99'063 105.47 2.00 43.00 85.00 152.00 302.00
Number of analysts by brokerage 
firm 1'420 10.36 1.00 2.00 6.00 11.00 84.81
        
This table shows descriptive statistics for the raw (not demeaned) variables. Forecast error represents the spread between realised 
earning per share for stock j and forecasts forecasted earning per share in year t deflated by the stock price at the end of year t. 
Company experience represents the number of years through year t for which an analyst provides estimates for company j. 
General experience represents the number of year through year t for which an analyst provides at least one forecast to I/B/E/S. 
Number of companies is the number of different firms for which analyst i provides forecasts during year t. Number of countries is 
the number of different countries for which each analyst provides forecasts during year t. Number of 2 digit codes is the number of 
different SICs codes for which each analyst provides forecasts during year t. Forecast age represents the number of days between 
fiscal year end and forecast date for company j in year t. Number of analysts by brokerage firm is the number of analysts employed 
by each brokerage firm during year t.  
All mean values are statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
On average, European financial analysts are following seven companies per year against 
more than nine for their US counterparts. The average number of days separating the last 
forecast from the end of the fiscal year exceeds 100 days; which is surprisingly high. This 
lack of forecasting activity could mirror the low frequency of accounting disclosures in some 
European countries22. Finally, each company is followed by an average of 9.65 analysts each 
year (not shown) and 28% of the analysts are employed by large brokerage houses (not 
shown). In summary, the turnover in the financial analysis labour market in Europe is higher 
than in the US. Though, the structure of the labour market does not seem to be different in 
these two regions. Furthermore, European financial analysts do not revise their forecasts 
frequently during the year. 
                                                          
22 For instance, quarterly accounts are required only in Norway. French companies have to issue quarterly 
revenue statements whereas in other countries half year accounts are issued.  
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Table 3.3: Spearman rank correlation among the regression variables  
                
 DCEXP  
            
   
DGEXP DNCOMP DNCOU DNSIC DTOP10 DFAGE
    
 
PMAFE  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
0.011 *** 0.024 *** -0.014 *** 0.016 *** -0.001 0.009 *** 0.183 *** 
DCEXP 0.615 *** 0.175 *** 0.036 *** 0.123 *** -0.002 0.110 *** 
DGEXP 0.273 *** 0.120 *** 0.196 *** 0.043 *** 0.117 *** 
DNCOMP 0.088 *** 0.687 *** -0.149 *** -0.034 *** 
DNCOU  -0.138 *** 0.313 *** 0.004  
DNSIC  -0.201 *** 0.001  
DTOP10  0.000  
             
 
Table 3.3 presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the differenced variables used in the regressions. PMAFE = difference between the absolute forecast 
error for analyst i for firm j at time t and the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t. DCEXP = the 
number of years (including t) that analyst i supplied a forecast for firm j minus the average number of years analysts following firm j had supplied forecasts. DGEXP = 
number of years (including t) that analyst i appeared in the data set minus the average number of years analysts following firm j at time t appeared in the data set. 
DNCOMP = the number of companies followed by analyst i at time t minus the average number of companies followed by an analyst following firm j at time t. DNCOU 
= the number of different countries for which analyst i provided forecasts during year t minus the average number of countries for which analysts following firm j during 
year t provided forecasts. DNSIC2 = the number of different 2 digit SICs for which analyst i provided forecasts during year t minus the average number of 2 digit SICs 
for which analysts following firm j during year t provided forecasts. DBIG5 = dummy variable with value of 1 (0 otherwise) if analyst works at a brokerage house ranked 
among the top 5% minus the mean value of dummy variable for analysts following firm j at time t. DFAGE = the age of analyst i’s forecast minus the age of the average 
analysts’ forecast following firm j at time t, where age is the difference in days between forecast year end date and estimation date.  
***, **, *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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• Regression variables 
Table 3.3 presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the regression variables. 
It comes out that forecast error is positively correlated with both experience variables 
(DCEXP and DGEXP). Forecast accuracy decreases as the number of companies (DNCOMP) 
and number of countries (DNCOU) increase. There is no statistically significant relationship 
between industry specialisation (DNSIC) and forecast accuracy.  
Surprisingly, a positive relation is found between the size of the brokerage house 
(DTOP10) and forecast error. The lower the number of industries followed, the higher is the 
number of countries. This is consistent with the argument that a higher industry specialisation 
leads to a higher degree of geographical diversification in the portfolio. Analysts employed by 
large brokerage houses tend to follow a smaller number of companies and industries but in a 
higher number of countries. Because some variables present a high degree of correlation, the 
robustness of the regression results has to be carefully checked. 
3.5.2 Analysts’ characteristics and relative forecast bias 
The coefficient estimates for equation (1) are shown in Table 3.4. Since almost 90% of 
the observations are concentrated within the last five years of the sample, only the 1995-1999 
coefficient estimates are reported. The conclusions are only slightly modified after including 
the observations of the first sub-period’s (1990-1994). The results, not presented here, are 
available upon request by the author. 
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports individual annual regressions’ results23. Three out of seven 
variables have coefficients that display the same sign over the whole period. Consistent with 
concurrent research, DFAGE and DNCOU are positive while DCEXP is negative; DFAGE 
being significant each year, DNCOU and DCEXP in three out of five years. Surprisingly, 
DTOP10 and DNSIC display changing signs’ coefficients over the period.  
                                                          
23 The adjusted R-squared are significantly lower than they would be with classical OLS estimation since we 
eliminate a large source of variation by removing firm-year effects. 
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Table 3.4: Relative forecast error and individual analysts’ characteristics 
             
         
Year DCEXP  DGEXP  DNCOMP DNCOU DNSIC DTOP10 DFAGE  Adj. R2 N 
       
             
Panel A: Annual regressions     
             
1995 -2.26   -0.43   -0.24 * 0.84   1.50 ** 9.23 *** 123.54 *** 4.17% 10'791
 -0.84  -0.20  -1.66 1.12 1.98 4.45 19.76  
1996 -4.34 ** -0.72   0.04   1.29 ** 0.61   0.61 *** 4.07 *** 4.74% 15'701
 -2.12  -0.47  0.35 2.45 1.07 2.63 24.16  
1997 -1.84   1.17   0.01   0.19   -0.31   -0.69   50.55 *** 1.76% 19'608
 -1.59  1.16  0.15 0.55 -0.91 -0.67 15.99  
1998 -3.12 *** 0.66   -0.04   0.53 * -0.23   -2.00 ** 65.88 *** 3.20% 20'840
 -2.79  0.62  -0.74 1.72 -0.75 -2.12 21.50  
1999 -4.83 *** 3.54 *** -0.19 * 1.00 ** 0.94 * 1.69   110.47 *** 4.17% 21'490
 -3.25  2.70  -1.83 2.22 1.79 1.34 25.21  
             
             
Panel B: Pooled regressions    
             
             
1995-1999 -3.22 *** 1.19 ** -0.07 * 0.76 *** 0.44 ** 1.63 *** 89.29 *** 3.40% 88'430
 -4.64  1.98  -1.84 3.82 2.08 2.78 47.56  
             
             
Panel C: Fama-McBeth regressions   
             
       
1995-1999 -3.28 *** 0.84   -0.08   0.77 *** 0.50   2.46   94.84 *** 5
 -5.67  1.11  -1.46 4.04 1.44 1.24 6.18  
             
 
Table 3.4 presents the regression coefficients with t-statistics below. In Panel A and B, t-statistics are based on White (1980). The t-statistics 
in panel C are calculated as in Fama and McBeth (1973). Panel A presents results of annual regressions. Panel B presents pooled regression 
coefficients estimated from 1995 to 1999. Panel C presents Fama and McBeth (1973) regression coefficients and t-statistics. All variables 
are defined as in Table 3.3. PMAFE is the independent variable. All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. 
***, **, *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the results of the pooled regressions whilst Panel C reports 
time-series averages and t-statistics of the yearly coefficients computed in the style of Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) 24. Consistent with Hong et al. (2000) and Jacob et al. (1999), no 
learning effect is detected after controlling for company-specific experience (DCEXP). 
Indeed, the coefficient associated with DGEXP is either positive (Panel B) or zero (Panel C). 
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This finding may have three origins. First, as suggested by Capstaff et al. (2001), the low 
value-relevance of earnings in some countries (e.g. Germany and Switzerland) may 
discourage analysts to spend time on earnings forecasting. This argument will be further 
investigated in the next sub-section. Second, the good performing analysts may be 
insufficiently rewarded by the labour market. This issue will be addressed more deeply in 
sub-section 5.4. Finally, the turnover in the profession may be so high that European analysts 
simply do not have time to accumulate significant experience during their careers.  
Contrary to what is expected, portfolio complexity has no influence on the forecast error 
as the coefficient associated with the number of followed firms (DNCOMP) is not significant 
at conventional levels. This result contradicts the US evidence. One explanation could be that 
more skilled analysts are assigned a greater number of companies. As expected, DNCOU is 
positive and significant. This finding denotes two aspects. First, analysts active on many 
European markets still encounter difficulties to integrate the impact of country-factors on 
companies’ earnings. Second, these analysts have difficulties to manage the different 
reporting environments that prevail across European countries. Moreover, the negative impact 
of country-diversification on forecast accuracy increases significantly over the period. Indeed, 
regressing the yearly coefficients associated to DNCOU on a constant term and the logarithm 
of a trend variable gives a positive and statistically significant value (at 1% level) for the 
slope coefficient. As shown in Panel C, there is no relationship between the relative forecast 
error and the number of industries followed by the analysts (DNSIC) once potential yearly 
correlations among residuals have been controlled for. Overall, this result is challenging for 
brokerage houses covering Europe that seek to optimise the structure of their research 
department. Actually, industry-organised research department increases the number of 
covered countries and, hence the forecast error. In this context, one optimal solution could 
consist in keeping a staff of country-specialised analysts in order to support the industry-
specialised ones.  
Forecast error does not decrease with the size of the brokerage house. Panel B reports a 
significant positive relation between forecast error and the size of the brokerage house 
whereas in Panel C no relationship is detected. This result is very different from those 
documented for the US market. Furthermore, it is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
24 The standard error of our pooled regressions’ estimates may be downwardly (upwardly) biased if regressions’ 
residuals are positively (negatively) correlated across years. By using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, we 
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analysts at larger firms have more resources, an easier access to managers’ private 
information and that the largest brokerage houses employ the best analysts. Two explanations 
can be suggested.  
First, the largest investment banks may simply not hire the most accurate analysts. This 
issue is investigated in sub-section 5.4. Second, for marketing reasons, smaller banks must 
provide international research even if they have limited resources to do it. The practical 
evidence suggests that, for international research, they may simply act as buy-side analysts 
and rely on the earnings forecasts provided by the largest banks’ sell-side analysts25. 
Consequently, as suggested by Cooper et al. (2001), looking only at forecast accuracy to 
assess analysts’ relative quality, may not be sufficient to distinguish between the performance 
of both groups of analysts.  
Finally, potential multi-collinearity effects are examined26. For this purpose, I compute 
the variance inflation ratio (see Kennedy, 2000) and arbitrarily remove the variable with the 
highest score. This operation does not change the inferences associated with the explanatory 
variables27. I also remove company experience (DCEXP) from equation (1) since it is highly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
are able to overcome this bias.  
25 This is corroborated by an article in Bilan by Vial (2002). Quoting the CEO of a Swiss private bank where the 
size of the team of analysts was strongly reduced, he writes: “Before, we were covering all markets. But now, 
we provide primary research only for the Swiss market and a limited number of European ones. For the rest, we 
select external research”. 
26 Note that by estimating fixed effects regressions as we do, potential problems due to multi-collinearity are 
already partly addressed (Baltagi, 2002, pp. 5-9). 
27 I also estimate equation (1) using Generalized Method of Moments. The standard errors associated to the 
regression coefficients are only marginally altered by this operation and the conclusions remain the same. 
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correlated with general experience (DGEXP). Again, this operation does not alter our 
conclusions28. 
3.5.3 Country regressions 
In order to check if there are major differences between the determinants of analysts’ 
relative performance across European countries, I estimate equation (1) for each of the 14 
countries of the sample. 
 
                                                          
28 The coefficient associated with DGEXP is negative in three out of five years but its average is not statistically 
significant over the period. 
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Table 3.5: Mean value for the raw variables by country 
                
   
         
Mean
                
Variable France UK Netherlands Germany Sweden Spain Switzerland Italy Norway Finland Denmark Belgium Ireland Austria
                
                
Relative forecast error (%)  -2.14 -0.56 -2.22 -2.24 -0.53          
               
           
                
                
           
              
              
 
-3.77 -0.85 -7.26 -1.55 -2.81 -1.41 -3.94 -34.43 -3.49
Company experience (years) 1.31 1.66 1.80 1.43 1.76 1.85 1.80 1.59 1.74 1.67 1.69 1.70 1.79 1.51
General experience (years)  2.64 2.45 2.58 2.48 2.54 2.57 2.64 2.52 2.38 2.54 2.49 2.42 2.85 2.66
Number of companies 8.63 7.17 9.03 7.50 7.27 8.03 8.49 7.65 7.36 8.17 7.71 8.39 9.61 7.54
Number of countries 2.14 1.80 2.58 2.45 2.67 2.51 2.73 2.78 2.73 2.95 2.76 2.99 2.37 3.64
Number of 2 digit codes  2.47 1.83 2.68 2.28 2.35 2.30 2.27 2.40 2.31 2.71 2.48 2.44 2.31 2.28
Forecast age (days) 98.29 111.61 110.89 86.17 101.83 110.91 99.12 100.63 101.91 102.15 109.72 101.00 125.11 99.79
Number of  analysts by 
brokerage firm 
9.55 10.83 6.14 7.55 6.99 4.96 4.62 4.49 5.22 4.31 3.79 3.46 2.61 2.15
               
This table shows the mean value for the raw (not demeaned) variables for each country. All variables are defined as in Table 3.2.  
All mean values are statistically significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3.5 reports the mean values of the raw regression variables for each country. The 
reported mean values are not homogeneous across European countries. Analysts following 
UK and Swedish shares appear to be the most accurate and those following Irish and German 
shares the least accurate ones29. Portfolio complexity and brokerage house size are negatively 
related to the size of the different stock markets. Analysts covering smaller countries 
generally follow a higher number of companies and a higher number of countries. This is 
consistent with the view that banks in smaller countries employ a smaller number of analysts 
who have to provide global European coverage for their clients. No differences can be noticed 
across countries for analyst’ experience; figures of all countries are smaller than the US ones. 
Analysts following German shares appear to be the most active (the average forecast age 
equals 86 days) whilst those following UK and Dutch shares are the least active ones.  
We run pooled regressions for each separate country separately over the 1995-1999 
period30. The explanatory variables are the same as those used in the multi-country analysis 
excepting the brokerage house’s size dummy variable. It is replaced by a country-based 
measure instead of a Europe-based one. Results for the pooled regressions are presented in 
Table 3.6. Consistent with the multi-country results, the coefficient associated with DFAGE is 
positive and significant for all countries. We report a significant relationship between firm-
specific experience (DCEXP) and forecast error in France and UK as well as a marginally 
significant one for the Netherlands. Knowing that these countries’ earnings display a high 
correlation with future returns, our result suggests that analysts may devote more resources to 
earning forecasting than those active in other countries. Unfortunately, excepting for Ireland, 
general forecasting experience is not significant. The relationship between the number of 
followed companies and relative analysts’ performance is negative and significant for UK and 
Swedish shares whilst it is significantly positive (as expected) for Danish shares only. As 
expected, the signs associated to DNCOU and DNSIC are positive for almost all countries, 
though only marginally or not significant. Differences across countries are noticed for the 
coefficients associated with brokerage house’s size. Analysts following UK, Swedish, Irish, 
                                                          
29 Since I do not attempt to investigate differences in forecast accuracy among countries but rather among 
analysts, I let the reader refer to Hope (2003), Chang et al. (2000) and Basu et al. (1998) who examine several 
variables which be at the origin of differences among countries. 
30 In order to save space, results for Fama and McBeth (1973) regressions are not tabulated. The main 
conclusions remain the same although the statistical significance of the variables is generally weaker. Results are 
available upon request by the author. 
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and Austrian shares employed by large brokerage houses seem to produce more accurate 
forecasts than those employed by small- and medium-sized brokerage houses.  
Table 3.6: Country regressions 
                 
Country DCEXP  DGEXP  DNCOMP DNCOU DNSIC DTOP10  DFAGE  Adj. R2 N 
                 
France  -3.34 *** 0.76   0.08   0.81 ** 0.08   -0.79   85.66 *** 3.05% 20'661
 -2.65  0.66  0.86 2.12 0.19 -0.67  23.41    
UK -9.33 *** 2.75 * -0.28 *** 0.80   0.62   -3.83 *** 105.34 *** 4.14% 18'907
 -5.24  1.89  -2.99 1.59 1.10 -2.98  23.49   
Netherlands -4.07 * 3.27   0.03   1.75 *** 0.20   3.56   96.01 *** 4.10% 8'997
 -1.95  1.63  0.32 2.99 0.36 1.54  16.08    
Germany 0.04   -0.42   -0.29 * 0.86   1.07   2.52   57.58 *** 1.27% 9'159
 0.02  -0.24  -1.86 1.53 1.27 1.06  10.37    
Sweden 1.24  -0.53  -0.56 ** 0.44  2.01 * -10.35 *** 146.27 *** 8.87% 5’389
 0.39  -0.20  -2.04  0.52  1.95  -4.22  18.68  
Spain -2.33  2.44  -0.22  1.78 ** 0.40  0.92  53.62 *** 1.72% 4’859
 -0.89  1.02  -1.18  2.39  0.46  0.35  8.63  
Switzerland -4.17   6.62 ** -0.21   0.82   0.70   3.44   88.38 *** 2.35% 4'691
 -1.21  2.15  -0.72 0.79 0.59 1.20  9.35    
Italy -0.65  -0.08  -0.28 ** -0.16  -0.01  -0.86  20.97 *** 0.29% 3’873
 -0.26  -0.04  -2.02  -0.27  -0.02  -0.34  2.89  
Norway -4.88  3.10  -0.18  1.63  -0.32  1.45  148.15 *** 10.69% 2’799
 -1.13  0.83  -0.47  1.46  -0.23  0.43  15.84  
Finland -2.04  -0.53  0.33  0.40  -0.04  3.62  90.03 *** 5.84% 2’768
 -0.61  -0.18  1.20  0.48  -0.04  1.49  10.55  
Denmark 3.64  1.82  0.42  -0.80  -1.22  -0.04  90.30 *** 3.92% 2’684
 0.93  0.53  1.39  -0.69  -1.08  -0.01  9.47  
Belgium 3.05  1.64  0.01 0.83 0.21 3.08  35.09 *** 0.66% 2’427
 0.81  0.43  0.07 0.88 0.21 0.89  3.54    
Ireland 1.04  -14.67 *** 0.67 0.40 -1.63 -10.05 * 149.60 *** 10.75% 863
 0.16  -2.75  1.37 0.21 -0.91 -1.68  7.36    
Austria -7.11  3.70  -0.19 -0.23 1.04 -13.22 * 63.33 ** 1.63% 381
 -0.68  0.53  -0.12 -0.08 0.32 -1.76  2.56    
 
Table 3.6 presents the regression coefficients with t-statistics below for equation (1). Pooled regression coefficients estimated from 1995 to 1999 
for each separate country. t-statistics are based on White (1980). All variables are defined as in Table 3.3. All coefficients have been multiplied by 
100.  
***, **, *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Overall, our results show that there are some differences throughout countries. Regression 
estimates for U.K. and Ireland present some similarities with those obtained in the U.S. This 
is not surprising since the UK market is the European market which is probably the most 
similar to the US one in terms of corporate governance system, accounting rules and job 
market for financial analysts. The coefficients associated with the size of the brokerage house 
display differences with those obtained in the multi-country regression. However, these 
differences across countries can not be attributed by differences in corporate governance 
procedures as suggested by Clement et al. (2000). U.K. and Ireland are common-law 
countries but Sweden and Austria are code-law ones. Other results are generally close to and 
consistent with the multiple-country results. However, their statistical significance is weak.  
3.5.4 Are accurate forecasters rewarded? 
This subsection addresses to the potential relation between the low effort devoted to 
earnings forecasting and the compensation system of European analysts. In other words, 
similar to Hong and Kubik (2003) for US analysts, I test whether analyst’s career 
development depends on their forecast accuracy. Descriptive statistics about financial 
analysts’ turnover and career developments are commented in order to characterize the 
European labour market for financial analysis. In a second step, I investigate whether this 
market rewards (punishes) very good (bad) performing analysts. Career concerns are 
measured in four ways: (1) The number of analysts who change brokerage house during a 
year, (2) the number of analysts who move from a low-tier brokerage house to a top-tier 
house during a year31, (3) the number of analysts who move from a high status brokerage 
house to a low status one during a year and (4) the number of analysts who move out of the 
profession during a year. The first three measures are taken from Hong and Kubik (2003) 
whilst the fourth one is taken from Hong et al. (2000). Each year, top-tier brokerage houses 
are defined as a the brokerage houses which stand in the top 10% percentile with respect to 
the number of analysts they employ during a year32.  
                                                          
31 As underlined by Hong and Kubik (2003) and Phillips and Zuckermann (2001), there are substantial 
advantages from being hired by an elite brokerage house: wages are substantially higher and analysts’ reputation 
increases due to higher media attention than in lower status houses.  
32 Hong and Kubik (2003) use two additional measures of brokerage house status: the Institutional Investor 
brokerage house yearly ranking and Carter-Manaster measure of investment banking hierarchy. Their results are 
robust to the measure employed. 
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• European financial analysts’ job separation measures 
Table 3.7 shows the movements in the European financial analysts business during the 
1990-1999 period. About 4.14% of the analysts change brokerage houses each year. This is 
less than in the US where Hong and Kubik (2003) document an average of 14.32% per year. 
Only 1.3% of the analysts move to top-tier brokerage houses in a given year and about the 
same proportion move to lower status brokerage houses. This is much lower than for the U.S. 
where 23.73% of analysts move to high-status houses and 25.74% to low-status houses each 
year. These numbers suggest that movements along the brokerage houses hierarchy are much 
lower in Europe than in the U.S. The average number of analysts who leave the profession 
each year exceeds 13% with peaks at over 20% during the most recent years33. This explains 
the low level of experience documented in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.7: Yearly movements of financial analysts 
      
Year N Movements (%) 
Up Movements 
(%) 
Down Movements 
(%) 
Exits 
(%) 
      
      
1990 110 5.45 1.82 1.82 11.82 
1991 139 2.17 0.72 2.17 15.94 
1992 194 2.58 0.00 0.52 13.92 
1993 357 2.24 0.84 0.84 9.24 
1994 700 3.71 0.71 1.29 8.14 
1995 1456 9.75 2.88 2.27 5.36 
1996 2113 8.00 3.60 2.27 11.31 
1997 2705 2.88 1.07 1.00 13.31 
1998 3004 2.93 0.67 0.63 21.60 
1999 3481 1.69 0.52 0.43 22.69 
      
Average  4.14 1.28 1.32 13.33 
 
Table 3.7 presents the percentage of analysts who move each year. N is the total number of analysts who produce a 
forecast during year t. Movements represents the percentage of analysts who changed brokerage house during year t. 
Up Movements represents the percentage of analysts who move from a low-status brokerage house to a high-status 
brokerage house during year t. Down Movements represents the percentage of analysts who move from a high-status 
brokerage house to a low-status brokerage house during year t. Exits represents the percentage of analysts who leave 
the profession during year t. The last row presents the yearly averages.  
 
                                                          
33 Despite the fact that virtually all analysts report to I/B/E/S, I can’t infer with certainty that all analysts who 
stop submitting forecasts to I/B/E/S leave the profession. Some of them may join a team of analysts or cover 
another geographic region. 
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Table 3.8 depicts the relationship between analysts’ movements and their experience. The 
objective is to investigate the relationship between analysts career concerns and experience. 
Consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003), the percentage of analysts who move from low 
status to high status brokerage houses increases as financial analysts become more seasoned. 
The percentage of analysts who move from a top-tier brokerage house to a low-tier house also 
increases with experience but remains very low across all experience years. Analysts are more 
inclined to quit the profession during their four initial years in the business. 
Table 3.8: Financial analysts movements and experience 
      
Experience 
(years) No. Analysts 
Movements 
(%) 
Up Movements 
(%) 
Down Movements 
(%) 
Exits 
(%) 
      
      
1 5'553 2.22 0.77 0.56 13.67 
2 3'633 4.38 1.54 1.27 17.34 
3 2'353 5.44 1.32 1.27 18.40 
4 1'357 5.53 2.06 1.62 14.59 
5 718 6.13 2.23 1.67 12.67 
6 326 7.67 2.76 2.76 15.34 
7 165 5.45 3.64 3.03 9.70 
8 79 8.86 3.80 2.53 22.78 
9 41 4.88 2.44 2.44 9.76 
 
Table 3.8 depicts the percentage of analysts who move during the 1990-1999 sample years with respect to their experience in 
the business. Experience is measured as the number of years through year t for which an analyst provides forecasts to 
I/B/E/S. No. Analysts is the total number of analysts with the corresponding years of experience in our sample. The analysts’ 
job separation measures are defined as in Table 3.7.  
 
• The link between analysts’ track-records and career concerns 
In order to formally test if the labour market rewards analysts for providing accurate 
forecasts, I investigate the relationship between the two job separation measures and forecast 
track-record. For that purpose, the two following probit models are estimated: 
, 21i,t+1 1 i t i,t
i,t
Prob Up Movement + TrackRec Experience
+Control variables
α β β= = ⋅ + ⋅    (2) 
, 21i,t+1 1 i t i,t
i,t
Prob Exit + TrackRec Experience
+Control variables
α β β= = ⋅ + ⋅    (3) 
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where: 
i,t+1Up Movement =
 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if financial analyst i moves 
to a top-tier brokerage house during year t+1 and zero otherwise. 
i,t+1Exit =
 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if financial analyst i leaves 
the profession during year t+1 and zero otherwise. 
,i tTrackRec =
 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if financial analyst i’s 
historical relative forecast error ranks in the top (bottom) 10% 
percentile during year t and zero otherwise. Historical relative 
forecast error is measured for each analyst as the average relative 
forecast error (PMAFE) during the 3 years preceding financial 
analyst i’s movement.34 
i,tExperience =
 
Number of years through t for which analyst i has been supplying at 
least one forecast during a year.  
Following Hong and Kubik (2003), I control for the type and number of firms followed 
by the analyst as well as for year effects. Consequently, three Control Variables are added to 
the regression: (1) the number of firms the analyst follows during the three-year period, (2) 
the average coverage of the portfolio of firms that the analyst follows during the three-year 
period, and (3) year dummies35. In order to calculate each analyst’s historical track-record, the 
sample is restricted to financial analysts with a minimum of 3 years of experience (e.g. an 
analyst’s track-record for 1995 is its average PMFAE computed between 1992 and 1994). 
Therefore, I estimate equation (2) for 4’557 analyst/year units between 1995 and 1999 and 
equation (3) for 3’800 analyst/year units on the same period. 
                                                          
34 Hong and Kubik (2003) also use a relative measure of accuracy in their study. However, they compute the 
average rank (in terms of forecast accuracy) of each analyst over all the shares he follows.  
35 Hong and Kubik (2003) add Brokerage house effects (dummy variable for each brokerage house) as an 
additional control variable. With this additional variable, the variance-covariance matrix is almost singular. For 
the same reason, excepting for year effects, the link between job separation and the control variables is assumed 
to be linear. 
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Rows 1 and 2 of Table 3.9 present the results for equation (2) whereas rows 3 and 4 
exhibit the results for equation (3)36. Coefficients for equation (2) indicate that there is no link 
between financial analysts forecast track record and the probability of being hired by a top-
tier brokerage house. High-status brokerage houses do not seem to value financial analysts’ 
historical track-record when they hire new analysts37. The coefficient associated with 
Experience is significantly different from zero. Consequently, analysts who have been in the 
business for a longer time are more likely to be hired by a top-tier brokerage house albeit no 
link with forecasting skills is established. The second set of results indicate that financial 
analysts who produce bad forecast track-records are significantly more likely to leave the 
profession. Moreover, the probability of leaving the business does not decreases as financial 
analysts become more seasoned.  
Table 3.9: Measuring the link between analysts’ movements and track-record 
          
 Track-Record  
 
 Top 10% Bottom 10% Experience 
 
N 
          
Up Movement -0.07 0.15 *** 3’800 
 0.17 0.03  
  
Exit 0.38 *** -0.02 4’557 
 0.08 0.02  
          
 
Table 3.9 presents results of logistic regressions (3) and (4). Coefficients are estimated from a sample 
of 4’556 analyst/year pairs between 1995 and 1999. Up Movement = 1 if analyst i moves to a top-tier 
brokerage house during year t+1, 0 otherwise. Exit = 1 if analyst i leaves the profession during year 
t+1, 0 otherwise. Top 10% = 1 if financial analyst i historical relative forecast accuracy lies in the top 
10% of the distribution, 0 otherwise. Bottom 10% = 1 if financial analyst i historical relative forecast 
accuracy lies in the bottom 10% of the distribution, 0 otherwise. Historical relative forecast accuracy 
is the mean PMAFE for each analyst computed from year t-2 to t. Experience = number of years 
(including t) that analyst i appeared in the data set. Standard-errors are shown below the coefficients. 
***, **, *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
In summary, only a small number of analysts who start at less prestigious brokerage 
houses are able to move up to prestigious ones. Top-tier brokerage houses do not value the 
track-record that analysts have developed in their previous positions but they consider other 
                                                          
36 In agreement with Hong and Kubik (2003), we have also estimated both equations for other forecast accuracy 
ranks (10-25%, 25-50%, etc.). Our results show that the probability that an analyst leaves the profession 
decreases homogeneously with his forecast accuracy. Inversely, whatever analysts’ forecast accuracy rank used, 
there is no relationship between analysts’ track-record and the probability of being hired by a top-tier brokerage 
house. 
37 Note that, as suggested by an anonymous referee, the small number of analysts who move to higher-status 
brokerage houses each (Up Movement = 1) may impact on the reliability of our results. 
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factors related to financial analysts’ experience (e.g. the network they have built during their 
tenure). Consequently, there is no incentive for financial analysts who seek for positive career 
developments to produce more accurate earnings’ forecasts. This result is consistent with the 
US evidence documented by Hong and Kubik (2003) on their 1996-2000 sub-period. They 
show that accuracy matters less for analysts’ career development over this period. Indeed, 
during the stock mania of the late 1990s, analysts may have faced pressure to promote stocks 
in order to generate underwriting business and trading commissions at the expense of their 
objectivity. The number of analysts who leave the profession each year is very important and 
remains important as financial analysts gain experience. Lower performing analysts are more 
likely to leave the market than better ones.  
Collectively, the findings suggest that the labour market for financial analysis in Europe 
reacts asymmetrically to forecast accuracy. On one hand, it sanctions financial analysts with 
too bad forecast track-records. On the other hand, it does not reward analysts with excellent 
track-records. These results may explain two of the previous findings. First, since analysts 
derive no benefits from forecasting more accurately than their peers, they do not devote much 
effort to earnings forecasting; hence the absence of learning effects. Second, the largest banks 
do not hire the best analysts in terms of forecast accuracy. Consequently, despite the 
additional resources available to them, they do not outperform their colleagues working for 
smaller firms in terms of forecasting accuracy.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the differences in analysts’ forecast accuracy can be 
associated with analysts’ experience, task complexity, and resources availability. It focuses on 
yearly EPS forecasts provided by financial analysts for 2812 different European companies 
between 1990 and 1999. Three main factors drive the relative performance of analysts active 
on European markets. First, the most recent forecasts appear to be the most accurate ones. 
Consequently, investors using consensus forecasts or financial researchers who intend to test 
asset pricing and cost-of-capital models involving earnings expectations variables will get a 
better quality consensus and a better proxy for earnings expectations by giving higher (lower) 
weight to the most recent (oldest) forecasts. Second, the lower the number of countries 
followed by an analyst, the more accurate she is. Therefore, a research department where 
company coverage is organised by industry may actually not be optimal in the European 
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context since synergies gained from covering stocks in the same industry may be more than 
offset by the difficulty to produce forecasts for a portfolio of firms from different countries. 
Finally, a positive relationship is reported between analysts’ relative performance and the 
number of years he follows a firm. However, this result is mainly driven by analysts 
following UK shares suggesting that low effort may be devoted to earnings forecasting in 
countries where earnings display low relevance for stock returns.  
Beside this, this study documents important differences relative to concurrent researches 
that have been performed on the US market. No relationship is found between forecast 
accuracy and the seniority of financial analysts. This result could be attributed to the lack of 
implicit incentives for analysts to produce good forecast track records in Europe during the 
period. No difference is noticed between the relative performance of analysts working for 
large brokerage houses and other analysts. This is not consistent with common wisdom that 
attributes more resources, more private access to management and more ability to the analysts 
who work for the largest banks.  
This study also raises several questions which are worth to be investigated by further 
research. There is a need to investigate the career concerns of European financial analysts in 
more details. More precisely, it would be interesting to examine whether there are other 
factors that impact on European analysts career development and whether these factors differ 
across the European countries. The important turnover detected in the European investment 
research community is an other important source of investigation. Why are European analysts 
moving out of the profession so quickly? A better understanding of the reasons which move 
analysts out of the profession would enable banks to give analysts the right incentives to stay. 
In turn, this would certainly increase the quality of the output produced by European financial 
analysts. Finally, it would be very interesting to complete the kind of investigation presented 
in this paper with additional performance criterion; for instance analysts’ timeliness (see 
Cooper et al., 2001) or price impact of forecast revisions (see Stickel, 1992) 
.
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Chapter 4: Who are the best? Local versus foreign analysts on Latin 
American emerging markets 
(In collaboration with Jean-François Bacmann) 
4.1 Introduction 
Past research suggests that geographic proximity is related to information flow. However, 
the empirical evidence on the impact of geographic proximity on the quality of investors’ 
information is mixed. Brennan and Cao (1997) report that US investors are less informed 
about foreign markets conditions than are local investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) find no 
evidence that foreign investors outperform in Japan. Using US mutual fund holdings, Coval 
and Moskowitz (2001) show that investors located near potential investments have significant 
informational advantages relative to the rest of the market. Choe et al. (2000) show that 
foreign investors on the Korean market are disadvantaged relative to domestic individual 
investors. Inversely, Seasholes (2000) reports that foreigners act like informed traders in 
emerging markets. He finds that foreign investors profits come from trading stocks of large 
firms with low leverage and liquid shares. Similarly, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that 
foreign investors on the Finnish stock market generate superior performance than local 
investors. 
The objective of the present paper is to investigate the relative performance of local and 
foreign analysts on Latin American emerging markets. As such, our research directly 
contributes to the debate on the impact of geographic proximity on the quality of information 
since practical evidence suggests that foreign analysts are more distant from the firms they 
follow than their local counterparts. However, our investigation differs from previous 
research since we do not focus on the relative performance of investors but on the relative 
performance of individuals located at the upstream side of them.  
Ex-ante, it is difficult to foresee which group of analysts is better at analyzing Latin 
American market companies. On one hand, foreign analysts may have superior resources and 
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better international expertise that provide them an advantage on their local counterparts. 
Moreover, being more distant from the analyzed firms, they may be less subject to agency 
problems such as conflict of interest. On the other hand, residence may give local analysts a 
better access to private information. Furthermore, a better knowledge of the institutional 
context in which companies evolve as well as the low cultural, geographical, and lingual 
distance between local analysts and the firms may induce an informational advantage for local 
analysts.  
We measure analysts’ relative performance with three dimensions: (1) forecast timeliness, 
(2) forecast accuracy and (3) impact of forecast revisions on security prices. Latin American 
markets were chosen for three reasons. First, for geographical considerations, Latin American 
markets have always presented a great interest for US institutional investors. As a 
consequence, they create an important demand for financial analysts services on these 
markets. Second, Latin American countries are in the same time zone as the United States. 
Consequently, the information set available to most of the foreign analysts at a given time is 
the same as that available to local analysts. Finally, as underlined by Choe et al. (2002), 
private information is likely to be more important on emerging stock markets than on 
developed ones.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, although local financial analysts appear 
to be more active than foreign ones, there is a strong evidence that analysts who work for 
foreign brokerage houses supply timelier forecasts than their local counterparts. Using 
Cooper, Day and Lewis. (2001, CDL thereafter) leader to follower ratio in order to distinguish 
between timely analysts (leaders) and less timely ones (followers), we detect a greater number 
of leaders among foreign analysts than among local analysts. This finding suggests that local 
analysts have a tendency to revise their earnings forecasts in order to accommodate the 
opinions of foreign analysts.  
Second, we find strong evidence that foreign analysts produce less biased forecasts than 
local analysts. This result holds for almost all Latin American countries and is robust to the 
size of the companies under study. We find that lead analysts, whatever their origin, produce 
more accurate forecasts than other analysts suggesting that leaders have an important 
informational advantage over other analysts.  
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Finally, abnormal returns following earnings forecasts revisions suggest that foreign 
analysts’ revisions impact prices more than local analysts’ revisions. We find that foreign 
financial analysts’ downward revisions have a significant impact on stock returns while local 
analysts’ revisions have no impact on stock returns. This suggests that the market considers 
forecast revisions provided by foreign analysts as more informative than the revisions 
provided by their local counterparts. 
Our paper complements previous research in three ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the importance of geography in economics by showing that location has an 
impact on the quality of the information provided by analysts. If foreign (local) investors rely 
mostly on foreign (local) analysts’ research in order to take their investment decisions, our 
results may explain the superior performance of foreign investors on some markets; see 
Seasholes (2000) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). Second, by showing that analysts’ 
location/affiliation has a significant impact on their forecast accuracy, we contribute to the 
large amount of literature which investigates the origins of financial analysts forecasts’ bias. 
Third, we provide a contribution to the research that investigates agency problems in financial 
analysis; see Michaely and Womack (1999) and Lin and McNichols (1998). If local banks 
have more commercial and investment banking relationship with local companies, the higher 
optimistic bias documented for local analysts may partly be caused by the conflict of interest 
they face. Beside their contribution to past research, our results have an important practical 
implication: Investors should better rely on the research produced by analysts working for 
foreign brokerage houses when they invest in Latin American emerging markets. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the data used in this study; Section 3 
investigates the relative timeliness of financial analysts; Section 4 tests for differences in 
forecast accuracy; Section 5 investigates the impact of forecast revisions on security prices; 
and Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Data and overview statistics 
The analysts’ forecasts38 are provided by Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
for 7 Latin American emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
                                                          
38 Note that we make no distinction between individual analysts and team of analysts. 
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and Venezuela. One year earning per share (EPS) forecasts are used from 1993 to 1999. 
Brokers are classified as local or foreign according to their country of origin. All brokerage 
houses with headquarters located in one of the 7 countries under study are classified as local. 
Other brokerage houses are classified as foreign. Stock prices are extracted from Datastream. 
To be included in the sample, a forecast should meet the following conditions: 
1. Realized EPS has to figure in the I/B/E/S Actual File. 
2. The forecast must be issued between the end of previous fiscal year and current year 
earning reporting date. 
3. The company for which the forecast is issued must be followed by at least 3 foreign 
and 3 local analysts. 
Table 4.1 : Summary statistics by year 
        
Year No. of Forecasts No. of Analysts No. of Brokers No. of Stocks 
        
 Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign  
        
1993 3246 1410 158 99 44 22 151 
1994 7257 3393 214 142 59 37 265 
1995 7144 3664 354 206 59 41 260 
1996 6709 4599 384 298 63 44 264 
1997 7016 5977 341 376 59 38 295 
1998 6034 5915 328 377 53 31 291 
1999 4810 4423 251 287 45 21 216 
        
Total 42216 29381 872 782 105 65 450 
        
 
This table reports yearly statistics for the data. No. of Forecasts represents the number of annual earnings 
forecasts made each year. No. of Analyst represents the number of analysts who produced a forecast 
during the fiscal year t. The total number of analysts who produced an earning forecast during the entire 
period is indicated in the last row. No. of Brokers represents the number of banks (or brokerage 
companies) for which analysts work each year. The total number of brokers identified during the entire 
period is indicated in the last row. No. of Stocks is the number of firms in the sample. The total number of 
firms for which forecasts were produced during the period is indicated in the last row. 
 
The last condition restricts the sample to big and medium-sized companies. The final 
sample includes 71'597 EPS forecasts. Table 4.1 shows that local analysts have produced 44% 
more forecasts than their foreign counterparts. The number of analysts and brokerage houses 
active on Latin American markets has sensibly increased between 1993 and 1999. This is due 
to the increasing coverage of the I/B/E/S database but also to the increasing attractiveness of 
these markets for foreign investors.  
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics by country and industry 
         
Panel A: sample by country  
         
  No. of Forecasts No. of Analysts No. of Brokers No. of Stocks
         
  Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign  
         
Argentina  6060 4469 165 275 27 41 56 
Brazil  16530 10193 346 394 34 47 185 
Chile  3156 2373 78 191 13 29 46 
Colombia  171 428 6 53 2 17 16 
Mexico  15116 10320 277 384 25 44 102 
Peru  1042 1237 37 139 12 34 33 
Venezuela  141 361 1 81 1 20 12 
         
         
Panel B: sample by industry       
         
  No. of Forecasts No. of Analysts No. of Brokers No. of Stocks
         
  Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
         
Finance  4822 4589 335 295 93 53 63 
Consumer non-durables  6646 4020 380 242 99 50 81 
Consumer services  5809 3957 324 233 87 48 54 
Consumer durables  1085 559 158 84 68 28 9 
Energy  1335 1041 155 116 59 37 11 
Transportation  327 223 76 54 42 27 6 
Technology  153 63 45 22 26 12 2 
Basic industries  9'243 5758 481 348 101 54 89 
Capital goods  5739 3591 389 251 87 50 66 
Utilities  7057 5580 349 293 103 53 69 
         
 
This table reports statistics by country and by industry. The variables are defined as in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.2 shows that most of the forecasts (73%) are concentrated on Brazil and Mexico. 
In addition, in each country, foreign analysts tend to be more numerous than local ones. 
However, from Table 4.1, we see that this finding is reversed at the aggregated level. Thus, 
foreign analysts tend to follow several different markets while local analysts are more focused 
on their respective local markets. Firms from 10 different industries are represented in the 
sample39. The most important industrial sectors in terms of number of forecasts are Basic 
Industries with 21% of the forecasts, Utilities and Consumer Non-Durables with 18%, and 
                                                          
39 The industry classification is based on the I/B/E/S industry grouping codes. 
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15% of the forecasts, respectively. There is no evidence that a particular industrial sector is 
more followed by a given group of analysts.  
Non-tabulated results indicate that the average number of analysts employed by foreign 
brokerage houses amounts to 7.9 while it amounts to 5.5 for local ones suggesting that, on 
average, foreign brokerage houses are bigger than local ones40. Foreign analysts follow higher 
market value companies than local analysts. The average market value of a company followed 
by a foreign analyst is approximately USD 2.2 billion while it amounts to USD 1.9 billion for 
local analysts. This evidence is observed for each individual year. It is consistent with the 
hypothesis that foreign investors favor bigger companies when they invest in emerging 
markets. Finally, 91 different companies out of 450 have quoted American Depositary 
Receipts (ADR). Lang et al. (2002) show that non-U.S. companies listed on U.S. exchanges 
have different characteristics than other non-U.S. firms: they display greater analyst coverage 
and increased forecast. 
Table 4.3: Frequency of forecast issuance and revision 
 
 
      
Panel A: number of calendar days elapsed between forecasts 
      
      
  Mean Min Median Max 
      
Local analysts  76.87 1.00 65.00 358.00 
Foreign analysts  79.24 1.00 66.00 372.00 
      
      
Panel B: number of revisions per analyst   
      
      
  Mean Min Median Max 
      
Local analysts  1.41 0.00 1.00 23.00 
Foreign analysts  1.16 0.00 1.00 11.00 
      
This table reports summary statistics on financial analysts’ activity. Panel A 
presents statistics about the number of calendar days that separate two consecutive 
forecasts by analyst for a particular company in a given year. Panel B reports 
statistics on the number of revisions by analyst for a particular company in a given 
year. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that local analysts are slightly more active than foreign ones. On 
average, they produce a forecast every 76 day while their foreign peers do it every 71 day. 
                                                          
40 Previous research shows that the number of analysts is a good proxy for the size of the brokerage house; see 
Stickel (1995).  
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Local analysts revise more often than their foreign counterparts: on average 1.41 times per 
firm each year against 1.16 times.  
Figure 4.1: Analysts’ activity across the year 
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This figure illustrates financial analysts’ average portfolio turnover by month of the year. The dashed part measures 
local analysts’ portfolio turnover for each month of the year. The white part measures the difference between local and 
foreign analysts’ portfolio turnover. The months of the year are represented on the X-axis. Portfolio turnover for a 
given analyst is the sum of all forecast revisions done during the month divided by the total number of companies 
followed. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows financial analysts’ average portfolio turnover by month of the year. The 
portfolio turnover for a given analyst is the sum of all forecast revisions done during the 
month divided by the total number of companies he follows. The turnover of local analysts is 
rather regular through the year. Moreover, it is greater than the turnover of foreign analysts 
during all months of the year. Foreign financial analyst revisions seem to follow a cyclical 
pattern. Analysts tend to revise more frequently during the months of January, March and 
July. Although the frequency of forecast revisions gives an insight on the activity of financial 
analysts, this does not indicate that more active analysts have advantages in collecting and 
processing information. They may simply change their mind several times to accommodate 
the opinions of others. Therefore, in the subsequent section, we propose to measure analysts’ 
relative activity with their timeliness. 
4.3 Analysts’ timeliness 
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4.3.1 Empirical design  
CDL show that timely analysts’ (leaders) forecast revisions provide greater value to 
investors than other analysts’ (followers) forecasts. They argue that timeliness is an important 
and necessary indicator of financial analysts’ relative performance. Using forecast accuracy 
alone to assess the relative performance of financial analysts can lead to misclassification 
errors because less informed analysts can improve the accuracy of their forecasts by simply 
mimicking timely skilled analysts.  
The leader to follower ratio developed by CDL is used to distinguish leaders from 
followers. This ratio is computed for each analyst/firm/year unit. It is distributed as 
(2 ,2 )KH KHF
41, where H is the number of other analysts following a particular firm in a given 
year and K is the total number of forecasts provided by the analyst during the year for that 
firm. Similar to CDL, analysts having  significantly greater than 1 at the 10% level are 
considered as leaders. Moreover, each analyst is required to produce at least 3 forecasts per 
year for the firm under consideration. As mentioned CDL, this restriction minimizes the 
possibility for an analyst to be classified as leader thanks to a single lucky forecast.  
LFR
In order to test whether a group (local or foreign) tends to lead the other one, we compare 
the number of local leaders to the foreign ones. However, since the total number of analysts is 
different between the 2 groups, such a comparison is not directly possible. Thus, the 
proportion of leaders in a given group , g gL , is compared to the proportion of analysts in 
group  in the sample, g gP . In order to determine whether a group of analysts has 
significantly more (less) leaders than its proportion in the population suggests, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
0 1: :g g gH L P vs H L P= ≠ g . 
Consequently, the following normally distributed statistic is computed:  
( )
( )1
g g
g
g g
L P
Time N
P P
−
= ⋅
⋅ −
, 
                                                          
41 CDL derive the distribution of the LFR by assuming that the time elapsed between the arrival of two 
subsequent revisions follows an exponential distribution. 
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where: 
g
Number of leaders in group gL
Total number of leaders
= , 
g
Number of analysts from group gP
N
= , 
N Total number of analysts= . 
4.3.2 Results for analysts’ timeliness 
According to the LFR statistic, 172 leaders out of 2’203 observations are detected. This 
represents 118 different analysts from 52 different brokerage houses. One analyst is classified 
8 times as leader whereas two analysts are classified 5 times. There are 91 out of 203 different 
companies for which a leader is identified.  
Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of the leaders according to their origin. The proportion of 
local analysts within the leaders is significantly smaller than their proportion within the full 
sample42. This result suggests that, on average, foreign analysts lead while local analysts herd. 
Even if local analysts supply forecasts more often, their forecasts revisions do not induce 
other analysts to revise their own forecasts and local analysts have a tendency to issue their 
forecasts shortly after lead foreign analysts have issued forecast revisions.  
Panel B of Table 4.4 identifies the country of origin of the leaders. Foreign analysts 
working for US, Dutch and German brokerage houses have a significant tendency to produce 
timely forecasts. On the other hand, Swiss brokerage houses’ analysts have a greater tendency 
to herd than their peers. The more timely local analysts are from Brazil while the less timely 
ones are working for Mexican, Argentinean, and Chilean brokerage houses. 
                                                          
42 The inverse is automatically true for foreign leaders. 
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Table 4.4: Financial analysts’ timeliness 
      
Panel A: local analysts' LFR vs. foreign analysts' LFR 
      
 No. of analysts No. of leaders % leaders % observations Difference 
 N   gL  gP   
      
Local 1334 90 52.3 60.6 -8.2 ***  
Foreign 869 82 47.7 39.4 8.2 ***  
      
      
 2203 172 100.0 100.0 0.0  
      
Panel B: LFR by analysts' country of origin   
      
Country of 
origin No. of analysts No. of leaders % leaders % observations Difference 
 N   gL  gP   
      
USA 399 50 29.1 18.1 11.0 ***  
Mexico 705 45 26.2 32.0 -5.8 ***  
Brazil 316 27 15.7 14.3 1.4 *  
Netherlands 71 12 7.0 3.2 3.8 ***  
Germany 73 7 4.1 3.3 0.8 **  
Switzerland 240 7 4.1 10.9 -6.8 ***  
Argentina 112 7 4.1 5.1 -1.0 **  
Chile 154 5 2.9 7.0 -4.1 ***  
      
      
 2203 172 100.0 100.0 0.0  
      
 
This table reports the number of analysts identified as leaders as well as the test of the null hypothesis, which is 
stating that the proportion of leaders in a given group equals the proportion of analysts from the given group in 
the total sample. The last column represents the difference between the percentage of leaders in a given group, 
gL , and the percentage of analysts from the given group, gP . The significance of this difference is determined 
by the following normally distributed statistic: ( ) ( )( )/ 1g g ge P P P N⋅ − ⋅g gL= −Tim . Panel A reports results 
for all Latin American markets. Panel B reports results by analysts’ country of origin. Results for countries with 
less than 50 observations are not shown. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4.5 reports the joint distribution of local and foreign lead analysts across 
companies. There are some segments of the market where only leaders from a particular 
group can be found. Indeed, there are 37 companies out of 203 (18%) for which only local 
leaders are identified. Among these firms, 16 are Brazilian. The number of companies for 
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which only foreign leaders are detected equals 24 (12%). Only a few companies (30 out of 
203) exhibit leaders from both groups.  
Table 4.5: Foreign and local leaders distribution across firms 
  No. of local leaders 
        
No. of foreign leaders  0 1 2 3 4 5
  
      
0  112 33 3 0 0 1
1  17 13 4 0 0 0
2  6 3 2 2 1 0
3  1 2 0 1 0 0
4  0 1 1 0 0 0
        
 
This table reports the number of different firms for which a given number of leaders was identified. Column 
headers are the number of local leaders, whereas row headers corresponds to the number of foreign leaders. 
The elements of the table are the number of different firms for which a given number of foreign leaders is 
identified conditional on the fact that a given number of local leaders is identified. 
 
In summary, the above results indicate that foreign analysts have a greater tendency to 
lead than local analysts. This is particularly true for U.S., Dutch and German analysts. 
Moreover, there are segments in the market where one category of analysts systematically 
leads other analysts. The implications of these findings in terms of forecast accuracy and 
earnings forecasts’ informativeness are investigated in the following two sections.  
4.4 Forecast accuracy 
4.4.1 Empirical design  
Forecast accuracy is the most widely used measure of the quality of an analyst’s research. 
Indeed, the more accurate earnings forecast is, the more accurate the price extracted from any 
valuation model will be. Forecast accuracy is measured using the average percentage forecast 
error adjusted for the horizon bias43. Analyst i ’s percentage forecast error at date t  is, 
it
ijt
FEPS EPSFE
EPS
−
= , 
                                                          
43 Prior studies such as Kang, O’Brien and Sivaramkarishnan (1994) show that forecast bias increases with 
forecast horizon. 
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where:  
itFEPS =  analyst i ’s EPS forecast for company j at date , t
EPS =  reported earning per share at the end of the forecast horizon. 
In order to correct for the horizon bias, CDL forecast accuracy regression is used. 
Compared to the matching forecasts methodology used by Stickel (1992), this operation is 
much less data-consuming and better suited for our study. Each  is regressed on the 
length of time from forecast release to earning announcement date. The residuals from this 
regression are used to measure forecast accuracy. Formally, 
ijtFE
ijt ijtFE Tα β ε= + ⋅ + , (1) 
where: 
T =  number of days until the earnings announcement date, 
ijtε =  residual forecast error for analyst  on firm  at date . i j t
The relative accuracy of each group of analysts is computed in three successive steps. 
First, for a given firm, the average residual forecast error is computed for each analyst, 
1
K
ij ijt
t
MFE Kε
=
=∑ , 
where: 
ijMFE =  mean forecast error by analyst i  for firm j , 
K =  number of forecasts issued by analyst i  for firm j  during a given year. 
Second, for each firm/year, individual analysts’ mean forecast errors are averaged over all 
analysts of a given group , g
g
gj ij
i g
jMGFE MFE N
∈
=∑ , 
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where: 
gjMGFE =  mean group forecast error for firm j , 
N =  number of analysts from group  following firm g j  during a given year. 
Finally, the mean difference forecast error between 2 groups is computed as 
1
J
Fj Lj
j
MDFE MGFE MGFE J
=
 = − ∑  
where  is the number of company/year units. In order to assess whether one group of 
analysts produces more (less) accurate forecasts than the other, the following hypothesis is 
tested: 
J
0 1: 0 :H MDFE vs H MDFE= ≠ 0
                                                          
. 
A parametric mean test, a Wilcoxon sign rank test of equality of medians as well as a 
non-parametric binomial sign test are performed to test the hypothesis. 
4.4.2 Results for forecast accuracy 
Table 4.6 reports the descriptive statistics for the absolute value of percentage forecast 
errors. These numbers are not corrected for the horizon bias44. Consequently, no statistical 
test is run on them since it would not be accurate to compare forecasts issued at different 
horizons. Despite this limitation, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from this table. 
First, their magnitude and variability are larger than those obtained by previous studies on 
developed markets. This reflects the difficulty for analysts to issue forecasts in countries 
characterized by important potential information asymmetries and unrestrictive corporate 
disclosure requirements. The lower means and standard deviations obtained for American 
Depositary Receipts are consistent with this explanation. Second, considering the median 
44 A clear economic interpretation of horizon bias-corrected forecast errors remains so far an open question in 
the litterature. 
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forecast error across countries, there does not seem to be particular countries for which 
analysts produce significant more accurate forecasts. 
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Table 4.6: Mean absolute forecast errors 
        
Sample N Analysts Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
        
        
Panel A: Forecast accuracy for Latin America 
        
Latin America 1741 Local 1.61 12.93 0.00 0.28 387.99 
  Foreign 1.54 10.96 0.00 0.29 355.71 
        
Panel B: Forecast accuracy by country 
        
        
Argentina 260 Local 1.47 8.32 0.00 0.23 119.01 
  Foreign 1.40 7.89 0.00 0.22 112.54 
        
Brazil 667 Local 1.52 10.87 0.00 0.30 250.22 
  Foreign 1.48 7.84 0.00 0.35 141.75 
        
Chile 180 Local 0.94 3.07 0.00 0.26 32.76 
  Foreign 0.88 3.28 0.00 0.18 38.87 
Mexico 461 Local 1.54 9.58 0.00 0.29 170.05 
  Foreign 1.47 7.17 0.00 0.30 108.90 
        
Peru 113 Local 1.04 2.87 0.01 0.29 23.47 
  Foreign 0.98 2.50 0.00 0.32 18.74 
        
Colombia 39 Local 0.25 0.40 0.01 0.14 2.22 
  Foreign 0.33 0.62 0.00 0.15 3.75 
        
Venezuela 20 Local 0.59 1.13 0.02 0.21 5.19 
  Foreign 0.58 0.96 0.00 0.30 4.40 
        
        
Panel C: Forecast accuracy by company characteristics 
        
High MV 594 Local 1.34 16.25 0.00 0.19 387.99 
  Foreign 1.44 15.50 0.00 0.21 355.71 
        
Small MV 576 Local 2.26 13.33 0.00 0.43 250.22 
  Foreign 2.02 9.39 0.00 0.51 141.75 
        
ADR 330 Local 0.87 1.93 0.00 0.22 16.58 
  Foreign 0.83 1.90 0.00 0.21 17.64 
        
        
Panel D: Forecast accuracy for leaders 
        
Leaders 84 Local 0.77 1.94 0.00 0.20 15.45 
 77 Foreign 0.78 1.81 0.00 0.20 10.62 
        
This table reports descriptive statistics for the absolute forecast errors (abs[ ]). Panel 
A presents descriptive statistics on absolute forecast error for all Latin American countries. 
Panel B reports statistics for individual countries. Panel C reports statistics on forecast 
errors for different companies’ characteristics while Panel D presents descriptive statistics 
for companies for which a leader is identified. Market values are computed in USD. High 
market value (MV) companies are companies with fiscal year end market capitalization 
located in the top 33% of the distribution. Small market value (MV) companies are 
companies with fiscal year end market capitalization located in the bottom 33% of the 
distribution. The identity of the companies with American Depositary Receipts as well as 
their first quotation date were taken from the New York Stock Exchange web site 
FEPS
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(http//www.nyse.com/listed). Note that the forecast errors are not corrected for the horizon 
bias.
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Third, consistent with previous research on developed markets (see Brown, 1997), financial 
analysts seem to produce more accurate forecasts for higher market capitalization companies. 
Finally, leaders’ earnings forecasts are more precise and display less dispersion.  
The slope coefficient of equation (1) equals 0.01 and is significantly different from zero45. 
Emerging market analysts’ bias decreases significantly with the distance between forecast 
release date and earnings announcement date. The intercept is not statistically different from 
zero.  
Hypothesis tests and descriptive statistics for the mean difference forecast errors 
( MDFE ) are reported in Table 4.7. Panel A reports the differences in MDFE  between local 
and foreign analysts for the whole sample as well as for each country. Except for Brazil and 
Venezuela, the average MDFE ’s are positive implying that foreign analysts outperform local 
analysts. This average is statistically significant in Columbia and only marginally in Mexico. 
However, looking at the distribution of MDFE ’s, we see that some extreme observations 
may bias the results of our parametric test. Therefore, a non-parametric approach appears 
much more appropriate. In this case, excepting for Venezuela, the null hypothesis is rejected 
for all countries, at conventional statistical levels. Thus, there is a strong evidence that foreign 
analysts are more accurate than local analysts on Latin American emerging markets. Panel B 
indicates that the superior ability of foreign analysts to predict firms earnings does not depend 
on size. Surprisingly, this superior ability is the lowest for American Depositary Receipts, 
which have a richer information environment and are the least distant firms for foreign 
analysts. Conflicts of interest due to increased investment and commercial banking 
relationship with foreign banks following U.S. exchange listing may explain this finding.  
As reported in panel C, there is a strong evidence that leaders produce more accurate 
forecasts than follower analysts. The leader-follower criterion appears more important than 
the geographical one. However, no comparison is performed between local and foreign 
leaders as the number of firm/year units for which leaders of both types are simultaneously 
identified is very low. Two important conclusions can be drawn about the behavior of 
financial analysts on Latin American markets. First, contrary to what has been documented by 
CDL, leader analysts do not “trade accuracy for timeliness”. Indeed, they are able to release 
timelier and more accurate forecasts. Second, follower analysts do not exactly reproduce the 
                                                          
45 Results are not shown. They are available on request by the authors. 
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earnings per share forecasts issued by leader analysts. Even if their forecast releases closely 
follow leader analysts’ ones, they avoid to reproduce exactly the information released by 
leader analysts.  
Table 4.7: Financial analysts relative forecast accuracy 
                           Distribution of the Mean Difference Forecast Errors (MDFE) Sign of MDFE 
            
N Mean  Stdev Min Median  Max  % Local > Foreign 
            
Panel A: Difference in forecast accuracy by companies' country of origin   
            
Latin America 1741 0.14 4.16 -97.38 0.08 *** 110.70  58.07 *** 
Argentina 260 3.30 16.55 0.25 1.72 ** 251.78  57.69 ** 
Brazil 668 -0.03 4.30 -97.38 0.07 ** 31.65  56.59 *** 
Chile 180 0.06 2.07 -26.16 0.15 *** 3.43  63.89 *** 
Mexico 461 0.24 * 3.07 -8.49 0.06 ** 60.77  55.75 ** 
Peru 113 0.02 1.37 -11.98 0.16 ** 3.29  62.83 *** 
Colombia 39 0.44 *** 0.77 -1.35 0.40 *** 3.10  76.92 *** 
Venezuela 20 -0.09 0.83 -1.98 0.04 1.60  50.00  
            
Panel B: Differences in forecast accuracy by companies' characteristics    
            
High Market Value 594 -0.02  4.27 -97.38 0.10 *** 31.65  59.43 *** 
Small Market Value 576 0.28  5.1 -26.16 0.08 *** 110.70  56.60 *** 
ADR 330 0.06  0.86 -8.10 0.06 ** 7.73  55.15 * 
            
Panel C: Differences in forecast accuracy by analysts' timeliness    
            
         % Leaders > Others
            
            
Local leaders vs. local 
followers 82 -0.38 
*** 0.77 -5.23 -0.44 *** 1.11  0.24 *** 
Foreign leaders vs. 
foreign followers 75 -0.44 
*** 0.67 -2.11 -0.41 *** 1.65  0.27 *** 
Local leaders vs. 
foreign followers 84 -0.33 
*** 1.11 -6.13 -0.27 *** 4.70  0.30 *** 
Foreign leaders vs. 
local followers 77 -0.67 
*** 1.08 -6.55 -0.54 *** 0.88  0.21 *** 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics as well as hypothesis tests for the Mean Difference in Forecast Errors (MDFE). 
In Panel A, the third column reports the average difference between local analysts’ forecast errors and foreign analysts’ 
forecast errors. Column 6 reports the median difference between local analysts’ forecast errors and foreign analysts’ 
forecast errors. Column 8 reports the percentage of firm/year units for which the average forecast error of local analysts 
was greater than the average forecast error of foreign ones. A parametric mean test is performed on column 3 numbers, a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test of equality of medians is performed on column 6 numbers, and a non-parametric sign test is 
performed on column 8 numbers. Panel B reports the same statistics for different companies’ characteristics. In Panel C, 
the third column reports the mean difference in forecast error between leaders and followers. Column 6 reports the 
median difference between lead analysts’ forecast errors and follower analysts’ forecast errors. Column 8 reports the 
percentage of firm/year units for which the average forecast error of lead analysts was greater than the average forecast 
error of follower ones. The same statistical tests as in Panel A and B are performed. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Overall, this section shows that emerging market companies’ fundamentals are predicted 
with a great amount of noise. In this context, foreign analysts have a better ability to analyze 
Latin American firms’ earnings potential than their local peers. This finding shows that the 
information asymmetries that can arise due to the distance (geographical, cultural or lingual) 
between the foreign analysts and the companies is more than compensated by their resources, 
expertise and/or talent. These results also show that the group of analysts that revises more 
frequently is the less accurate one. Finally, timely analysts are the most accurate ones. 
Consequently, lead analysts do not give up forecast accuracy when releasing more timely 
forecasts.  
4.5 Impact of forecast revisions on security prices 
4.5.1 Empirical design  
This section investigates whether one group of analysts’ revisions provides more 
information to investors. The objective is to determine whether the stock price reaction 
following forecast revisions differs between the different groups of analysts. The reaction 
around forecast revisions for a given firm is proxied by the cumulative excess return during 
the forecast release period (days 0 and +1). This cumulative excess return is computed as the 
difference between the buy-and-hold returns for the firm’s common stock and the value-
weighted Datastream country index.  
The incremental information content of each revision is measured by the scaled distance 
relative to the consensus forecast46. More precisely: 
1
1( )
ijt jt
ijt
jt
FEPS CF
FSUR
CFσ
−
−
−
=  
where: 
ijtFSUR =  forecast surprise following analyst i ’s revision for firm j  at date t , 
1jtCF − =  consensus EPS forecast for firm  at date t , j 1−
                                                          
46 Our results are not sensitive to the choice of the scaling factor. 
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1( )jtCFσ − =  standard deviation of the consensus forecast
47 at date t . 1−
The consensus forecast is based on the average of the forecasts issued by analysts 
(excluding analyst i ) during the 2 months preceding date . Each analyst is required to 
provide at least 3 forecasts per year for the firm and each consensus forecast is required to 
contain at least 3 individual forecasts.  
t
The impact of forecast revisions on security prices is measured by the following cross-
sectional regression equations: 
0 1 2 3jt ijt jt i jtCAR FSUR LNSIZE LOCβ β β β ε= + + + + , (2) 
0 1 2 3jt ijt jt i jtCAR FSUR LNSIZE LEADβ β β β ε= + + + + , (3) 
0 1 2 3jt i ijt i ijt jt jtCAR LOC FSUR FOR FSUR LNSIZEβ β β β ε= + × + × + + , (4) 
where: 
jtCAR =  cumulative excess return for firm j  during the forecast release period 
(days 0 and +1), 
jLNSIZE =  logarithm of the market value (in USD) of common stock at fiscal year 
end, 
iLOC =  dummy variable set to 1 if analyst  is a local one and 0 otherwise, i
iLEAD =  dummy variable set to 1 if analyst  is a leader and 0 otherwise, i
iFOR =  dummy variable set to 1 if analyst  is foreign and 0 otherwise. i
Equations (2) and (3) measure the abnormal return associated with the different groups of 
analysts’ forecast revisions. Equation (4) measures the proportion of abnormal return 
explained by local and foreign analysts’ forecast revisions. The size variable is a proxy for the 
                                                          
47 Similar to Stickel (1992), a standard deviation less than 0.25 is arbitrarily set to 0.25 to mitigate small 
denominators. Our results are not affected by this operation. 
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differences in firms’ information environment48 but also for foreign investors’ ownership 
since they tend to concentrate their investments on high-capitalization liquid firms.  
4.5.2 Results for the impact of forecast revisions on security prices 
Table 4.8 reports the mean cumulative abnormal return during the forecast release period. 
The price reaction depends on the size of the revision. Strong downward revisions as well as 
bottom 50% revisions display statistically significant price reactions. Conversely, top 50% 
and strong upward revisions do not impact on prices. This is consistent with Stickel (1992, 
1995) who documents a non-linear relation between forecast revisions and price reactions. 
Therefore, the regressions are restricted to revisions of a given magnitude. 
Table 4.8: Stock price reactions following forecast surprises 
            
 All FSUR  Bottom 10%  
Bottom 
50%  Top 50%  Top 10% 
            
Mean (%)  -0.06 ** -0.24 ** -0.11 *** 0.00  -0.01
Standard deviation (%)  4.69 5.08 4.74 4.65  4.63
N  26027 2603 13019 13019  2603
            
 
This table reports some descriptive statistics about the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following forecasts’ 
revisions. Cumulative abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold return for the firm’s 
common stock and the value-weighted Datastream country index during the forecast release period (days 0 and 1). The 
column All FSUR reports statistics on CARs for all forecast surprise level. Bottom 10% reports CARs for forecast 
surprises located in the top 10% of the distribution. Bottom 50% reports statistics for CAR’s located in the bottom 50% of 
the distribution. In the column Top 50%, statistics are reported for CAR’s located in the top 50% of the distribution. Top 
10% reports statistics for CAR’s located in the top 10% of the distribution. 
***, **, *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Results for the cross-sectional regressions (2), (3) and (4) are reported in Table 4.9. First, 
the impact of revisions on prices is larger for bigger firms. This differs from what has been 
found on developed markets. Small firms are probably characterized by low foreign investor 
                                                          
48 Stickel (1995), among others, reports that buy and sell recommendations induces a greater price reaction for 
smaller companies than for larger ones. 
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following and low liquidity. This may prevent prices from integrating new information 
releases quickly49.  
                                                          
49 The same analysis was conducted using days 0 to 5 cumulative excess returns. The main conclusions remain 
the same.  
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Table 4.9: The relation between stock price reactions and analysts’ origin 
Panel A:  
FSUR Cut-off    N  
Bottom 10%  *** 0.096 ** 0.237 *** -0.011 2603 
  (1.968)  (3.236) (-0.054)   
Bottom 50% *** 0.093 *** 0.142 ***
0 1 2 3jt ijt jt i jtCAR FSUR LNSIZE LOCβ β β β ε= + + + +
0β 1β 2β 3β
0 1 2 3jt ijt jt i jtR FSUR LNSIZE LEADβ β β β ε= + + + +
0β 1β 2β 3β
 0.062 ** -0.165  13019  
 (-2.068)  
 
(-0.318)  (2.150)  (-0.681)    
Top 10% -1.326 *** -0.002  0.193 *** -0.497 2603  
 (-2.749)  (-0.056)  (2.844)  (-0.953)    
Panel C: 0 1 2 3jt i ijt i ijt jt jtAR LOC FSUR FOR FSUR LNSIZEC β β β β ε= + × + × + +  
FSUR Cut-off 0β   1β 2β 3β  1 2β β=   N
Bottom 10% -1.657 *** 0.065  0.169 ** 0.246 *** 2.396  2603
 (-3.149)  (1.244)  (2.491)  (3.355)    
Bottom 50% -1.017 *** 0.068 * 0.138 *** 0.144 *** 1.417  13019
 (-4.901)  (1.711)  (2.715)  (4.870)    
Top 50% -0.405 ** -0.036  0.002  0.061 ** 0.622  13019
 (-1.992)  (-0.831)  (0.085)  (2.102)    
Top 10% -1.309 *** -0.015  0.001  0.191 *** 0.089  2603
 (-2.672)  (-0.280)  (0.031)  (2.802)    
   
-1.626   
(-2.966)   
-0.943 -0.102 13019   
 (-4.387)  (2.756)  (4.780)  (-1.208)  
Top 50% -0.009 0.059 ** 13019 
(-1.590)  (-0.370)  (2.053) (-1.333)   
Top 10% -1.225 ** -0.003 *** -0.143 2603 
(-2.439) (-0.103) (2.778)  (-0.777)  
Panel B: CA  
FSUR Cut-off  N  
-1.641 *** 0.096 ** 0.238 0.125 2603 
  
-0.336 -0.111     
   
0.189    
     
   
Bottom 10% ***   
 (-3.114)  (1.963)  (3.253)  (0.223)    
Bottom 50% -1.008 0.093*** *** 0.144 *** -0.236 13019  
(2.750) (4.846)  
-0.419 ** 
 
 (-4.857)    (-1.016)   
Top 50% -0.008
 
This table presents the coefficients obtained by regressing the cumulative abnormal returns following forecast revisions on 
the magnitude of the revision, firm size, and dummy variables indicating analysts’ status. Revisions are dated within the 
firm’s current fiscal year over the 1993-1999 period. jtCAR  is the cumulative abnormal return to security  during the 
release period (days 0 and +1). 
i
ijtFSUR  is the forecast surprise following analyst i ’s revision at date . t jtLNSIZE  is the 
natural logarithm of the market value (in USD) of common stock at fiscal year end.  is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if analyst i  is employed by a foreign brokerage house and 0 otherwise. 
iFOR
iLOC
i
 is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if analyst  is employed by a local brokerage house and 0 otherwise. i LEAD  is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if analyst i  is a leader and 0 otherwise. In the fifth column of panel C, a F test is performed to test the equality of 
1β  and 2β . All coefficients are multiplied by 100. T-statistics are based on White (1980). For each regression the adjusted 
2R  are less than 0.01.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Second, there is a statistically significant relation between forecast surprise and price reaction 
for large downward and bottom 50% revisions (see panel A and B). Third, panel A shows that 
the intercept of cross-sectional equation (2) does not differ between local and foreign 
analysts. This is also the case for leader and follower analysts (see panel B). Fourth, panel C 
reports that there is a strong link between downward revisions (bottom 10% and bottom 50%) 
by foreign analysts and cumulative abnormal returns. This link is not found when looking at 
local analysts. Moreover, the regression coefficient for large downward foreign analysts’ 
revisions is 2.6 times larger than for local analysts. The market incorporates the information 
embedded in foreign analysts’ revisions. Conversely, the information included in local 
analysts’ forecasts is not taken into account by the market. However, the equality of the 
coefficients cannot be rejected by the F-tests. Finally, for the top 50% as well as for the top 
10% (large upward revisions) cut-offs, there is no price reaction at all. For all revision levels, 
cumulative excess returns following forecast releases are bigger for larger firms.  
Overall, this section shows that the incremental information contained in large downward 
and bottom 50% forecasts revisions by foreign analysts has a significant impact on stock 
prices. On the other hand, prices do not react to forecasts revisions issued by local analysts. 
This result is consistent with the findings of the two previous sections: foreign analysts 
produce more accurate and timelier forecasts than local ones. As a consequence, the 
unexpected component of their forecasts, measured by the forecast surprises, has a greater 
impact on excess stock return than the corresponding forecast surprises for local analysts. The 
market does not seem to consider forecasts issued by leader analysts as being more 
informative than those issued by other analysts. However, the scarcity of the observations for 
which a leader could be identified (972 revisions out of 31’439) may be at the origin of this 
finding. Finally, there is evidence that emerging market investors take into account financial 
analysts’ tendency for overconfidence. Indeed, prices do not react to large upward revisions at 
all.  
4.6 Conclusions 
Foreign financial analysts’ EPS forecasts are more timely and more accurate than local 
financial analysts’ forecasts. Building on CDL methodology, 172 leader analysts are 
identified. Out of these 172 leaders, 82 are foreign. This is significantly greater than the 
proportion of foreign analysts’ forecasts in the sample. Conversely, local analysts display a 
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significant tendency to follow the “crowd”. The fact that only a few local and foreign leaders 
are identified simultaneously for a given firm indicates that local and foreign leaders leads 
other analysts on specific segments of the market. This is particularly true for local analysts 
on the Brazilian market. Except for Venezuela, foreign analysts are more accurate in each 
individual country. Considering all countries, foreign financial analysts’ forecasts are more 
precise in 58% of the cases.  
In terms of security price, stocks react negatively to downward revisions released by 
foreign analysts. There is no price reaction following local financial analysts’ revisions. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is mixed to the extent that the coefficients associated to foreign 
and local analysts’ forecast surprises are not statistically different. Forecasts issued by leaders 
do not have any significant additional impact on security prices. However, this finding may 
be due to the low weighting of leaders’ revisions in the whole sample.  
Overall, the consistency between the results given by the various performance measures 
indicates that there is no reason to question the superior performance of foreign financial 
analysts. This superiority may be linked to the superior resources available to analysts who 
work for important international brokerage houses, to the better international expertise of 
these analysts, to their greater talent, and to conflicts of interest faced by analysts employed 
by local banks, which offer commercial or investment banking activities. The present results 
are consistent with a better information and greater sophistication on the part of foreign 
investors. Indeed, foreigners’ portfolio profits on emerging markets, such as those 
documented by Seasholes (2000), may be driven by the better ability of foreign analysts at 
analyzing firms’ situation for their clients. However, further research is needed to understand 
which category of investors (foreign or domestic) trade around foreign and local analysts’ 
revisions. Moreover, this study shows that financial analysts’ forecasts on Latin American 
emerging markets share some common properties with forecasts issued on developed 
markets: On average, they are too optimistic, their bias decreases as the result’s release date 
narrows and the forecast errors are influenced by some firm characteristics such as size, and 
information environment (ADR’s). Finally, the practical implication of this investigation is 
that investors should rely more heavily on foreign financial analysts’ forecasts than on local 
ones when they invest in Latin American markets. 
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Chapter 5: Executive Compensation and Analyst Guidance: The Link 
between CEO Compensation and Expectations Management 
(In collaboration with Manuel Kast) 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, companies have tried particularly hard to meet analyst expectations. 
There has been a strong decrease in the tendency of managers to report earnings falling short 
of analyst estimates (Brown 2001a, Burgstahler and Eames 2001). Reporting earnings that do 
not fall short of analyst expectations can be achieved by two principal mechanisms. First, 
through the manipulation of discretionary accruals, executives are able to manage earnings in 
order to meet or beat analyst expectations. The second method is the induction of pessimism 
in analyst forecasts by providing analysts with negative clues leading to downward revisions 
in the consensus estimates. As a result, firms can more easily meet or beat analyst 
expectations. The business press is replete with articles referring to this latest practice. In a 
December 1998 Fortune Magazine article entitled “The Guidance Game”, E. Schonfeld 
writes: 
“… a company is allowed to provide the analysts with clues, or so-called guidance, 
about what it thinks earnings will be. The guidance number usually shows up as the 
consensus estimate among analysts. If the company meets or just beats the 
consensus, both that company and the analyst win: The stock goes up and everyone 
looks smart.” 
Fuller and Jensen (2002) attribute the increasing tendency of managers engaging in 
analyst manipulation strategies to a shift in the nature of executive compensation structure. As 
stock options have become an increasingly important component of executive compensation, 
the preservation or enhancement of short term stock value around the earnings announcement 
has become a priority for managers. In the Business Week edition of May 24, 1998, M. 
Vickers corroborates this explanation: 
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“Companies need to generate positive surprises to keep not only stockholders but 
also stock-option holders happy – and that group is growing…” 
In this paper, we investigate whether the tendency of executives to manage analyst 
forecasts downward is related to the incentives provided by their compensation packages. 
Although past research and financial media have claimed that executives’ expectations 
management practices are due to the increasing dependence of their compensation to the 
evolution of short term stock prices, to date no direct empirical tests of this relationship have 
been performed, taking explicitly into account the degree and nature of management’s 
compensation and ownership exposure to their firm’s stock performance. 
We conduct two distinct sets of investigations. First, we identify the key components of 
CEO compensation contracts together with stock and option ownership, which influence the 
extent of analyst guidance, taking into account other firm-specific factors. We tackle this 
problem by considering the characteristic components of the CEO compensation package due 
to their differing risk and incentive profiles. We find that CEO compensation components 
strongly influence the propensity of managers to engage in expectations management 
strategies. Consistent with common wisdom, we report a strong positive relationship between 
the practice of analyst guidance and the value of the CEO’s in-the-money exercisable options 
as well as one between the sensitivity of the option portfolios to stock price movements and 
analyst guidance. Moreover, we document a positive relationship between the percentage of 
shares held by CEOs and analyst guidance. Furthermore, there is a strong positive relationship 
between analyst guidance and the bonuses paid annually to CEOs suggesting that meeting or 
beating analyst expectations constitutes an important determinant of CEO performance 
assessment. Finally, we document a negative link between CEO base salary and analyst 
guidance.  
Second, we examine the extent to which the stock market is able to discern any 
pessimistic bias in analyst consensus forecasts induced by expectations management 
strategies. We conduct an event study around the earnings announcement dates to measure the 
valuation effects induced by expectations management strategies and we investigate whether 
these valuation effects are related to the factors that explain the extent of analyst guidance. 
Similar to previous research, we find that firms which meet of beat analyst consensus 
forecasts display strong positive cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding 
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the announcement date. However, for these firms, the market is partially able to discern 
analyst guidance strategies: companies that are suspected of managing analyst expectations in 
order to report a positive earnings surprise display a lower abnormal return at the earnings 
announcement than those not suspected of guiding analysts downward. Further analysis 
shows that this discount is significantly and positively related to the options held by the 
CEOs.  
Our findings complement previous research in several ways. For the first time the crucial 
role of executive compensation in explaining analyst guidance is demonstrated. Secondly, we 
complement Matsumoto’s (2002) analysis in which she shows that specific firm 
characteristics explain managerial incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, although 
without including executive compensation components. In addition we provide the evidence 
that managers actually profit from taking actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. We 
also complement the results of Aboody and Kaznik (2000), who show that executives 
manipulate analyst expectations by rushing bad news reports in order to decrease the strike 
prices of their awarded options. While they consider only the impact of newly awarded 
options as incentives to manipulate analyst expectations we take into account explicitly the 
impact of all exercisable in-the-money options and share ownership. Finally, our investigation 
contributes to the earnings surprise literature by showing that the positive cumulative 
abnormal returns for firms that meet or beat analyst forecast is smaller if the firms are likely 
to achieve this through expectations management. This complements the results of Bartov et 
al. (2002), who draw identical conclusions, by using a different method to measure 
expectations management. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature 
related to expectations management. In Section 3, we develop hypotheses concerning the 
cross-sectional relationship between expectations management and CEO compensation 
components as well as CEO stock and option ownership. Section 4 presents the sample and 
the empirical design. Results are provided in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
5.2 Literature review 
Three important conclusions for expectations management stand out from past research. 
First, reported earnings impact stock prices. Bartov et al. (2002) show that stocks of firms 
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which meet or beat analyst forecasts command a significantly higher return at the 
announcement date than those with unfavorable surprises. Furthermore, they show that the 
cost of managing analyst expectations downward before the announcement date, is more than 
compensated by the stock price reaction to positive earnings surprises at the announcement 
date. More specifically, the stock price response to earnings announcement is 1.5 times 
stronger than the response to analysts’ downward revisions before the announcement date in 
their sample. Lopez and Rees (2000) show that the firms that beat or meet analyst estimates 
over multiple subsequent quarters experience positive cumulative abnormal returns at the 
announcement date. Skinner and Sloan (2001) document that firms reporting negative 
surprises suffer large asymmetric market reactions compared to those reporting positive 
surprises; this applies in particular to growth firms.  
Second, management is concerned about the evolution of short term stock prices for 
several reasons. As underlined by Richardson et al. (2001), managers of companies that 
intend to issue new equity are preoccupied with the current price level of their company as it 
directly impacts the amount of capital raised in the issue. Since many equity issues occur in 
the period following the public earnings announcement, a sharp price increase at the earnings 
release is particularly important for the success of such issues. Richardson et al. (2001) show 
that forecast pessimism prior to an earnings announcement is more common for firms that are 
about to issue new equity. The structure of management compensation packages is another 
reason why executives care about their firms’ near term stock prices. Murphy (1999) 
documents a strong increase in option compensation for U.S. CEOs between 1991 and 1996 
across all industrial sectors. He also reports a strong increase in the value of stocks held by 
S&P 500 CEOs over the nineties. Yermack (1997) investigates CEO timing ability with 
respect to corporate news announcements and finds that CEOs receive stock option awards in 
advance of good earnings news boosting stock prices. By the same token, earnings 
announcements before CEO stock option awards are less favorable on average. Yermack 
concludes that CEOs exert influence on the compensation committee and are therefore able to 
manage the timing of their awards. Aboody and Kaznik (2000) find that CEOs make 
opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that increase the value of their stock option 
compensation. In particular, they investigate the timing of voluntary disclosures around 
option awards to the CEOs of firms with fixed award schedules, and find that managers of 
such firms manage investor expectations downward prior to the award date, by delaying good 
news and rushing forward bad news. Richardson et al. (2001) show that analyst forecasts are 
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more pessimistic for firms whose insiders are net sellers of the firm’s stock in the period 
following earnings announcement. Managers may as well be concerned that a negative 
earnings surprise will affect their performance evaluation. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) find an 
increased probability of CEO turnover when earnings fall short of analyst expectations. In the 
same vein, Matsumoto (2002) shows that managers of firms with high institutional ownership 
are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. She attributes her finding 
to the pressure for near-term performance characterizing institutional investors. Moreover, 
she finds that firms relying on implicit claims with stakeholders and companies in industries 
with high litigation risk are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
Finally, prior research concludes that managers have the ability to manage analyst 
forecasts. This is achieved by using numerous mechanisms, including public disclosures and 
non-formal communications (Rao and Sivakumar 2000) or by pressure on analysts to adjust 
their forecasts away from their true beliefs. A crucial input to the analyst is timely access to 
new information about the covered companies and, most of the time, this information is 
obtained from the companies themselves. Consequently, analysts have to cooperate with firms 
to achieve less restricted access to company management (Boni and Womack 2002). Lim 
(2001) argues that analysts rationally issue biased forecasts in order to obtain valuable future 
information from management, which is one of their key sources of information. To the extent 
that the analyst’s employer holds large positions or maintains an investment banking 
relationship with the company covered, the analyst is likely subject to additional pressures 
regarding his forecasts. Michaely and Womack (1999) and Lin and McNichols (1998) 
document a systematic bias in recommendations for companies underwritten by the analyst’s 
institution.  
Overall, past research shows that there is a strong relationship between the sign of the 
earnings surprise and the stock price reaction at the earnings announcement, that managers 
have strong incentives to avoid negative surprises, and that they have the possibility to 
manage analysts through various information channels or by exerting pressure on analysts to 
issue forecasts that are compatible with managements’ own objectives.  
5.3 Hypothesis development 
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In this section, we provide a description of the various components that constitute most 
executive compensation packages: base salary, annual bonus, long term incentive plans, 
restricted stock plans, and stock option plans. Then, we develop hypotheses about the 
relationship between expectations management and these compensation components as an 
integral part of the CEO’s total firm-related financial exposure.  
Base salary represents the fixed component in executive contracts. Salaries are typically 
based on general industry salary surveys, and supplemented by detailed analysis of selected 
industry peers. Gao and Shrieves (2002) show that high CEO base salary decreases the 
incentive to engage in earnings management strategies. Since the total compensation of 
managers with a high base salary component is less dependent on the evolution of short term 
stock price, we expect managers with large base salary components to be less likely to engage 
in expectations management strategies. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between the salaries paid to CEOs and expectations 
management is negative. 
Bonus plans awarded to top executives are generally based on a single-year performance 
measure. Murphy (1999) reports that most companies use two or more performance measures 
to pay the annual bonus to top executives and almost all companies rely on some measure of 
accounting profits to assess performance. Previous research suggests that the difference 
between analysts’ earnings forecasts and realized earnings serves as a measure for the board 
to assess management performance (Puffer and Weintrop 1991) and that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts reflect the board of directors’ expectations about future performance for their 
organizations (Imhoff and Lobo 1984, Fuller and Jensen 2002). Therefore, executives 
receiving bonus plans have an interest to keep the directors’ expectations moderate (via 
analyst forecasts) in order to set performance thresholds relatively low. Accordingly our 
second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the annual bonus plans awarded to CEOs and 
expectations management is positive. 
The structure of common long term incentive plans is similar to the structure of bonus 
plans, with the exception that long term incentive plans are typically based on rolling-
averages of three or five-year cumulative performance. As a consequence, we expect the 
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relationship between long term incentive plans and expectations management to be similar, 
but weaker than that between bonus plans and expectations management. This leads to our 
third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between long term incentive plans awarded to CEOs and 
expectations management is positive. 
CEO stock positions have a linear payoff with respect to the share price. As a result, we 
expect a positive relationship between the total value of stocks held by managers and analyst 
guidance. Restricted stocks are “restricted” because shares are forfeited under certain 
conditions typically related to employment retention. We also expect a positive relationship 
between restricted stocks awarded to managers and analyst guidance. However, this latter 
relation is expected to be weaker as our data contains the restricted stocks granted in the 
current fiscal year only, which may also not be at the CEO’s free disposal yet.50 Hence the 
fourth hypothesis states the following: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the stocks held by CEOs and 
expectations management. 
Stock options provide a direct link between managerial rewards and share price 
appreciation. Awarded stock options are usually non-tradable, and are typically forfeited if 
the executive leaves the firm before vesting. Murphy (1999) documents that most options 
expire after ten years and are granted with strike prices equal to the “fair market value” on the 
date of the grant. Given the convexity of option value with respect to stock price, executives 
will have a strong incentive to guide analysts, particularly when the sensitivity of granted 
options value with respect to stock price is relatively high. This leads to the fifth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between expectations management and the 
options held by the CEO (and their sensitivity with respect to stock price). 
5.4 Sample and methodology 
                                                          
50 The detailed description of the compensation variables is contained in Section 4.3. 
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In this section, we first describe our sample selection process. Then, we present the 
measurement of the variables used in this paper and report their summary statistics. Finally, 
we describe the methodology used to test our hypotheses.  
5.4.1 Sample selection 
We use data from four sources. The CEO compensation information is taken from 
Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. Execucomp reports components of executive 
compensation for approximately 1500 U.S. firms (S&P 500, S&P 400 Mid Cap, S&P 600 
Small Cap) between 1992 and 2001. We obtain annual earnings forecasts from Thomson 
Financial’s I/B/E/S historical database. Accounting data is taken from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat. Daily stock returns and market capitalization data are obtained from the Center of 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The initial sample contains 14’873 observations for 
3’956 different firms in the Execucomp database. Firms are excluded from this initial sample 
if they are financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4800-4999), 
quasi-regulated industries (SIC codes 8000 and above), or if the firms have missing data in 
I/B/E/S, CRSP, or Compustat. We also exclude firm-year observations in which a company 
has incomplete or inconsistent details concerning the options granted to its CEO (e.g. missing 
maturity date, missing exercise price or a maturity date smaller than the grant date). We 
exclude as well firm-years in which a company belongs to an industry (defined by its two-
digit SIC code) that contains less than 8 other companies for that year.  
Finally, we exclude all observations for the years 1992 and 2001.51 In 1992, Execucomp 
reports compensation data for 433 CEOs only.52 As a result, after having filtered the data as 
described above, only 174 observations remain for this year. Another reason to delete this 
year from our sample is the fact that it was the first year in which executive compensation 
information had to be published in the present form and we do not want to introduce any self-
selection biases in case the characteristics of the firms (not) reporting are correlated with the 
firm characteristics used in the construction of our explanatory variables. The final sample 
contains 7’787 firm-year observations.  
                                                          
51 The exclusion of the observations for the year 2001 is due to the fact that we still have not received the latest 
update of the CRSP daily database. As soon as this is done, we will add these observations to our sample. 
52 In 1992 only S&P500 companies were included in the database.   
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5.4.2 Measuring expectations management 
In order to measure expectations management, we adapt Matsumoto’s (2002) 
methodology to yearly data. She defines expectations management as the difference between 
the last analyst consensus earnings forecast and the expected earnings per share based on a 
model of prior earnings and stock price changes. More formally, for each firm i in industry j 
during year t, the yearly change in earnings is modeled as a function of prior yearly change in 
earnings and returns cumulated over the current year:53 
1
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where: 
ijtEPS∆  =  earnings per share for firm i in two-digit SIC code j in year t, less earnings 
per share for the same firm one year prior, as reported by I/B/E/S. 
ijtP  =  price per share for firm i in two-digit SIC code j at the end of year t. 
ijtCUMRET  =  cumulative daily excess return for firm i in four-digit SIC code j during year 
t. Returns are cumulated from three days after year t-1 earnings 
announcement to 20 days before year t earnings announcement. 
The model is estimated for each firm-year using all firms in that year that belong to the 
same two-digit SIC code. In a year, there must be at least 8 companies in a particular industry 
for the equation to be estimated. The parameter estimates from the prior firm-year are used to 
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. (6) 
This value is then added to the previous year’s earnings to obtain an estimate of the 
expected analyst forecast ( ) for the current year’s earnings: [ ]E FEPS
1ijt ijt ijtE FEPS EPS E EPS−  = + ∆   . (7) 
53 Returns are intended to capture additional value-relevant information that an analyst might use to estimate 
earnings. 
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Finally, we compute the unexpected earnings forecast as the difference between the last 
consensus forecast released by analysts prior to the earnings announcement date ( ) and 
the expected analyst forecast computed from the model: 
FEPS
ijt ijt ijtUEF FEPS E FEPS= −   . (8) 
Similar to Matsumoto (2002), we define a dichotomous variable DOWN=1 if UEF  
indicating that analyst expectations have been managed downward, and DOWN=0 if UEF  
indicating that analyst expectations have not been managed downward. 
0<
0≥
In Table 5.1, we report the average value of the coefficients obtained from the industrial 
regressions described in equation (5) as well as the average value of their associated t-
statistics, together with regression R-squareds. 
Table 5.1:Summary statistics for the expectations management proxy  
       
   Average    
 Mean Std. dev. t-stat. Q1 Median Q3 
    
α  0.043 0.247 1.320 -0.014 0.037 0.100 
1β  0.854 10.578 1.756 -1.700 0.178 2.231 
2β  0.543 0.631 1.988 0.283 0.393 0.542 
Adj.  2R 0.292 0.211 n.a. 0.165 0.254 0.342 
    
 
Reported average parameter estimates, standard deviations, and average t-statistics from the regression 
of changes in earnings per share on past changes in earnings per share and cumulative excess stock 
returns. The regression is estimated each year using data for all firms in the same two-digit SIC code. 
Altogether 269 regressions are performed for 36 different two-digit SIC code groups from 1992 to 1999. 
 
On average, changes in earnings per share are positively and significantly associated with 
cumulative excess returns. Earnings per share changes are also positively associated with past 
changes in earnings. However, the average significance level is weaker.  
5.4.3 Measuring CEO compensation components and ownership variables 
We obtain the dollar value of each CEO’s annual base salary, the dollar value of the 
CEO’s annual bonus, the amount paid out to the CEO according to the company’s long term 
incentive plans (LTIP), and the value of restricted shares (RSG) awarded during the year 
directly from the Execucomp database. In addition, we include the total percentage of the 
firm’s shares held by the CEO at the end of the fiscal year ( ) to assess the impact of SHARE
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the total share position (as opposed to the stock grants awarded in the present year only) on 
expectations management. In addition we use the value of in-the-money and exercisable 
options ( INMONEX ) held by the CEO to measure the impact of the entire relevant option 
position. This item is provided by Execucomp and includes all in-the-money exercisable 
options from prior years’ grants.  
 are aware that the Black-Schol
ited by institutional restrictions to 
 are subject to fo
company execut
ionately in thei
ors would. However, as underl
e
Considering the convexity of the relationship between share and option price, we should 
ideally compute a sensitivity measure of the INMONEX options to price movements in order 
to assess the exact impact of share price changes on CEO option portfolios. However, we 
cannot achieve this since Execucomp reports detailed characteristics (e.g. maturity, strike 
price) only for the options that have been granted during the current fiscal year. Therefore we 
compute a variable based on the average sensitivity of the latter options in the CEO’s 
portfolio to price changes of the underlying company stock (OPTSENS) to use it as a proxy 
for the sensitivity of the INMONEX options. The sensitivity of options that have been granted 
to CEOs during the current fiscal year, is measured as in Core and Guay (2001). We define 
the sensitivity of granted options awarded to CEOs as the change in the dollar value of the 
holder’s option for a 1% change in the stock price. We estimate the sensitivity of stock option 
value to stock price as the partial derivative of the option value with respect to stock price 
(“delta”). The option deltas are based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula, as modified by 
Merton (1973) to account for dividend payments.54 The detailed methodology as well as the 
parameters used to compute the value of the options awarded annually to CEOs are presented 
in the appendix. 
                                                          
54 We es approach has many limitations for executive stock options: executives 
are lim hedge or arbitrage their option values in the secondary market, their 
options rfeiture if they leave the company, and they are not free to trade or sell their options. In 
addition, ives are undiversified, with their financial as well as human capital invested 
disproport r company. As a result, CEOs tend to exercise their options much earlier than outside 
invest ined by Core and Guay (2001), the Black-Scholes model can be considered 
as an accurate m thod to produce an instrumental variable to capture cross-sectional variation in option plan 
deltas. 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for CEO compensation components 
 Mean Std. dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
        
SALARY 559.552 315.819 0.000 396.677 500.000 625.000 3'654.849
BONUS 504.575 787.798 0.000 149.500 298.000 500.000 14'276.000
LTIP 127.083 649.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15'105.000
RSG 289.089 7'446.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 650'812.050
SHARE 3.346 7.097 0.000 0.195 0.483 1.379 63.230
INMONEX 8'312.227 44'984.672 0.000 162.299 891.250 2'737.279 1'959'915.445
OPTSENS 40.892 180.398 0.000 2.974 9.491 20.742 9'993.093
 
SALARY is the annual base salary paid to CEOs. BONUS denotes the annual bonus paid to CEOs. LTIP is the sum paid 
to CEOs in a given year according to the long term incentive plan. RSG is the value of restricted shares awarded to CEOs 
in a given fiscal year. SHARE is the percentage of shares held by CEOs at the end of a given fiscal year. INMONEX is 
the value of in-the-money exercisable options held by CEOs at the end of a given fiscal year. Option sensitivity 
(OPTSENS) is the dollar amount of option value change if the underlying stock price moves up 1%. Except for SHR, 
which is expressed in percent, all variables are expressed in thousands of dollars. The total number of observations is 
7’787. 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the CEO compensation components. The average annual base 
salary paid to CEOs equals 559’552 dollars. The distribution for base salary is highly skewed, 
some CEOs receiving nil base annual salary. The mean annual bonus paid to CEOs equals 
approximately 0.50 million of dollars, with a range from just 0 to more than 14 million 
dollars. The average value of the long term incentive plans paid to CEOs equals 127’083 
dollars. Less than 33% of CEOs receive long term incentive plans. The average (median) 
amount of in-the-money exercisable options held by CEOs equals 8.31 (0.89) million dollars, 
with a range from 0 to almost 2 billion dollars. An increase in the share price by 1% leads to 
an average value increase of the stock options awarded annually to CEOs of 40’892 dollars. 
Again, this amount varies substantially across the sample observations, with a standard 
deviation of 180’398 dollars. The average amount of restricted stocks granted to CEOs is 
relatively small compared to other compensation components. Its mean is 289’089 dollars 
and, similar to long term incentive plans, less than 33% of CEOs receive restricted stocks. 
Finally, the mean (median) percentage of shares held by CEOs equals 3.35% (0.48%), with a 
range from 0% to 63.23%. 
5.4.4 Measuring control variables 
We include additional explanatory variables to control for earnings thresholds, 
information environment, growth prospects, and further firm-specifics that are potentially 
related to expectations management. Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that executives acting in 
self interest and being subject to outside monitoring have strong incentives to manipulate 
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behavioral thresholds. In their analysis of earnings per share and forecast error distributions, 
Degeorge et al. find evidence consistent with earnings management in order to exceed zero 
earnings, past earnings, and analyst expectations. We include three control variables to 
capture these thresholds. The indicator variable  equals one if a particular firm reports 
a loss in the current fiscal year (annual Compustat item A18). 
LOSS
MEET  is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm’s reported EPS at the announcement date meets or beats analyst 
expectations, as measured by the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement date. The 
indicator variable INCEPS  equals one if the firm reports a positive earnings variation 
relative to the previous year (Compustat item A18).  
A priori, the direction of these threshold variables’ influence on the probability of 
expectations management is not unambiguous. On the one hand, meeting or beating analyst 
expectations leads to a significant stock price rise at the earnings announcement. Furthermore, 
Lopez and Rees (2000), show that this appreciation is much lower for firms that report a loss. 
Accordingly, the same argument could apply to firms (not) reaching positive earnings 
changes. Therefore, one can expect managers of firms that report a loss, that will not meet 
analyst expectations, or that report a fall in earnings per share to have less incentives to 
manage analysts. On the other hand, if managers already use earnings management to reach 
one or several of these behavioral thresholds, then the probability of executives making use of 
analyst management might decrease. Hence, the relationship between analyst guidance and 
LOSS might be positive and negative for INCEPS and MEET.  
Brown and Higgins (2002) find that guidance increases with the richness of the firm’s 
information environment. They characterize information environment as the availability and 
effectiveness of communication between managers and analysts and document a positive 
relationship between a firm’s analyst coverage and the probability of expectations 
management. In addition they use the absolute value of the final forecast error as an 
alternative proxy for information environment and document a negative relationship between 
forecast error magnitude and expectations management. However, this finding is to a certain 
extent tautological, since forecast errors will be smaller almost by construction for firms that 
manage analyst expectations downward. Typically, firms that beat analyst forecasts do so by a 
very small amount, whereas firms whose earnings fall short of the consensus frequently do so 
by much larger numbers (“big baths”). We measure a firm’s informational environment by 
using two related proxies. First, we include residual analyst coverage (RCOV) as proposed by 
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Hong et al. (2000). Residual analyst coverage is the residual from the regression of the 
logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm on the logarithm of the 
market value of the company taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. The number of analysts 
for a particular firm-year corresponds to the number of estimates which constitute the last 
consensus forecast released before the earnings announcement date. Using residual coverage 
instead of the number of analysts following the firm provides a measure that does not serve as 
proxy for a firm’s market capitalization. As shown by Hong et al. (2000), market value is the 
most important determinant of analyst coverage. Consistent with Brown and Higgins (2002), 
we expect a positive relationship between expectations management and analyst coverage. 
Our second proxy for informational environment is the absolute value of the initial forecast 
error (IFE). We compute it as: | | , where is the first consensus 
forecast released by analysts for company i in year t,  is the company’s actual earnings 
per share, and  is the company’s share price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Matsumoto 
(2002) documents a strong negative relationship between the initial forecast error and the 
probability that a firm meets or beats analyst expectations.
/
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We include the market-to-book ratio (MB) as a proxy for the growth prospects of the firm. 
It is computed as the market capitalization of the company divided by its book value of assets, 
both taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. Prior research has found growth firms (high 
market-to-book ratio) to suffer large and asymmetric reactions to negative earnings surprises 
(Skinner and Sloan 1999). Brown (2001b) shows that growth firms have a higher probability 
of managing analysts compared to value firms. He accounts for this by the increase in 
managerial compensation in stocks and options. Due to the asymmetric market reaction to bad 
news, growth firm managers’ portfolios will suffer a higher loss following a negative earnings 
surprise than those of value firm managers. Thus, if this explanation is valid, by including 
stock-based compensation and a proxy for growth jointly as explanatory variables for 
expectations management, there should not be any difference between the propensity of 
growth and value firms to engage in expectations management strategies. However, if the 
motives for growth firm managements to avoid negative surprises are not exclusively due to 
the structure of their management compensation, the growth proxy should remain positive and 
55 Note that Matsumoto (2002) also uses the logarithm of the firm market value as control variable for the firm 
information environment. Due to potential multi-collinearity problems between market capitalization and most 
of the compensation variables, we do not include this proxy for the informational environment. However, 
including the logarithm of the market value does not change any main conclusions. 
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significant in explaining earnings management. Matsumoto (2002) reports that firms with 
high growth prospects (measured by the analyst long term EPS growth consensus forecast for 
the firm) are more likely to take actions to avoid negative surprises.56 Alternatively, firms in 
distress (with very low market-to-book) might depend particularly on short-term earnings 
surprises in order to obtain additional financing or signal recovery to stakeholders, which 
suggests a negative relationship between analyst guidance and market-to-book. 
We include three additional variables to control for the value-relevance of earnings, 
reliance on implicit claims with stakeholders, and litigation risk. Matsumoto (2002) shows 
that firms with low value-relevance of earnings (i.e., firms whose future cash flows are 
predicted poorly by current earnings) are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises, 
since market reactions are expected to be relatively moderate. We use EARNRET to control 
for the value-relevance of earnings. It is computed as the decile rank of the R-squared from 
yearly industry-specific regressions of cumulative excess returns on yearly changes in 
earnings.57 Matsumoto (2002) finds that firms depending particularly on implicit claims with 
stakeholders are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. She argues 
that avoiding negative surprises at the earnings announcement yields more favorable terms of 
trade with stakeholders, such as suppliers, clients, and employees. These groups are likely to 
limit their assessment of a company’s financial performance to reported earnings, since the 
financial press focuses its attention primarily on earnings announcements rather than initial 
analyst forecasts. We use the proxies LABOR, DUR, and R&D, developed by Bowen et al. 
(1995) to measure reliance on implicit claims. LABOR is a measure of labor intensity, defined 
as one minus the ratio of total gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item A7) 
divided by firm size, measured as total gross assets (total assets plus accumulated 
depreciation, depletion, and amortization with Compustat items A6 and A196 respectively). 
The indicator variable DUR denotes membership in the durable goods industry sectors and 
equals one for firms with primary (three-digit) SIC codes 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283, 301, 
and 324-399. R&D denotes research intensity, computed as annual research and development 
                                                          
56 We also estimate our regression with the firm consensus long term EPS growth forecast supplied by I/B/E/S 
instead of MB. Our results are insensitive to this modification. 
57 Firms are grouped according to their two-digit SIC code. Every year, for each industry group, we regress 
cumulated daily excess returns (cumulated from three days after the fiscal year t-1 earnings announcement date 
to 20 days before fiscal year t earnings announcement) on the change in earnings per share from fiscal year t-1 
to fiscal year t, scaled by the share price at the end of fiscal year t-1. We require each industry group to contain 
at least 8 firms. The firms with 2R s in the highest (lowest) 10% of the distribution are assigned a value of 1 
(10).  
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expenditures (Compustat item A46) divided by total assets (Compustat item A6). Employing 
factor analysis with principal component factors we transform LABOR, DUR, and R&D into 
the single variable ICLAIM, representing reliance on implicit claims.58 
Furthermore, a strong price drop at the earnings announcement can give rise to 
shareholder litigation. Therefore, firms with a higher risk of shareholders filing lawsuits may 
take more actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. Consistent with Francis et al. (1994), 
Soffer et al. (2000), Ali and Kallapur (2001), and Matsumoto (2002), we control for litigation 
risk by including the dummy variable LIT indicating whether a firm belongs an industry 
classified as litigious. LIT equals one for firms with primary SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374 (biotechnology, electronics, retailing, and 
computers). 
Table 5.3 displays descriptive statistics of the control variables. The mean and median of 
EARNRET with values of 6.2 and 7.0 respectively are relatively high since the industry 
portfolios with low R-squareds contain more firms on average than the industry groups with 
high R-squareds from the regressions of cumulative excess returns on annual changes in 
earnings. Only 8.8% of the firm-year observations are loss reporting firms. The thresholds of 
meeting or beating analyst forecasts and reporting increased EPS have been reached in 65% 
and 69% of firm-years respectively. Firms in the durable goods industries account for 42.5% 
of the firm-year observations, firms in litigious industries account for 34.8%. Residual analyst 
coverage ranges from -1.9 to 1.4 with the mean (median) of 0.003 (0.022) close to zero. Both 
IFE and MB display very large positive outliers. Due to the replacement of missing values 
with zeros, R&D is highly skewed as well, with about 30% of the values being zero. We use it 
together with LABOR and DUR to generate ICLAIM, which has zero mean and variance one 
by construction. 
                                                          
58 Almost one third of the observations for R&D are missing. Following Bowen et al. (1995) and Matsumoto 
(2002) we replace missing values by the value zero. The results do not depend on this ad-hoc assumption. We 
also perform all regressions with LABOR, DUR, and R&D jointly and individually included as additional 
explanatory variables. The coefficients of DUR and R&D are never significantly different from zero. Only 
LABOR is (highly) significant and positive, thus behaving identically as ICLAIM.  
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics for control variables 
 Mean Std. dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
        
EARNRET 6.231 2.710 1.000 4.000 7.000 9.000 10.000
LOSS 0.088 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MEET 0.653 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
INCEPS 0.692 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
IFE 0.055 1.118 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.021 90.944
RCOV 0.003 0.446 -1.918 -0.285 0.022 0.295 1.388
MB 4.146 12.540 0.123 1.716 2.612 4.250 678.094
LABOR 0.574 0.216 0.024 0.429 0.600 0.742 0.995
DUR 0.425 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
R&D 0.040 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.051 1.395
ICLAIM 0.000 1.000 -1.755 -0.758 -0.099 0.711 9.131
LIT 0.348 0.476 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
   
 
Returns on earnings EARNRET is the decile rank from industry specific regressions of cumulative excess returns on 
yearly changes in earnings. LOSS is an indicator variable which equals one if a loss is reported in the current fiscal year. 
MEET is an indicator variable which equals one if reported earnings meet or beat the last consensus estimate prior to the 
announcement. Increasing earnings per share INCEPS is an indicator variable that equals one if reported earnings per 
share exceed the previous year’s earnings per share. Initial forecast error IFE is the absolute value of the difference 
between the first consensus estimate in the fiscal year and reported earnings per share, scaled by share price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Residual analyst coverage RCOV is the residual from a regression of the log of one plus the 
number of analysts contributing to the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement on the log market value of the 
company at the beginning of the fiscal year. Market-to-book ratio MB is market value of equity divided by book value of 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. Labor intensity LABOR is defined as one minus the ratio of gross property, 
plant, and equipment to total gross assets. DUR is a dummy variable indicating membership in durable goods industries 
(SIC codes 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283, 301, 324-399). R&D is annual research expenses divided by total assets. 
Missing values for R&D are set to zero. ICLAIM is the score of the factor analysis combining LABOR, DUR, and R&D 
into a single variable measuring reliance on implicit claims. LIT is a dummy variable indicating membership in litigious 
industries (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374). The total number of observations is 
7’787. 
 
For the regression analysis, we measure all compensation and ownership variables as well 
as IFE and MB with the values of their cumulative distribution functions (hereafter referred to 
as cdf) for three reasons. Firstly, all these variables are highly skewed. The cdf transformation 
generates a uniform distribution of the transformed variables, which enhances the speed of 
conversion of the parameter estimates to the true population parameters. Secondly, the effect 
of outliers is mitigated without discarding this information completely as done in censoring 
the sample. Finally, this transformation is consistent with imposing decreasing marginal 
effects as the variables increase. Intuitively, this postulates that the first 1000 Dollars of any 
compensation component have higher importance than a 1000 Dollar variation at high income 
or ownership levels. The cdf transformation is similar to the log transformation commonly 
applied to firm size. However, the log transformation is less appropriate for the compensation 
and ownership variables, since there is a large number of observations with value zero, which 
would yield infinitely large negative values. Moreover, the use of the cdf transformation is 
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not problematic for this study, since we are mainly interested whether distinct components of 
executive compensation increase or decrease the probability of expectations management (i.e. 
we are after the sign of the estimated coefficients), rather than estimating precisely the 
marginal effect of a 1000 Dollar increase in executive remuneration on the probability to 
manage analysts. 
In Table 5.4, we report Pearson correlation coefficients between DOWN and the 
exogenous variables, where SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, 
IFE, and MB are expressed as the values of their cumulative distribution functions. Except for 
SALARY, the signs of the correlation coefficients are consistent with those predicted by our 
hypotheses. The compensation components and ownership variables are generally 
significantly positively correlated,59 except for the percentage of shares owned by CEOs 
which is negatively correlated with the compensation components and option ownership. The 
annual bonus awarded to CEOs is positively related to MEET and INCEPS and negatively 
related to LOSS. The signs of the correlation coefficients between DOWN and the firm-
specific control variables are consistent with previous research.  
5.4.5 Measuring the impact of CEO compensation on expectations management 
To test whether executive compensation components are associated with expectations 
management as postulated in our hypotheses, we first perform a logit regression, modeling the 
probability that analyst expectations have been managed downward. 
For the limited dependent variable model, the existence of a latent variable is assumed 
such that: 
*D
*
*
1 if  0
0 if  0i
D
DOWN
D
 >
= 
<
*
i iD x
 
with β ν′= + ~ logistic(i, . 20, / 3)ν π
                                                          
59 We conduct multi-collinearity diagnostic tests computing the variance inflation ratios (Kennedy 2000) for all 
variables used in the regression analysis.  None of these ratios displays a value greater than 10, thus indicating 
that multi-collinearity does not cause any concern. 
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Table 5.4: Correlation coefficients for regression variables 
    
SALARY BONUS    
  
LTIP RSG SHARE INMONEX OPTSENS EARNRET LOSS MEET INCEPS IFE RCOV MB ICLAIM LIT
     
DOWN 0.020 0.142 0.059 0.009 0.016 0.169 0.085 0.003 -0.062 0.105 0.112 -0.214 0.024 0.021 0.046 0.002 
SALARY 0.503  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
    
    
    
   
    
    
0.141 0.134 -0.233 0.273 0.317 -0.059 -0.144 0.038 0.037 -0.107 -0.016 0.003 -0.128 -0.102 
BONUS 0.166 0.138 -0.209 0.398 0.341 -0.019 -0.264 0.183 0.340 -0.349 0.005 0.114 0.022 -0.101 
LTIP 0.041 -0.087 0.097 0.073 -0.010 -0.089 0.044 0.080 -0.148 -0.033 0.057 -0.007 -0.076 
RSG -0.072 0.043 0.074 -0.019 -0.067 0.029 0.064 -0.086 0.006 -0.015 -0.045 -0.082 
SHARE -0.152 -0.267 -0.046 -0.018 -0.002 0.004 0.009 -0.023 0.007 -0.044 0.020 
INMONEX 0.417 0.036 -0.155 0.170 0.248 -0.357 0.113 0.322 0.133 0.104 
OPTSENS 0.042 -0.087 0.109 0.103 -0.193 0.122 0.202 0.115 0.082 
EARNRET  0.032
 
0.031 0.027 -0.034 -0.002 0.096 0.197 0.129 
LOSS -0.173 -0.286 0.376 -0.031 -0.111 0.088 0.117
MEET 0.278 -0.242 0.081 0.100 0.058 0.055
INCEPS -0.571 0.075 0.177 0.031 0.021
IFE -0.073 -0.330 -0.076 -0.068
RCOV -0.008 -0.101 0.112 
MB 0.214 0.201
ICLAIM 0.216
 
Summary of the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression analysis. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are measured as 
the values of their cumulative distribution functions. The other variables are measured as described in Table 5.3. The total number of observations is 7’787. Bold figures denote significance 
at the 1% level. Figures in italic denote significance at the 5% level.  
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This corresponds to: 
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 (9) 
Consistent with prior research on earnings management and forecast guidance 
(Matsumoto 2002, Brown 2002) we pool the observations from 1993 to 2000 performing the 
logit regression for the entire sample.60 In all regressions indicator variables  to  control 
for year effects (relative to the base year 2000, represented by the constant 
93I
0
99I
β ), which are not 
captured by the compensation (and control) variables. 
In order to evaluate the compensation and ownership hypotheses jointly with the various 
alternative explanations for forecast guidance, we extend the above specification by including 
the full set of control variables: 
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(10) 
A potential drawback of the pooled logit specification is unobserved heterogeneity. For 
instance, the CEO’s ability to guide or manipulate analysts is hard to measure, but might be 
correlated with other explanatory variables, thus causing biased coefficient estimates. The 
executive’s skill to negotiate his or her compensation components with the compensation 
committee, for example, is likely to be correlated with the skill to deal with analysts, and will 
be reflected in the compensation variables. Moreover, differing attitudes toward business 
ethics or moral standards are just as hard to observe, but undeniably play a role in the CEO’s 
60 This implies the assumption that observations i = 1,...,N are independent, including consecutive observations 
of the same firm. In order to correct for firm clustering we compute robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering. However, these differ only in the order of three digits after the comma, so we do not report them 
(available upon request). 
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propensity to manage analysts. Therefore we estimate a fixed effects logit model, allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 93 23 99
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=′Λ  and iα the firm-specific fixed effect. 
Since the estimation of the conditional logit model restricts the sample to firms with 
temporal variation in the endogenous variable, all the firms which are found to manage 
expectations throughout the entire sample period have to be excluded from the regression as 
well as the firms for which the DOWN variable is 0 throughout. Moreover, the conditional 
logit estimator requires at least two years of observations for each firm. Since the exclusion of 
these "extreme" observations may diminish the significance of explanatory variables due to 
sample restriction, as opposed to correcting for unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate the 
random effects probit model, which is an alternative panel specification that takes unobserved 
heterogeneity into account without losing the firms deleted with the fixed effects logit 
method. The model is specified as follows. 
*
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16
17 93 23 99...
P
it it it it it it
it it it it it
it it it it it it
i it
D SALARY BONUS LTIP RSG SHARE
INMONEX OPTSENS LOSS INCEPS MEET
IFE EARNRET MB RCOV ICLAIM LIT
I I
β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β α η
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+  (12) 
with itη  ~ i.i.d. N(0,1) and iα ~ N(0, ). 2ασ
In addition we perform further sensitivity analyses relating to variable measurement and 
conditioning the sample on behavioral thresholds. 
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 CEO compensation and expectations management 
Table 5.5 displays the results of the pooled logit regression of DOWN on the compensation 
and ownership variables, controlling for year effects (coefficients on the year dummies are 
not reported) 61.  
Table 5.5: Downward guidance and CEO compensation components 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value Marginal Effect 
   
SALARY - -0.613 0.000 -0.139 
BONUS + 0.987 0.000 0.224 
LTIP + 0.304 0.000 0.069 
RSG + -0.017 0.842 -0.004 
SHARE + 0.439 0.000 0.100 
INMONEX + 1.006 0.000 0.228 
OPTSENS + 0.257 0.011 0.058 
   
Wald chi2(14) 614.140 N 7787 
Prob > chi2 0.000  Pseudo R2 0.068 
 
 
Pooled logit regression results including compensation variables only; year effects are 
included but not reported. Except for time dummies, all exogenous variables (defined in 
Table 5.2) are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution 
functions. p-values are computed with robust standard errors. Marginal effects are computed 
as , evaluated at the means of X. The chi2 statistic and the corresponding p-
value are given for the joint test of significance of the model coefficients. N is the number of 
firm-year observations. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, computed as 
2/(1 )Xe eβ β′ ′+
1 ( / )u c
X
L L− , where uL denotes the unconstrained Log-Likelihood of the (full) model and 
cL denotes the constrained Log-Likelihood of the constrained (intercept only) model. 
 
Consistent with our first hypothesis salary has a negative influence on the probability of 
expectations management. With a p-value <0.000 it is highly significant. Consistent with our 
second hypothesis, the relationship between bonus and analyst guidance is positive. As with 
salary, the p-value <0.000 indicates high significance. Consistent with our third hypothesis, 
long term incentive plans increase the probability of expectations management. Again, with a 
p-value <0.000 the variable is highly significant. Not supporting our fourth hypothesis, the 
variable RSG (restricted stock grants) is not significantly different from zero and has a 
                                                          
61 The dummy coefficients are all highly significant, individually and jointly. 
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negative sign. We attribute this result to the failure of the variable (in the raw form) to 
measure the value of stock at the disposal of the executive for short term transactions. 
However, our fourth hypothesis is strongly supported by the high significance of SHARE (p-
value <0.000) which is positively related to expectations management. SHARE is likely a 
much better proxy to measure the CEO’s incentive from stock ownership than RSG, which 
measures the value of the restricted stocks awarded in the current year only, during which, for 
many the vesting period has not yet ended. Consistent with our fifth hypothesis, both option 
value and sensitivity are positive and (highly) significant with p-values <0.000 and 0.011 
respectively. INMONEX and BONUS display the largest coefficients. 
In summary, the pooled regression with year effects strongly supports our hypotheses 
about the relationship between expectations management and CEO compensation, stock and 
option ownership. 
Table 5.6 shows the results of the pooled logit regression of the analyst guidance measure 
DOWN on the compensation and ownership variables, controlling for year effects and further 
firm-specific control variables.  
 
Again, with only the exception of restricted stock grants all CEO compensation and 
ownership variables lend strong support to our five hypotheses. The coefficient of SALARY is 
negative and highly significant (p-value <0.000). The coefficients of BONUS, SHARE, and 
INMONEX are positive and highly significant (p-values <0.000), while the coefficients on 
LTIP and OPTSENS remain positive and significant at conventional levels. 
The three threshold variables LOSS, INCEPS, and MEET are all significant, with INCEPS 
having a negative coefficient. Consistent with prior research (Matsumoto 2002), the variable 
proxying for forecasting uncertainty IFE, is negative and highly significant. In contrast to 
Matsumoto (2002) EARNRET is not significant. Nor is residual analyst coverage RCOV, 
which also does not explain analyst guidance. In sharp contrast to previous research MB is 
negative and highly significant. Likely, as conjectured by Brown (2001b), market-to-book 
was found positive and significant in explaining analyst management due to growth firms’ 
pronounced stock and option remuneration practices. In our sample we control for these 
effects and find MB to have the opposite sign, possibly because it proxies for distress. Again, 
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consistent with prior research there is a positive relation between reliance on implicit claims 
(ICLAIM) and analyst guidance. As in Matsumoto (2002), LIT is negative, but not significant 
at conventional levels.62 
Table 5.6: Downward guidance, CEO compensation components, and control variables 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value Marginal Effect 
     
SALARY - -0.477 0.000 -0.108 
BONUS + 0.652 0.000 0.147 
LTIP + 0.200 0.024 0.045 
RSG + -0.098 0.265 -0.022 
SHARE + 0.379 0.000 0.086 
INMONEX + 0.814 0.000 0.184 
OPTSENS + 0.210 0.044 0.047 
LOSS +/- 0.207 0.031 0.045 
INCEPS +/- -0.230 0.001 -0.051 
MEET +/- 0.255 0.000 0.058 
IFE - -1.574 0.000 -0.355 
EARNRET - 0.000 0.992 0.000 
MB +/- -0.635 0.000 -0.143 
RCOV + -0.008 0.892 -0.002 
ICLAIM + 0.092 0.001 0.021 
LIT + -0.101 0.078 -0.023 
   
N
  
Chi2(23) 786.471  7787 
Prob > chi2 0.000  Pseudo R2 0.0919 
 
Pooled logit regression estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables; year effects are 
included but not reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are 
expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All 
reported items are defined as in Table 5.5.  
                                                          
 
62 We also investigate the relationship between expectations management and earnings management.  We 
estimate discretionary accruals as the difference between actual accruals reported by the firms and an estimate of 
total accruals given by the modified Jones model (Jones 1991) described in Dechow et al. (1995). In order to 
control for earnings management, we run regression (10) with an additional dichotomous variable that takes a 
value of 1 when the estimate of discretionary accruals is positive and zero otherwise. This variable is not 
statistically significant and its inclusion does not impact the signs or the statistical significance of the 
coefficients associated with the other variables. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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Overall, the inclusion of additional firm-specific control variables corroborates the 
importance of executive compensation with stock and option ownership in order to explain 
expectations management. 
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Table 5.7: Fixed and random effects estimations  
 Panel A: Fixed effects logit regression Panel B: Random effects probit regression 
Conditional logit (fixed effects) and random effects probit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables; year effects are included but not 
reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, 
IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in 
Table 5.5.  
      Variable Predicted sign Coeff. p-value
Marginal 
Effect Coeff. p-value
Marginal 
Effect 
SALARY  -0.285
  0.285 
  0.127 0.043 
-0.025 0.825 -0.006 -0.057 0.286 -0.021
   
   
  0.110 
   
   
   
  -  
   
   
OV +   -0.002
   
   
      
 
- -0.300 0.280
0.000
-0.075 0.000 -0.105
BONUS + 1.146
0.171
0.392
0.123
0.000
0.022
0.145
0.046LTIP
RS
+
G + 
SHARE + 0.024 0.905 0.006 0.223 0.000 0.082
INMONEX + 1.492
0.440
0.000 0.371 0.493
0.124
0.000 0.182
0.046OPTSENS
LOSS
+ 0.001 0.049
+/- 0.209 0.128 0.052 0.123 0.039 0.044
INCEPS +/- -0.291 0.000 -0.073 -0.137 0.001 -0.050
MEET +/- 0.196
-1.221
0.002 0.049
0.304
0.155 0.000 0.058
IFE - 0.000 -0.945 0.000 -0.349
EARNRET - 0.003 0.816 0.001 0.000 0.986 0.000
-0.140MB
RC
+/- -2.183 0.000
0.531
-0.543 -0.380 0.000
0.071 0.018 -0.004 0.906
ICLAIM + 0.051 0.677 0.013 0.058 0.001 0.021
LIT + -0.769
 
0.027 -0.187
 
-0.063 0.070 -0.023
 
Chi2(23) 825.931 N 6844 855.812 N 7’787
Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.140 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.092
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5.5.2 Sensitivity tests 
The results of modeling the dependence across units in a panel framework are presented in 
Table 5.7. The fixed effects logit regression of DOWN on the compensation, ownership, and 
control variables is displayed in Panel A.  
All compensation and ownership components keep their predicted sign, but compared to 
the pooled logit regression, the marginal effects of the variables BONUS, INMONEX, and 
OPTSENS are now about twice as large and still highly significant. No longer significant 
however, are the compensation and ownership variables SALARY, LTIP, and SHARE. The 
coefficients of the threshold variables LOSS, INCEPS, and MEET stay at about the same 
level, but with LOSS being no more significant. Like BONUS and the option variables, the 
marginal effect of MB is changing remarkably, now being almost four times as large as before 
and still highly significant and negative. LIT becomes significant, but in opposition to the 
prediction, whereas ICLAIM loses significance. IFE is still negative and highly significant, 
EARNRET and RCOV remain insignificant. 
The strong changes in the magnitudes of BONUS, INMONEX, and OPTSENS are possibly 
a sign of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm or equivalently CEO level, relating to skill and 
ethical standards. However, the conditional logit approach is flawed with the deletion of all 
firms with the endogenous variable indicating expectations management in all years as well as 
the firms without expectations management in all years. This way 943 "extreme" observations 
(12.1% of the sample) are ignored. 
Compared to the fixed effect logit regression, the random effect probit approach has the 
advantage that it does not discard any firms without time series variation in DOWN, but it 
imposes the restriction that the unit specific effects iα be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. The results are displayed in Table 5.7, Panel B. All the variables that were 
significant in the pooled logit regression remain significant with the same signs as in the 
random effects probit regression. Again with the exception of RSG, the coefficients of all 
compensation and ownership variables support our hypotheses relating expectations 
management to executive compensation. SALARY, BONUS, SHARE, and INMONEX are 
highly significant (with p-values <0.000) and LTIP is significant at the conventional level. 
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In a related robustness test, we check whether there is a bias in the standard errors 
obtained from the pooled logit regressions due to correlated regression residuals across years. 
We run separate yearly cross-sectional regressions for equation (10) and compute the time-
series average coefficients and t-statistics in the style of Fama and McBeth (1973).  
Table 5.8: Fama-MacBeth yearly regressions  
Variable Predicted sign p-value Sign Average Coefficient 
     
SALARY - -0.413 0.068 [7/8] 
BONUS + 0.676 0.000 [8/8] 
LTIP + 0.225 0.032 [6/8] 
0.405 0.033 [7/8] 
OPTSENS + 0.173 0.101 [3/8] 
LOSS +/- 1.728 [6/8] 
INCEPS +/- -2.127 0.071 [7/8] 
MEET +/- 3.786 0.007 [7/8] 
IFE - -9.664 0.000 [8/8] 
+/- -8.585 0.000
RSG + -0.094 0.319 [4/8] 
SHARE + 
INMONEX + 0.776 0.000 [8/8] 
0.128
EARNRET - 0.574 0.584 [4/8] 
MB [8/8] 
RCOV + -0.416 0.690 [5/8] 
ICLAIM + 0.875 0.411 [6/8] 
LIT + -0.789 0.456 [5/8] 
     
N 7'787   
   
 
Average coefficients of yearly logit regressions for equation (10). In the third column, p-
values corresponding to the reported t-statistics are displayed. t-statistics are computed as 
the mean coefficient divided by its standard deviation multiplied by the square-root of the 
number of cross sections. In column 4, the number of yearly regressions is reported, for 
which the sign of the coefficient is as expected. For the variables for which no sign 
prediction can be made, column 4 reports the number of years, in which the sign of the 
coefficient corresponds to the sign obtained for the average coefficient value. All 
exogenous variables are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, 
RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values 
assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. 
 
Table 5.8 shows that our main results are robust to this estimation methodology as well. 
The significance levels of SALARY and SHARE are reduced, but INMONEX and BONUS 
remain highly significant, pinpointing the importance of CEO compensation components for 
causing analyst guidance. However, OPTSENS is no more significant at conventional levels, 
confirming that the sensitivity of recently granted (and not necessarily exercisable) options 
has less impact on expectations management practices. The most important differences with 
respect to the pooled regression results concern the control variables: ICLAIM which was 
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previously highly significant is no more significant, LOSS is no more significant, and INCEPS 
is only weakly significant. MB and IFE remain highly significant.  
To summarize, we find that pooling observations, estimating panel models, and 
performing Fama-MacBeth regressions altogether lend strong support to our hypotheses. Our 
major conclusions are not sensitive to the method applied. 
We take the pooled logit specification to a final sensitivity analysis conditioning on the 
behavioral thresholds rather than including them directly in the regressions. This appears 
appropriate if the incentives produced by executive compensation components to manage 
analysts depend on reaching the earnings thresholds positive profits (LOSS = 0), positive 
change in earnings (INCEPS = 1), and reaching the consensus forecast (MEET = 1). The 
results of conditioning the logit regression on reaching these thresholds are displayed in Table 
5.9 and those of the logit regression on missing these thresholds are displayed in Table 5.10. 
The evidence is consistent with the view that reaching earnings thresholds is important 
for the influence of certain incentive variables on expectations management, although not for 
all variables. SALARY, BONUS, and SHARE are highly significant with the predicted signs in 
all regressions, conditional on reaching the respective thresholds (Panel A). When the 
thresholds have not been reached (Panel B), these variables are typically not significant 
anymore, except SALARY conditional on INCEPS = 0. However, INMONEX is always 
positive and highly significant, independent of reaching any of the thresholds. The same 
applies to IFE, which is always negative and highly significant. Similarly, MB is negative and 
significant throughout. 
Again we interpret these results as strong support for our hypotheses, with the 
compensation in stock options providing a particularly strong incentive to manage analysts in 
all the scenarios under test. The result that SALARY, BONUS, and SHARE while being 
(strongly) significant in the unconditional regressions, are not significant when earnings 
thresholds have not been reached, can be reconciled with the fact that thresholds have been 
reached by far more often than missed in our sample. 
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Table 5.9: Conditioning on reaching behavioral thresholds.  
                                      profit reporting firms                                                   meet = 1 firms                                       firms with positive increase in EPS 
Variable Pred. sign Coeff. p-value 
     Coeff.   Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff. p-value Marginal
Effect 
p-value Marginal
Effect 
             
SALARY - -0.488 0.000 -0.109 -0.603 0.000 -0.128  
 0.152 0.797  
+ 0.241 0.054 0.112  
 0.385 -0.018  
  
 0.191 
+ 0.185 0.041 0.269 0.029 
IFE - 0.000 -0.320 0.000 -0.279  
  
 -  
 0.104 0.164 0.022  
+ 0.075 0.053  
  
             
Wald chi2(20)  661.871 N 7100 456.891 N 5086 485.005 N 5392 
  
-0.566 0.000 -0.120
BONUS 
LTIP 
+ 0.683 0.000
0.009
0.000
0.321
0.169
0.024
0.869 0.000 0.184
0.217 0.046 0.046
RSG + -0.080 -0.109 0.330
0.000
-0.023 -0.071 0.511 -0.015
SHARE + 0.399
0.753
0.000 0.089
0.168
0.422 0.090 0.605 0.000
0.000
0.128
INMONEX 
OPTSENS 
+ 0.000
0.089
0.785
0.067
0.000
0.599
0.167
0.014
0.898
0.137
-1.433 -1.313 -1.348 0.000 -0.286
EARNRET - 0.000
0.596
0.982
0.000
0.000
-0.133
-0.005
-0.633
0.706
0.000
-0.001
-0.134
0.000
-0.493
0.990
0.000
0.000
MB +/- -0.105
RCOV + 0.022 0.721
0.020
0.005
0.017
0.033 0.652 0.007
ICLAIM 0.133
0.469
0.011 0.060 0.098 0.013
LIT + -0.082 0.169 -0.018 0.052 0.011 0.031 0.658 0.007
Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.085 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.086 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.087 
 
Pooled logit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables except for the three threshold variables on which the regressions are conditioned; year effects are included but not reported. All 
exogenous variables are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned 
by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.10: Conditioning on missing behavioral thresholds 
                                                  loss reporting firms                                                 meet = 0 firms                                  firms without pos. increase in EPS 
Variable            Pred. sign Coeff. p-value Marginal Effect 
Coeff. p-value Marginal
Effect 
Coeff. p-value Marginal
Effect 
              
SALARY    
   
0.695   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
-0.222 0.017 -0.004 
ICLAIM +   
 
         
  251.491  2395 
2 0.000 2 0.089 
- -0.060 0.868
0.995
-0.015 -0.172 0.318 -0.042 -0.392 0.027 -0.096
BONUS + -0.003 -0.001 0.135 0.481 -0.042 0.278 0.162 0.068
LTIP +  -0.125 -0.031 0.383 0.009 0.093 0.149 0.340 0.037
RSG +  -0.221 0.445 -0.055 -0.080 0.581 -0.020 -0.171 0.257 -0.042
SHARE +  0.149 0.615 0.037 0.219 0.154 0.053 -0.079 0.629
0.000
-0.019
INMONEX +  1.691
0.932
0.000 0.418 0.860 0.000 0.209 0.752 0.185
OPTSENS + 
- 
 0.014 0.230 0.527 0.004
0.000
0.128 0.384 0.051 0.094
IFE  
 
-1.278 0.030 -0.316 -1.324 -0.322 -2.051 0.000
0.943
-0.504
EARNRET - 0.022 0.516 0.005 0.007 0.656 0.002 -0.001 0.000
-0.004 MB 
RCOV 
+/- 
+ 
 
 
-0.967
-0.152
0.002
0.395
-0.239
-0.038
-0.660 0.000 -0.161
-0.054
-0.852
-0.016
0.000
0.871
 0.182 0.010
0.242
0.045 0.196 0.000 0.048 0.204 0.000 0.050
-0.082 LIT +  -0.232 -0.057 -0.367
 
0.000 -0.090 -0.334 0.001
    
Wald chi2(20) 
Prob > chi2 
  
 
104.831 N
Pseudo R
687 302.203 N 2701 N
Pseudo R 0.000 0.146 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.094
 
Pooled logit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables except for the three threshold variables on which the regressions are conditioned; year effects are included but not reported. 
All exogenous variables are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values 
assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5.5.  
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5.5.3 CEO compensation and earnings surprises 
With the results in the previous subsections we have demonstrated the strong role of CEO 
remuneration in explaining analysts (downward) guidance. A related question is whether the 
same compensation and ownership variables also predict the sign of realized earnings 
surprises, measured by MEET. We expect the same signs for the coefficients of the 
compensation and ownership variables as in explaining downward guidance.  
Table 5.11: Meeting or beating market estimates and CEO compensation components 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value Marginal Effect 
   
SALARY -0.061 
BONUS 0.575 0.131 
LTIP + 
LOSS 
0.182 
-0.089
ICLAIM 0.020 
+ 
Wald chi2(22) 
0.000
- -0.266 0.014
+ 0.000
0.045 0.616 0.010 
RSG + 0.019 0.830 0.005 
SHARE + 0.146 0.113 0.035 
INMONEX + 0.381 0.000 0.087 
OPTSENS + 0.116 0.270 0.031 
+/- -0.607 0.000 -0.146 
INCEPS +/- 0.788 0.000
IFE - -0.562 0.000 -0.117 
EARNRET - 0.010 0.286 0.002 
MB +/- 0.365 -0.018 
RCOV + 0.290 0.000 0.063 
+ 0.092 0.001
LIT 0.183 0.002 0.041 
     
793.824  N 7787 
Prob > chi2  Pseudo R2 0.092 
 
Pooled logit regression results of MEET on all explanatory variables; year effects are 
included but not reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are 
expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All 
reported items are defined as in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.11 shows that most of all BONUS and INMONEX positively predict the sign of 
earnings surprises at high levels of significance (with p-values <0.000), while SALARY has 
the expected negative coefficient and is significant at the conventional level. LTIP, RSG, and 
SHARE have the expected signs but are not significant. Moreover, earnings threshold 
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variables LOSS and INCEPS are highly significant as well as RCOV, ICLAIM, and LIT, with 
the expected positive sign. 
We infer that bonus, in-the-money exercisable options, and SALARY have an equally 
important role in explaining the sign of earnings surprises as they have in downward guidance 
of analyst forecasts. 
5.5.4 Does the market discount discernible expectations management? 
We conduct an event study to investigate whether the market discounts any discernible 
expectations management strategies. This requires the calculation of the cumulative abnormal 
returns around the earnings announcement date. We estimate the following equation: 
it i i mt i it itR R Dα β λ= + + +ε 3 (1 ) 
[ ]248; 2i it A A∈ − +  
[ ]1/ 5 if  2; 2
0 otherwise
i i
it
t A A
D
 ∈ − +
= 
 
where 
iA  =  earnings announcement date for firm i 
itR  =  log return of stock i on day t adjusted for capital changes and dividends 
mtR  =  log return of the market index on day t 
iλ  =  Cumulative abnormal return for stock i between  and .2iA − 2iA + 63 
The earnings announcement date is taken from I/B/E/S, individual stock returns are 
obtained from CRSP, and the market index is the CRSP value-weighted stock index. Equation 
(13) is estimated with a weighted least square regression as in Heinkel and Kraus (1988)64 to 
correct for missing returns. Announcement date returns are missing for 24 observations. As a 
result, we estimate the model for 7’763 firm-year observations.  
                                                          
63 As a first step we conduct an analysis of abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date. We 
observe most significant abnormal returns during the five days chosen as the event window.  
64 The weights are the square roots of the number of days over which the return is computed. 
 115
Table 5.12 summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns earned by firms at the 
announcement dates. Consistent with previous research, firms that meet or beat analyst 
expectations (zero or positive earnings surprise) earn a significant positive abnormal return of 
1.30% during the period surrounding the announcement date. On the other hand, firms that 
fail to meet analyst expectations display a cumulative abnormal return of –1.20% during that 
period. The return differential between firms that meet or beat expectations and those that fail 
to do so equals 2.40% and is highly significant. 
Table 5.12: Cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement date  
    
 Earnings surprise 
 
 Positive Negative 
 
Difference 
 
0.024 
 
   
Zero or  
   
CAR 0.013 -0.012
(p-value) <0.01
 
<0.01 <0.01 
N 5’073 2’690 2’383 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 7’763 firm-year observations around 
the earnings announcement dates between 1993 and 2000. CARs are 
estimated with a market model type regression over 250 days ending two 
days after the event date, using a WLS regression as in Heinkel and Krauss 
(1998). The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings 
announcement date to two days after this date. Companies’ cumulative 
abnormal returns are classified into two distinct categories according to the 
sign of their earnings surprise. The earnings surprise is computed as the 
difference between the released earnings per share and the last consensus 
issued by analysts for a particular firm in a given year. 
 
In Table 5.13, we present cumulative abnormal returns conditional on whether a 
particular company meets or beats analyst expectations and conditional on whether 
expectations management is suspected.  
The cumulative abnormal returns earned by firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts by 
managing analyst expectations downward are 1.10% lower than the cumulative abnormal 
returns of firms reporting a zero or positive surprise without managing expectations 
downward. On average, managers who engage in analyst manipulation still earn a positive 
abnormal return, but this abnormal return amounts to only 0.90% over the period surrounding 
the announcement date. This suggests that the market has some ability to anticipate the 
expectations management strategies implemented by managers. For firms that do not meet 
analyst expectations, no significant difference is observed in cumulative abnormal returns 
conditional on whether expectations management is suspected. 
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Table 5.13: Market reaction when expectations management is suspected 
     
Earnings Expectations CAR 
management (p-value) 
 
Positive (DOWN=1) 0.009
 Difference 
surprise N (p-value) 
    
Zero or Suspected 3’423  
   (<0.01)
 
 
 (<0.01)
-0.011
 
 
Not suspected 
(DOWN=0) 1’650 0.020 -0.011 
   (<0.01) (<0.01) 
    
Negative Suspected (DOWN=1) 1’530 -0.012  
   
 Not suspected (DOWN=0) 1’160 -0.002 
  (<0.01) (0.643) 
     
 
i i i 4
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 7’763 firm-year observations around the earnings 
announcement dates between 1993 and 2000. CARs are estimated with a market model type 
regression over 250 days ending two days after the event date with a WLS regression as in 
Heinkel and Krauss (1998). The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings 
announcement date to two days after this date. Companies’ cumulative abnormal returns are 
classified into four distinct categories according to the sign of their earnings surprise and the sign 
of their unexpected forecast error (UEF ). Earnings surprise is computed as the difference 
between the released earnings per share and the last consensus issued by analysts for a particular 
firm in a given year. A given company is suspected of managing expectations in a given year if 
. UEF  is computed as described in section 4. 0UEF <
 
The objective of the following analysis is to investigate whether the lower abnormal 
return reported for firms suspected of managing analyst expectations downward depends on 
CEO compensation components and on firm-specific variables which have been shown to 
impact analyst guidance. In other words, we aim to assess which variables are taken into 
account by investors to detect potential analyst manipulation strategies. In order to do so, we 
model the cumulative abnormal returns of firms that meet or beat analyst expectations as a 
function of a subset of our explanatory variables. This subset contains the explanatory 
variables that are either partially or fully known by the market at the earnings announcement 
dates. We estimate the following model. 
0 1 2 3 4 5i i iSHR INMONEX MB ICLAIM LITλ δ δ δ δ δ δ ε= + + + + + + , (1 ) 
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with all variables defined as before. e expect the variables which were shown to be 
positively related to expectations management, to be negatively related with cumulative 
abnormal returns at the announcement dates. More precisely, the sign of the coefficients 
associated with SHR, INMONEX, ICLAIM and LIT are expected to be negative. If the 
abnormal returns of growth firms are entirely generated by their CEOs’ stock and option 
positions, MB should not be significant,  whereas, regarding our previous regression results, 
we could expect as well a  positive coefficient. 
65 W
Table 5.14: Explaining market reaction for firms suspected of managing earnings 
     
Predicted sign t-stat. (p-value) 
 
3.042
SHARE - 0.008 1.827 0.068 
INMONEX - -0.010 -2.093 0.036 
0.711 
-0.003 0.469 
LIT - 2.893
 
N 
MB + -0.002 -0.371
ICLAIM - -0.725
0.008 0.004 
    
5073   
Adj. 2R  0.40%   
F test 3.864  
 
 
(p-value) 0.002   
    
 Coefficient 
 
Intercept 0.013 0.002 
 
 
Regression results of the cumulative abnormal returns of firms that meet or beat analyst 
forecasts on CEO compensation components and firm-specific control variables, which are 
partially or entirely known by the market at the earnings announcement dates. CARs are 
estimated with a market model type regression over 250 days ending two days after the event 
date with a WLS regression as in Heinkel and Krauss (1998). The event window ranges from 
two days preceding the earnings announcement date to two days after this date. SHARE, 
INMONEX, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative 
distribution functions. t-statistics are based on White (1980). 
Table 5.14 summarizes our estimation results for equation (14). Only the coefficients 
associated with INMONEX  and  display statistical significance at the conventional level. 
As expected, 
LIT
INMONEX  is significantly negatively related to the cumulative abnormal 
returns. This means that the abnormal returns at the announcement date are lower for firms 
whose CEOs hold an important amount of in-the-money exercisable options. Contrary to 
                                                          
65 Note that it is probably difficult for investors to assess the exact value of INMONEX
ons, 
at announcement the 
date. However, due to the vesting period attached to the awarded stock opti INMONEX
erefore able to estim
 contains options 
that have generally been granted to CEOs during past fiscal years. Investors are th ate the 
approximate value of INMONEX  from companies’ previous proxy statement , investors can 
also infer the shares owned by CEOs from the proxy statement. Moreover, companies have to report all insider 
trades on a regular basis. 
s. Concerning SHR
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expectation, the coefficient associated with firms with high litigation risk is positive and 
significant. However, as documented above, our regression results concerning this coefficient 
are difficult to reconcile as  does not seem to be positively associated with expectations 
management. Regarding the low adjusted 
LIT
2R , there might be other variables that can explain 
the documented discount at the announcement date for firms that manage analyst expectations 
downward. We leave this issue for further research. 
In summary, we show that the gains for CEOs from managing earnings expectations 
downward also comes at a cost for executives. The abnormal return for firms that manage to 
meet or beat analyst forecasts by manipulating expectations downward is significantly lower 
than the abnormal return for firms that fulfill market estimates without manipulating analyst 
expectations. Our results indicate that the discount attributed by the market to companies 
suspected of ma ted to the value of in-the-money exercisable 
options owned by CEOs. 
This paper investigates whether the increasing tendency of executives to manage analyst 
forecasts downward is, as informally suggested by past academic research and financial 
media, related to a change in the structure of executive compensation packages. Using CEO 
compensation components in conjunction with their share and option ownership, our results 
are consistent with this explanation. We how that CEOs who hold considerable share and 
option positions are mo a yst expectations downward. Moreover, other 
compensation components that are not directly related to share price movements are shown to 
have a significant impact on CEOs’ analyst guidance motives. Expectations management is 
negatively related to salary, indicating that high fixed compensation decreases the incentives 
of managers to ma ecasts. Furthermore, we document a positive 
relationship between the annual bonus paid to CEOs and expectations management. This 
suggests that board of directors’ expectations are related to analyst expectations and that 
meeting analyst expectations may be an important criterion used by board of directors to 
measure CEO performance.  
naging analysts is positively rela
re likely to m
nipulate analyst for
 s
nage anal
5.6 Conclusion 
In a second set of investigations, we show that the cumulative abnormal return for firms 
that meet or beat analyst forecasts at the announcement date is significantly lower for firms 
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that are likely to pursue expectations management strategies. We show that this lower return 
is significantly related to the amount of options held by CEOs. This suggests that the market 
has some ability to identify firms that manage analysts in order to meet or beat their forecasts 
more easily.  
Using a large U.S. American sample, we document for the first time the importance and 
impact of CEO compensation components on expectations management. However, our results 
may not generalize to all market segments, since the substantial amount of data required to 
conduct this study biases our sample towards larger firms. Moreover, since executive 
compensation components are only available from the main provider on an annual basis, we 
conduct our study with annual earnings per share forecasts. As a result, our results may not be 
generalized to quarterly earnings forecasts. Naturally, the validity of our results depends on 
the quality of the proxy used in this paper to detect expectations management. 
Promising directions for further research include extending the set of executives beyond 
the CEO to study compensation and ownership effects on expectations management, devising 
trading strategies based on executive compensation information and earnings "surprises", as 
well as modeling temporal trends more explicitly in order to examine whether the 
documented temporal patterns in analyst guidance and earnings surprises can be entirely 
explained by the strong growth in stock price sensitive components of executive 
compensation. 
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Appendix 
Measuring the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock option award to a 1% price change of 
the underlying company’s stock price 
The value of the options awarded yearly to CEOs can be calculated with the following 
formula: 
( 1) ( 1 )σ− − = Φ − Φ − dT rTAward value N Se d Xe d T  (1 ) 5
where 
( ) ( )2ln / / 2
1
σ
σ
+ − +
=
S X r d T
d
T
 (1 ) 6
N  =  number of shares covered by the award,66 
S  =  price of the underlying stock, 
X  =  exercise price, 
risk-free interest rate, 
d  =  expected dividend rate over the life of the option, 
expected stock return volatility over the life of the option, 
time to maturity, 
Φ  =  cumulative probability for the normal distribution. 
r  =  
 =  
 =  
7
                                                          
σ
T
The incentive sensitivity from awarded options (OPTSENS) in a given year is estimated 
in the following way: 
, (1 ) 
where . 
)100/(SNOPTSENS ⋅∆⋅=
( 1)−∆ = ΦdTe d
66 We include all awarded options in our measure even those that are awarded to adjust existing options such as 
“reload” options. Our results are not sensitive to this inclusion. 
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We use the following assumptions to estimate the parameters of the Black-Scholes 
formula: 
market price of the company’s stock on the date of the option grant. 
 =  ln(1+dividend rate), with dividend rate defined as the company’s 
average dividend rate over the past three-years. If, in a particular year, 
the dividend rate is above the 95  percentile of the distribution of yields 
for that year, it is reduced to the 95  percentile value. Dividend rate and 
95  percentile values are obtained from Execucomp. 
th
th
th
 =  annualized volatility, estimated from past 60 months’ returns. If, in a 
particular year, a company’s stock volatility is in the bottom or top 5% 
of the cross-sectional volatility distribution, its volatility is increased or 
decreased to the 5  or 95  percentile values. Annualized volatility and 
percentile values are taken from Execucomp. 
th th
 
 
S  =  
 =  ln(1+riskless interest rate), where the risk-free interest rate is the 
approximate average yield that could have been earned in the year in 
which the option was granted by investing in a U.S. Treasury bond 
carrying a seven year term. This yield is obtained from Execucomp. 
r
d
σ
 122  
Conclusion 
In this final conclusion, I summarize my empirical findings’ broad contributions to the 
existing literature and discuss some unresolved issues as well as guidelines for future 
research. 
The empirical findings reported in the first essay of this dissertation show that results 
obtained by studies that investigate the determinants of relative analysts’ accuracy in the U.S. 
can not be generalized to other countries where analysts face different institutional, 
professional, and economic environments. This is also probably true for many other findings, 
even early ones, documented on US analyst forecasts. For instance, an investigation of the 
superiority of financial analyst earnings forecasts relative to econometric model forecasts in 
non-US countries would certainly be relevant. More precisely, analysts’ superiority relative to 
econometric models may vary with the corporate informational environment. Therefore, given 
the different institutional context across countries, different results can be expected 
internationally. In addition, I show that, in markets where stock returns fail to incorporate 
accounting returns, analysts have lower incentives to provide accurate forecasts. On those 
markets, the demand for accurate forecasts by investors may be low and the time needed by 
market prices to converge toward their intrinsic values may be relatively long. As a 
consequence, on these markets, analysts’ career concerns may be strongly related to their 
stock-picking abilities and not to their forecast accuracy. The recent availability of sufficient 
individual analysts’ recommendations for non-US markets will probably enable future 
research to test non-US analysts’ stock-picking abilities as well as the influence of the 
accuracy of their recommendations on their career concerns. Finally, I confirm the difficulties 
encountered by analysts confronted with various economic environments to incorporate 
macroeconomic shocks into their forecasts. The relationship between the macroeconomic 
situation and the properties of analyst forecasts deserves further investigations. In particular, 
the influence of macroeconomic forecasts on financial analyst forecasts, such as those issued 
in the Livingston Survey, should be examined in more details. Indeed, it is of interest to know 
whether analysts incorporate macroeconomic forecasts in their own forecasts, the extent of 
the influence of macroeconomic forecasts on analyst forecast revisions or dispersion, and the 
time needed by analysts to incorporate these macroeconomic forecasts into their information 
set. Moreover, studies that examine financial analysts’ efficiency can be refined by extending 
 123
analysts’ information sets with macroeconomic forecasts or variables that have been shown to 
predict business-cycle variations instead of past forecast errors. More generally, I think that 
there is a need to better understand the judgment and decision process behind analyst 
forecasts. 
In my second essay, I provide clear confirmation on the superior ability of some specific 
groups of analysts. Foreign analysts and leader analysts display better performance than other 
analysts. The superiority of foreign analysts is consistent with Higgins (2002) who reports 
superior accuracy on the part of US analysts in Japan. However, this is not consistent with 
Malloy (2002) who finds that analysts’ performance decreases with their geographical 
distance from the firms’ headquarters. These contradictory results underline the need to 
further investigate the impact of geographic proximity on analysts’ performance. Moreover, I 
confirm the relationship between analysts’ reputation – foreign analysts who work for major 
international brokerage houses are probably more reputed than local ones – and performance 
first documented by Stickel (1992). I also provide evidence confirming the herding behaviour 
of some analysts. However, my results do not include a clear insight on the origin of this 
herding behaviour. Local analysts may herd to protect their reputation, which is lower than 
the reputation of foreign analysts, or foreigners may lead because they have an informational 
advantage over local analysts. Consequently, the herding behaviour of analysts needs to be 
investigated in more details in order to identify precisely the reasons that lead analysts to 
herd. An investigation of the characteristics of leader and follower analysts may provide some 
explanations on the origin of their herding behaviour. For instance, if leaders are assigned less 
complex portfolios and have more resources available than followers, herding may be 
attributed to informational advantages.  
My third essay clearly confirms that managers have strong incentives to manage analysts’ 
expectations downward in order to release earnings that meet or beat market estimates. 
Therefore, I contribute to the debate on the origin of the changing pattern of financial analyst 
forecast bias. My results favour the managerial behaviour hypothesis. In this area, a very 
surprising fact is that analysts seem to have been steadily and repetitively manipulated over 
the recent decade. Consequently, it would be relevant to investigate whether they have 
incentives to actively participate in this guidance game. In other words, they may also profit 
from managers’ expectations management practices. An appropriate way to solve this issue 
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would be to investigate the characteristics (e.g. seniority) of manipulated analysts as well as 
their job separation outcomes (e.g. potential Institutional Investor All-American ranking). 
Finally, I would like to mention two further topics not directly related to my results but 
that would deserve interesting further investigation. The first topic is related to the influence 
of earnings or analysts’ related news on contrarian strategies. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 
1987) attribute price reversals to investors’ tendencies to overreact. Competing explanations 
for long-term reversals are based on microstructure biases that are prevalent for low-priced 
securities (see Ball et al., 1985) or time-varying expected returns (see Ball and Kothari, 1989 
among others). However, nobody has tried yet to relate the profitability of contrarian 
strategies to either earnings-related news, as Chan et al. (1996), or to analyst related news. 
The main difference between momentum and contrarian strategies is the pre formation 
window used to rank stocks on the basis of their past returns and the holding horizon. Both 
are longer for contrarian strategies. Therefore, instead of forming portfolios by ranking stocks 
on the basis of the most recent earnings surprises, stocks could be ranked on the basis of an 
average measure of earnings surprise computed over a longer window (e.g. 2 to 5 years). 
Similarly, stocks could also be ranked on the basis of their average one-year-earnings forecast 
growth rate computed over an identical period. The future returns of these strategies should be 
compared with those of portfolios formed on the basis of long term past returns. If the 
strategies built on the basis of earnings were to subsume contrarian strategies, long-term price 
reversals could be attributed to analysts’ overreaction.  
Second, analysts’ data may provide good proxies in order to test several recent asset 
pricing models. Standard asset pricing theories assume that economic agents possess perfect 
knowledge of the probability law that governs the realization of the state of the world. Even 
more constraining, agents are supposed to have homogenous beliefs sot that a representative 
agent can be used. This is true for one-period (see Sharpe, 1964) and multi-periods (see 
Merton, 1973; Breeden, 1979) asset pricing models asset pricing models. The empirical 
success of this type of model, however, is limited. In particular, these models can not explain 
the size of the mean aggregate equity premium (see Mehra and Prescott, 1985 among others) 
and the assumed existence of a representative agent implies that there is no role for asset 
trading. The difficulty of reconciling existing asset pricing theories with empirical evidence 
has led to several models that relax the assumption of perfect knowledge of the state of the 
economy on the part of investors. This uncertainty appears under several names in the 
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literature, such as incomplete information, model uncertainty or parameter uncertainty. They 
differ mainly in the way of modelling the uncertainty. One category of models formalise 
uncertainty in the Bayesian framework; see Detemple and Murthy (1994), Kandel and 
Stambaugh (1996), and Lewellen and Shanken (2001) among others. They study the 
implications of uncertainty for asset prices in representative agent and heterogeneous agent 
economies. The other category follows the view of Knight (1921). For him, the decision 
maker’s view of uncertainty cannot be represented by a probability prior; see Epstein and 
Wang (1994, 1995) and Kogan and Wang (2002) among others. Overall, these models all 
suggest a relationship between stock prices and uncertainty. However, the form of this 
relationship may not be the same across the two categories. These asset pricing models 
display high practical relevance and can be directly related to the research performed on 
financial analysts. Indeed, they formalise the practical evidence that investors’ decisions rely 
mostly on information through noisy channels and capture the fact that investors have access 
to differing information sets. This is consistent with research on financial analysts that shows 
that their forecasts are biased (i.e. noisy) and may display important dispersion. As a 
consequence, the availability of analyst forecasts provides a good opportunity to test these 
models. Some recent research investigates the influence of financial analyst forecast 
dispersion, used as proxy for differences of opinion among investors, and stock returns (see 
Gyssel and Juergens, 2001; Diether et al, 2002). They find that forecast dispersion is related 
to stock returns. However, they offer a mixed evidence on the sign of the relationship. These 
mixed results and the low number of studies that have tried to assess the empirical influence 
of both uncertainty and heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices suggest that additional 
investigation may be needed in this area. In order to be consistent with existing theoretical 
models, further research should examine the relationship between stock prices and both 
uncertainty and heterogeneous beliefs. Past empirical studies do not distinguish between 
uncertainty and heterogeneous beliefs. Typically, analyst forecast dispersion is used as proxy 
for both factors. For instance, in situations where investors are highly uncertain about future 
states of the world but agree on this uncertainty, future asset prices will differ from situations 
where there is a high uncertainty with high differences of opinion among investors. Therefore, 
distinct proxies for these variables should be investigated. Furthermore, further research 
should consider liquidity. Theoretical evidence suggests a relationship between uncertainty 
and shares’ liquidity; see Routledge and Zin (2001). Empirical studies find a positive 
relationship between analyst dispersion and liquidity; see Ajinkya et al. (1991) among others. 
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Past studies offer clear evidence on a positive relationship between liquidity and asset returns 
(see Pastor and Stambaugh, 2001; Gibson and Mougeot 2000 among others) as well. 
However, Diether et al. (2002) document a negative relationship between dispersion and 
stock returns. These seemingly contradictory results highlight the need to consider future 
returns, dispersion, and liquidity altogether in order to investigate the causality relations 
between them.  
 127  
References 
Abarbanell, J.S., 1991, Do analysts’ earnings forecasts incorporate information in prior stock 
price changes?, Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 147-165. 
Abarbanell, J.S. and R. Lehavy, 2003, Biased forecasts or biased earnings? The role of 
reported earnings in explaining the apparent bias and over/underreaction in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=232453. 
Aboody, D. and R. Kaznik, 2000, CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate 
voluntary disclosures, Journal of Accounting Economics 29, 73-100. 
Ajinkya, B.B. and M.J. Gift, 1985, Dispersion of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and the 
(option model) implied standard deviations of stock returns, Journal of Finance 40, 1353-
1365. 
Ajinkya, B.B., Atiase, R.K. and M.J. Gift, 1991, Volume of trading and the dispersion in 
financial analysts’ earnings, Accounting Review 66, 389-401. 
Alford, A., Jones, J., Leftwich, R. and M. Zmijewski, 1993, The relative informativeness of 
accounting disclosure in different countries, Journal of Accounting Research 31, 183-223. 
Ali, A., Klein, A. and J. Rosenfeld, 1992, Analysts’ use of information about permanent and 
transitory earnings components in forecasting annual EPS, Accounting Review 67, 183-
198. 
Ali, A. and S. Kallapur, 2001, Securities price consequences of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and related events, Accounting Review 76, 431-461. 
Baca, S.P., Garbe, B.L. and R.A. Weiss, 2000, The rise of sector effects in major equity 
markets, Financial Analysts Journal March/April, 31-39. 
Ball, R. and S.P. Kothari, 1989, Nonstationary expected returns: Implications for tests of 
market efficiency and serial correlations in returns, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 
51-74. 
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P. and A. Robin, 2000, The effect of international institutional factors on 
properties of accounting earning, Journal of Accounting Economics 29, 1-51. 
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P. and J. Shanken, 1995, Problems in measuring portfolio performance: 
An application to contrarian investment strategies, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 79-
107. 
Baltagi, B.H., 2002, Econometric analysis of panel data, John Wiley & Sons, second edition. 
Barber, B.M., Lehavy, R., McNichols, M.F. and B. Trueman, 2001, Prophet and losses: 
Reassessing the returns to analysts’ stock recommendations, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269119. 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D. and C. Hayn, 2002, The rewards to meeting or beating earnings 
expectations, Journal of Accounting Economics 33, 173-204. 
 128
Basu, S., Hwang, L. and C.L. Han, 1998, International variation in accounting measurement 
rules and analysts’ earnings forecast errors, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 
25, 1207-1247. 
Bildersee, J., Radhakrishnan, S. and J. Ronen, 1996, Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, 
precision of earnings, and trading volume reaction, International Review of Financial 
Analysis 5, 99-111. 
Black, F. and M. Scholes, 1973, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, Journal of 
Political Economy 81, 637-654. 
Boni, L. and K. L. Womack, 2001, Wall Street Credibility: What do investors want and 
need?, Working Paper, University of New Mexico and Dartmouth College. 
Boni, L. and K. L. Womack, 2002, Wall Street’s credibility problem: Misaligned incentives 
and dubious fixes?, Working paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  
Bowen, R.M., DuCharme, L. and D. Shores, 1995, Stakeholders’ implicit claims and 
accounting method choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 255-295. 
Brav, A. and R. Lehavy, 2003, Expected return and asset pricing, Journal of Finance, 
Forthcoming. 
Breeden, D., 1979, An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption and 
investment opportunities, Journal of Financial Economics 7, 265-296. 
Brennan, M.J. and A. Subrahmanyam, 1995, Investment analysis and price formation in 
securities markets, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 361-381. 
Brennan, M.J. and H.H. Cao, 1997, International portfolio investment flows, Journal of 
Finance 52, 1851-1880. 
Brown, L.D., 1997, Analyst forecasting errors: Additional evidence, Financial Analysts 
Journal November/December, 81-88. 
Brown, L.D., 2001a, A temporal analysis of earnings surprises: Profit vs. losses, Journal of 
Accounting Research 39, 221-241. 
Brown, L.D., 2001b, Small negative surprises: Frequency and consequence, Working paper, 
Georgia State University, http://www-cba.gsu.edu/~wwwacc/lbrown/WorkingPaper.html. 
Brown, L.D., 2001c, How important is past analyst forecast accuracy? Financial Analysts 
Journal November/December, 25-40. 
Brown, L.D. and H.N. Higgins, 2002, Managers’ guidance of analysts: International evidence, 
Working paper, Georgia State University and Worcester Polytechnic Institute, http://www-
cba.gsu.edu/~wwwacc/lbrown/WorkingPaper.html. 
Brown, L.D., Richardson, G.D. and S.J. Schwager, 1987, An information interpretation of 
financial analyst superiority in forecasting earnings, Journal of Accounting Research 25, 
49-67. 
Brown, L. and M. Rozeff, 1978, The superiority of analyst forecasts as measures of 
expectations: Evidence from earnings, Journal of Finance 33, 1-16. 
 129
Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev, 1997, Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses, Journal of Accounting Economics 24, 99-126. 
Burgstahler, D. and M. Eames, 2001, Management of earnings and analysts’ forecasts, 
Working paper, University of Washington and Santa Clara University. 
Capstaff, J., Paudyal, K. and W. Rees, 2001, A comparative analysis of earnings forecasts in 
Europe, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 28, 531-562. 
Chan, L.K., Jegadeesh, N. and J. Lakonishok, 1996, Momentum strategies, Journal of 
Finance 51, 1681-1713. 
Chang, J.J., Khanna, T. and K.G. Palepu, 2000, Analyst activity around the world, SSRN 
Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=204570. 
Choe, H., Kho, B.C. and R.M. Stulz, 2000, Do domestic investors have more valuable 
information about individual stocks than foreign investors?, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=254574. 
Chopra, V.K., 1998, Why so much error in analysts' earnings forecasts?, Financial Analysts 
Journal 54, 30-37. 
Clement, M., 1999, Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity 
matter?, Journal of Accounting Economics 27, 285-303. 
Clement, M., Rees, L. and E.P. Swanson, 2000, The influence of corporate governance, 
culture, and income predictability on the characteristics that distinguish superior analysts, 
Working Paper, The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University. 
Cooper, R.A., Day, T.E. and C.M. Lewis, 2001, Following the leader: A study of individual 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, Journal of Financial Economics 61, 383-416. 
Core J.E. and W.R. Guay, 2001, Stock option plans for non-executive employees, Journal of 
Financial Economics 61, 253-287. 
Cornell, B., 2001, Is the response of analysts to information consistent with fundamental 
valuation? The cas of Intel, Financial Management Spring, 113-136. 
Coval, J.D. and T.J. Moskowitz, 2001, The geography of investment: Informed trading and 
asset prices, Journal of Political Economy 109, 811-841. 
Crichfield, T., Dyckman, T.R and J. Lakonishok, 1978, An evaluation of security analysts’ 
forecasts, Accounting Review 73, 277-294. 
Crockett, A., Harris, T., Mishkin, F. and E. White, 2003, Conflicts of interest in the financial 
services industry: What should we do about them?, Draft report prepared for the fifth 
Geneva Conference on the World Economy.  
De Bondt, W.F.M. and R.H. Thaler, 1985, Does the stock market overreact?, Journal of 
Finance 40, 793-805. 
De Bondt, W.F.M. and R.H. Thaler, 1987, Further evidence on investor overreaction and 
stock market seasonality, Journal of Finance 42, 557-581. 
De Bondt, W.F.M. and R.H. Thaler, 1990, Do security analysts overreact?, American 
Economic Review 80, 52-57. 
 130
Dechow, P., Sloan, R.G. and A.P. Sweeney, 1995, Detecting earnings management, 
Accounting Review 70, 193-225. 
Dechow, P., Hutton P. and R.G. Sloan, 2000, The relation between analysts’ long-term 
earnings forecasts and stock price performance following equity offerings, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 17, 1-32. 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J. and R. Zeckhauser, 1999, Earnings management to exceed thresholds, 
Journal of Business 72, 1-33. 
Desai, H., Liang, B. and K. Singh, 2000, Do all-stars shine? Evaluation of analyst 
recommendations, Financial Analyst Journal May/June, 20-29. 
Detemple, J. and S. Murthy, 1994, Intertemporal asset pricing with heterogeneous 
information, Journal of Economic Theory 62, 294-320. 
Diether, K., Malloy, C. and A. Scherbina, 2002, Differences of opinion and the cross-section 
of stock returns, Journal of finance 57, 2113-2141. 
Dini, J., 2001, The All-American research team, Institutional Investor October, 119-123. 
Dugar, A. and Nathan S., 1995, The effect of investment banking relationships on financial 
analysts’ recommendations and investment recommendations, Contemporary Accounting 
Research 12, 131-160. 
Eaterwood, J.C. and S.R. Nutt, 1999, Inefficiency in analysts' earnings forecasts: systematic 
misrecation or systematic optimism?, Journal of Finance 54, 1777-1797. 
Epstein, L. and T. Wang, 1994, Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian uncertainty, 
Econometrica 62, 283-322. 
Epstein, L. and T. Wang, 1995, Uncertainty, risk-neutral measures and security price booms 
and crashes, Journal of Economic Theory 67, 40-80. 
Fama, E.F., McBeth, J., 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests, Journal of 
Political Economy 51, 55-87. 
Fama, E.F. and M. Miller, 1972, The theory of finance, Dryden Press, Hinsdale, IL. 
Foerster, S.R. and G.A. Karolyi, 1999, The effect of market segmentation and investor 
recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United State, 
Journal of Finance 54, 981-1013. 
Francis, J. and K. Shipper, 1993, Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures, Journal of 
Accounting Research 32, 137-164. 
Frankel, R. and C.M.C. Lee, 1998, Accounting valuation , market expectation, and cross-
sectional stock returns, Journal of Accounting and Economics 25, 283-319. 
Fried, D. and D. Givoly, 1982, Financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: A better surrogate for 
market expectations, Journal of Accounting and Economics 4, 85-107. 
Fuller, J. and M.C. Jensen, 2002, Just say no to Wall-Street, Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 14, 41-46. 
 131
Gao, P. and R.E. Shrieves, 2002, Earnings management and executive compensation: A case 
of overdose of option and underdose of salary?, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302843.  
Ghysels, E. and J.L. Juergens, 2001, Stock market fundamentals and heterogeneity of beliefs: 
Tests based on a decomposition of returns and volatility, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301836. 
Gibson, R. and N. Mougeot, 2000, The pricing of systematic liquidity risk: Empirical 
evidence from the US stock market, Working paper, University of Zürich. 
Golliau, C., 2000. Analystes financiers: Les stars de la finance. LePoint 08.09.2000, 
http://www.lepoint.fr. 
Grinblatt, M. and M. Keloharju, 2000, The investment behaviour and performance of various 
investor types: A study of Finland’s unique data set, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 
43-67. 
Gu, Z. and J.S. Wu, 2003, Earnings skewness and analyst forecast bias, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 35, 5-29. 
Guay, W.R., Haushalter, D. and B.A. Minton, 2003, The influence of corporate risk exposures 
on the accuracy of earnings forecasts, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=375740. 
Hamon, J. and B. Jacquillat, 1999, Is there value-added information in liquidity and risk 
premiums?, European Financial Management 5, 369-393. 
Heinkel, R. and A. Kraus, 1988, Measuring event impacts on thinly traded stocks, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23, 71-88. 
Higgins, H.N., 1998, Analyst forecasting performance in seven countries, Financial Analysts 
Journal May/June, 58-62. 
Higgins, H.N., 2002, Analysts’ forecasts of Japanese firms’ earnings: Additional evidence, 
SSRN Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=306019. 
Hensley, D.C. and J.W. Strouse, 2002, New rules regarding research analysts’ perceived 
conflicts of interest: An ever-evolving landscape, Journal of Investment Compliance 3, 13-
21. 
Holmström, B., 1999, Managerial incentives problems: A dynamic perspective, Review of 
Economic Studies 66, 169-182. 
Hong, H., Lim, T. and J.C. Stein, 2000, Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and 
the profitability of momentum strategies, Journal of Finance 55, 265-295. 
Hong, H., Kubik, J.D. and A. Solomon, 2000, Security analysts’ career concerns and herding 
of earnings forecasts, Rand Journal of Economics 31, 121-144. 
Hong, H. and J.D. Kubik, 2003, Analyzing the analysts: Career concerns and biased earnings 
forecasts, Journal of Finance 58, 313-351. 
Hope O., 2003, Accounting policy disclosures and analysts' forecasts, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Forthcoming. 
 132
Imhoff, E.A and G.J. Lobo, 1984, Information content of analysts’ composite forecast 
revisions, Journal of Accounting Research 22, 541-554. 
Irvine, P.J.A., 2001, Do analysts generate trade for their firms? Evidence from the Toronto 
stock exchange, Journal of Accounting and Economics 30, 209-226. 
Isakov, D. and F. Sonney, 2003, Are practitioners right? On the relative importance of 
industrial factors in international stock returns, FAME Research Paper Series, 
http://www.fame.ch/index.cfm?page=/fame/faculty_research/research_paper_series/compl
ete_list/paper_72. 
Jacob, J., Lys, T.Z. and M. Neale, 1999, Expertise in forecasting performance of security 
analysts, Journal of Accounting Economics 28, 51-82. 
Jacquillat, B. and P. Grandin, 1994, Performance measurement of analysts’ forecasts, Journal 
of Portfolio Management 21, 94-102. 
Jones, J., 1991, Earnings management during import relief investigations, Journal of 
Accounting Research 29, 193-229. 
Kandel, S. and R. Stambaugh, 1996, On the predictability of stock returns: An asset allocation 
perspective, Journal of Finance 51, 385-424. 
Kang, S., O’Brien, J. and K. Sivaramakrishnan, 1994, Analysts’ interim earnings forecasts: 
Evidence on the forecasting process, Journal of Accounting Research 32, 103-112. 
Kang, J. and R.M. Stulz, 1997, Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio 
equity ownership in Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 2-28. 
Keane, M.P. and D.E. Runkle, 1998, Are financial analysts' forecasts of corporate profits 
rational?, Journal of Political Economy 106, 768-805. 
Kennedy, P., 2000, A guide to econometrics, Blackwell publisher, 4th edition.  
Knight, F., 1921, Risk, uncertainty and profit, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston. 
Kogan, L. and T. Wang, 2002, A simple theory of asset pricing under model uncertainty, 
Working Paper, Massachussets Institute of Technology and University of British 
Columbia, http://finance.commerce.ubc.ca/~wang/ - wk. 
Kothari, S.P., 2001, Capital market research in accounting, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31, 105-231. 
Kothari, S.P., Sabino, J.S. and T. Zach, 2001, Implications of data restrictions on performance 
measurement and tests of rational pricing, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=195509. 
Krische, S.D. and C.M.C. Lee, 2000, The information content of analyst stock 
recommendations, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=254547. 
Lang, M.H. and R.J. Lundholm, 1993, Cross-sectional determinants of analyst rating of 
corporate disclosures, Journal of Accounting Research 31, 246-270. 
Lang, M.H. and R.J. Lundholm, 1996, Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior, 
Accounting Review 71, 467-492. 
 133
Lang, M.H., Lins, K.V. and D. Miller, 2002, Do analysts matter most when investors are 
protected least? International evidence, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=323440. 
Lang, M.H., Lins, K.V. and D. Miller, 2003, ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross listing 
in the U.S. improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value?, Journal 
of Accounting Research, Forthcoming. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 2000, Investor protection and 
corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27. 
Lee, C.M.C., Myers, J. and B. Swaminathan, 1999, What is the Intrinsic Value of the Dow?, 
Journal of Finance 54, 1693-1741. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and P.D. Wysocki, 2003, Earnings management and investor protection: 
An international comparison, Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming. 
Lewellen, J. and J. Shanken, 2002, Learning, asset-pricing tests, and market efficiency, 
Journal of Finance 57, 1113-1145. 
Lin, H. and M.F. McNichols, 1998, Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and investment recommendations, Journal of Accounting and Economics 25, 101-127. 
Lim, T., 2001, Rationality and analysts’ forecast bias, Journal of Finance 56, 369-385. 
Liu, J., and J. Thomas, 2000. Stock returns and accounting earnings, Journal of Accounting 
Research 38, 71-101. 
Lopez, T.J. and L. Rees, 2000, The effect of meeting analyst forecasts and systematic positive 
forecast errors on the information content of unexpected earnings, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=181929.  
Lys, T. and S. Sohn, 1990, The association between revisions of financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and security price changes, Journal of Accounting Economics 13, 341-363. 
Malloy, C.J., 2002, The geography of equity analysis, Working Paper, University of Chicago, 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~cmalloy/. 
Matsumoto, D.A., 2002, Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, The 
Accounting Review 77, 483-514. 
Merton, R.C., 1973, An intertemporal capital asset pricing model, Econometrica 41, 867-887. 
Merton, R.C., 1973, Theory of rational option pricing, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 4, 141-183. 
Michaely, R. and K.L. Womack, 1999, Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter 
analyst recommendations, Review of Financial Studies 12, 653-686. 
Mikhail, M., Walther, B. and R. Willis, 1997, Do security analysts improve their performance 
with experience?, Journal of Accounting Research 35, 131-166. 
Mikhail, M., Walther, B. and R. Willis, 1999, Does forecast accuracy matter to security 
analysts?, Accounting Review 74, 185-200. 
 134
Miller, G.S., 1999, Earnings performance and discretionary disclosures, SSRN Working 
Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=198973. 
Miller, G.S. and J. Piotroski, 2000, The role of disclosure for high book-to-market firms, 
Working Paper, Harvard University. 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1998, Apples to apples: A series of reports on accounting for 
value in world markets, Lead author: Harris, T. S., Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, New 
York. 
Murphy, K.J., 1999, Executive compensation, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=163914. 
Muth, J.F., 1961, Rational expectations and the theory of price movements, Econometrica 29, 
315-335. 
Nobes, C. and R. Parker, 1998, Comparative International Accounting, Sixth edition, Prentice 
Hall. 
O’Brien, P.C., 1988, Analysts’ forecasts as earnings expectations, Journal of Accounting 
Economics 10, 53-83. 
O’Brien, P.C., 1998, Discussion of international variation in accounting measurement rules 
and analysts’ forecast errors, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 25, 1249-1254. 
Ohlson, J.A., 1995, Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 11, 661-687. 
Pastor, L. and R.F. Stambaugh, 2001, Liquidity risk and expected stock returns, SSRN 
Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=331840. 
Perotti, E.C. and E.L. Von Thadden, 2003, Strategic transparency and informed trading: Will 
capital market integration force convergence of corporate governance, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 61-85. 
Philbrick, D.R. and W.E. Ricks, 1991, Using Value Line and IBES analysts forecasts in 
accounting research, Journal of Accounting Research 29, 397-417. 
Phillips D.J. and E.W. Zuckermann, 2001, Middle-status conformity: Theoretical restatement 
and empirical demonstration in two markets, Working paper, Stanford Business School.  
Puffer, S.M. and J.B. Weintrop, 1991, Corporate performance and CEO turnover: The role of 
performance expectations, Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 1-19. 
Rao, H. and K. Sivakumar, 1999, Institutional sources of boundary-spanning structures: The 
establishment of investor relations departments in the fortune 500 industrials, Organization 
Science 10, 27-42. 
Richardson, S.A., Teoh, S.H. and P.D. Wysocki, 1999, Tracking analysts' forecasts over the 
annual earnings horizon: Are analysts' forecasts optimistic or pessimistic?, SSRN Working 
Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=168191. 
Richardson, S.A., Teoh, S.H. and P.D. Wysocki, 2001, The walkdown to beatable analyst 
forecasts: The roles of equity issuance and insider trading incentives, SSRN Working 
Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=281196. 
 135
Rielle, C., 2001, La grande migration, Bilan January, 34-36. 
Routledge, B. and S.E. Zin, 2001, Model uncertainty and liquidity, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294732. 
Securities Industry Association (SIA), 2001, Costs and benefits of regulation fair disclosures, 
http://www.sia.com/publications/html/online_publications.html. 
Scharfstein, D. and J.C. Stein, 1990, Herd behavior and investment, American Economic 
Review 80, 465-479. 
Seasholes, M., 2000, Smart foreign traders in emerging markets, Working paper, Harvard 
Business School, Cambridge, M.A. 
Sharpe, W., 1964, Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of 
risk, Journal of Finance 19, 422-442. 
Shiller, R.J., 1981, Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in 
dividends?, American Economic Review 71, 421-436. 
Sinha, P., Brown, L.D. and S. Das, 1997, A re-examination of financial analysts’ differential 
earnings forecast accuracy, Contemporary Accounting Research 14, 1-42. 
Skinner, D., 1994, Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news?, Journal of Accounting 
Research 32, 38-61. 
Spiegel Online, 2000, Analysten noch schlimmer als Wetterfrösche. 
http://www.spiegel.de./witschaft/0,1518,109690,00. 
Soffer, L., Thiagarajan, R. and B. Walther, 2002, Earnings preannouncement strategies, 
Review of Accounting Studies 5, 5-26.  
Skinner, D.J. and R.G. Sloan, 2001, Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock 
returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=172060. 
Stickel, S., 1992, Reputation and performance among security analysts, Journal of Finance 
47, 1811-1836. 
Stickel, S., 1995, The anatomy of the performance of buy and sell recommendations, 
Financial Analysts Journal September/October, 25-39. 
Teoh, S.H. and T.J. Wong, 1997, Analysts’ credulity about reported earnings and 
overoptimism in new equity issues, SSRN Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=8529. 
Trueman, B., 1994, Analyst forecasts and herding behavior, Review of Financial Studies 7, 
97-124. 
Yermack, D., 1997, Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news 
announcements, Journal of Finance 52, 449-476. 
Vial, T., 2002, Les analystes méritent-ils leur salaire?, Bilan January, 39-40. 
Womack, K.L., 1996, Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value ?, 
Journal of Finance 51, 137-167. 
 136
Welch, I., 2000, Herding among security analysts, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 369-
396. 
White, H., 1980, A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838. 
Zimmermann, J. and I. Gontcharov, Do accounting standards influence the level of earnings 
management?, SSRN Working paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=386521. 
 
